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Few officials can so affect the lives of others as can prosecutors.
Yet few operate in a vacuum so devoid of externally enforceable constraints.1 Indeed, contemporary efforts to constrain the discretion of actors in the criminal justice system have not only bypassed the prosecutor,2 they have tended to expand her power by squeezing the system's
seemingly insoluble bubble of discretion her way.'
The courts are the most important, and in many instances the
t Professor of Law, New York University. B.A. 1973, Vassar College; J.D. 1976,
Stanford University. I would like to express my deep appreciation for the
extraordinarily generous contributions of my colleagues and friends, Anthony G.
Amsterdam, William E. Nelson, and John E. Sexton. I am also appreciative of the
support of the Fibmen D'Agostino Greenberg and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at New York University Law School.
1 See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
188-214 (1969) (discussing the lack of externally enforceable constraints).
2 Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1521-22 (1981) (noting recent trends limiting the discretion of the police, magistrates,
sentencing judges, parole boards, and correctional officials, but not prosecutors).
3 For example, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553
(Supp. 111 1985), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (Supp. II 1985), requires the United States
Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines to confine the sentencing discretion of
judges. The likely result of this current federal effort will be to attach increased importance to the prosecutor's charging decision.
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only, check on prosecutorial misbehavior; and the Constitution is a major source of judicial authority over prosecutorial practices. Surprisingly, however, there has been virtually no systematic examination of
the manner in which courts enforce the constitutional proscriptions that
circumscribe the prosecutor's considerable power. Instead, courts and
commentators have tended to view various prosecutorial abuses as discrete problems to be analyzed and resolved on an atomistic basis.
This Article attempts a systematic examination of the way constitutional principles are utilized to constrain prosecutorial activities. It
does so by exploring an array of prosecutorial practices that are subject
to constitutional regulation: (1) selective prosecution; (2) prosecutorial
vindictiveness in charging; (3) prosecutorial abuse and misuse of the
grand jury; (4) the prosecutor's duty to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence; (5) the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges in selecting a petit jury; and (6) the double jeopardy bar to
retrying a defendant whose first trial was aborted because of an error
by the prosecutor.
These areas are particularly relevant for several reasons. First, unlike issues involving confessions or searches and seizures in which the
governmental actions at issue are apt to be those of the police or other
investigatory law enforcement personnel, claims made in the enumerated areas will almost always involve allegations of misbehavior on the
part of the prosecutor. Second, the six areas cover a fairly broad spectrum of prosecutorial activity, including pre-indictment behavior, behavior in the grand jury, post-indictment/pre-trial behavior, and
prosecutorial behavior at various stages of the trial. Finally, the chosen
areas implicate a variety of substantive constitutional guarantees-due
process, 4 equal protection, 5 and double jeopardy'-thereby allowing an
examination not tied to any particular constitutional provision.
Where a criminal defendant challenges a prosecutorial action as
unconstitutional, the courts tend to factor the prosecutor's intent into
the calculus for deciding the constitutional claim. This tendency is not
the result of any overarching theory concerning the role of intent in the
constitutional regulation of prosecutorial conduct-at least not one that
has been articulated by the courts. Instead, it is the description of a
4 "No person shall ...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
I "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Although the fifth amendment, unlike the
fourteenth, does not contain an equal protection clause, it does contain an equal protection component. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
" "No person shall. . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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thread that weaves through a group of constitutional claims that the
courts have treated as discrete, unrelated problems. Yet even within
these individual problem areas, the courts have not meaningfully explored whether and why the prosecutor's intent ought or ought not to
be part of the analysis of the defendant's constitutional claim. Reliance
upon prosecutorial intent has been not only unsystematic, but largely
unreflective.
These qualities do not, of course, render such reliance wrong.
Courts often reach the right destination without taking law reviewish
detours to get there. A preference for intent-based analysis might prove
justified on several grounds. These include: (1) the fairness, consistency
and predictability of the results reached under it; (2) systemic considerations relating to the administration of criminal justice; and (3) the fact
that doctrinally sound, administrable schemes that do not turn on the
prosecutor's intent-for example, those which utilize bright line rules
or which focus principally on the harm caused by the challenged
prosecutorial behavior-are simply not available. In Section I, the examination of the six areas yields two conclusions: first, that the pervasive determinant of the constitutionality of a prosecutorial action is not
the objective circumstances surrounding it but the prosecutor's intent in
taking it; and second, that this focus on intent divests the system of
7
consistency and predictability.
Section II then explores the systemic costs of this preference for
intent-based analysis and finds that these costs are substantial. Section
III examines whether, despite these costs, the preference can be justified because it serves important systemic values relating to the administration of criminal justice, and concludes that it cannot. Thus, the use
of intent-based analysis in any particular area must be justified rather
than assumed.
Section IV returns to the six areas explored in Section I and examines, in a preliminary way, the residual justifications for employing
7 The concept of "prosecutorial intent" is used here in its broadest and least technical sense. It encompasses the thoughts, motivations and purposes behind an individual
prosecutor's actions in a particular case, as well as any office policies and strategies that
affect the prosecutor's handling of a criminal matter. Furthermore, this Article makes
no meaningful distinctions between the concepts of "motive" and "purpose," and those
terms are used interchangeably. Indeed, some commentators have questioned whether,
for purposes of constitutional analysis, there are any meaningful distinctions between
the two concepts. See, e.g., Clark, Legislative Motivation and FundamentalRights in
ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 953, 955-63 (1978) (analyzing "motive"
and "purpose" and concluding that they are functionally indistinguishable); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205,
1217-21 (1970) (arguing that any distinction between "motive" and "purpose"
grounded upon political expediency, the immediacy of legislative aims, or ascertainability will be of negligible assistance to the court).
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intent-based analysis to govern constitutional challenges to prosecutorial
behavior in each of those six areas. Where intent-based analysis appears to be warranted, Section IV examines the feasibility of using objectifying presumptions to require the prosecutor to justify the challenged action.
I.

THE PERVASIVE PREFERENCE FOR INTENT-BASED ANALYSIS

0 body swayed to music, 0 brighteningglance
How can we know the dancerfrom the dance?
-W.B. Yeats, Among School Children8
By the dancer's thoughts, so it seems, at least where the dancer is
a prosecutor and the dance is a prosecution.
In this Section, the review and analysis of doctrine demonstrates
that consistency and predictability-the first justification-are not the
hallmarks of those areas that place primacy on prosecutorial intent. Indeed, to the contrary, those areas seem prone to yield ad hoc and confused results; and ad hoc and confused results can hardly be said to be
fair. Moreover, in at least one of those areas, the double jeopardy bar
after a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct, the emphasis on
prosecutorial intent itself seems unfair.
A.

Selective Prosecution

1. The Nature and Source of the Proscription
Ordinarily, "so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."' Thus, a
defendant normally has no right to have a prosecutor's charging decision reviewed."0 When, however, the charge brought is unusual, either
8 W.B. YEATS,

Among School Children, in

THE VARIORUM EDITION OF THE

POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 446 (P. Allt ed. 1957).
9 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (citation omitted).
'0 The barriers to judicial review of the decision whether and whom to prosecute
fall into three categories. The first category encompasses objections to the judiciary's
competence to review the executive branch's discretionary law enforcement decisions
and is largely derived from the separation of powers doctrine. Briefly, this doctrine
holds that the authority to decide how best to enforce the laws is appropriately, and in
the federal system constitutionally, vested in the executive, and that the courts must
afford the executive due leeway in exercising this authority. See Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (stating that the decision to prosecute is ill-suited to

1987]

PROSECUTORIAL INTENT

1369

because other known violators have not been prosecuted or because the
violated statute is rarely enforced, a defendant may seek to have the
prosecutor's exercise of charging discretion closely examined.
A claim of selective prosecution attacks not the merits of the prosecutor's case against the defendant, but the fact that the prosecutor has
chosen to proceed against her while declining to bring similar criminal
charges against others who appear to be equally culpable and apprehensible. 1 In effect, a defendant's selective prosecution challenge says
to the prosecutor, "You have singled me out. Why?" Selective prosecution claims thus have an equal protection ring to them. They do, howjudicial review); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481-482 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(stating that courts do not have jurisdiction to review prosecutor's discretionary decisions). The judiciary's authority to review charging decisions is constrained on one side
by its lack of competence to disapprove affirmative decisions to prosecute, which stems
from the judiciary's inability to evaluate such factors as the allocation of scarce law
enforcement resources, the adequacy of various law enforcement agencies, and the demands of the public, and is hemmed in on the other side by the judiciary's lack of
power to compel the executive to prosecute where it has decided not to. See Inmates of
Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380-82 (2d. Cir. 1973) (stating that the absence of statutory standards defeats judicial review of prosecutorial discretion); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir.) (stating that the power
to prosecute is discretionary and may depend on matters other than probable cause),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
The second category of impediments to judicial review comprises the various barriers to full enforcement of the criminal laws. These barriers include the lack of adequate
prosecutorial resources, a surfeit of broad or ambiguous laws that render a wide spectrum of behavior subject to prosecution, and the fact that some laws, such as those
dealing with sexual mores, for example, are adopted mainly to express a moral posture
and with the expectation that they will not be enforced. See Comment, Curbing the
Prosecutor'sDiscretion:United States v. Falk, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R1v. 372, 37374 (1974). These barriers to full enforcement effectively make selective enforcement an
element of virtually every prosecution. Consequently, the argument goes, the courts
have no business in making this necessary fact of the legal system's life an issue in some
cases but not in others.
The final category of hurdles to judicial review contains the practical objections to
its consequences. Another defense is added. Another proceeding, a hearing to explore
the defendant's allegations, is necessary. See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 637
(7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Pell, J., dissenting). Another clearly guilty defendant goes
free. These consequences may be especially troubling if the selective prosecution defense
is as available in prosecutions for serious crimes as it is in prosecutions for minor infractions. See People v. Zammora, 66 Cal. App. 2d 166, 236, 152 P.2d 180, 216 (1944)
(discussing claim of discriminatory prosecution raised by a defendant charged with
murder); Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal
Laws, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1111 (1961) ("[T]here seems to be no basis for distinguishing between heinous and harmless criminal conduct, because discriminatory enforcement in either situation constitutes unequal treatment."). But cf. United States v.
Banks, 368 F. Supp. 1245, 1251-52 (D.S.D. 1973) (arguing that the presumption of
prosecutorial regularity is enhanced when the crime is serious).
I' It has been argued that the doctrine of selective enforcement is unsound in theory, misguided in policy, and self-defeating in practice. See Cardinale & Feldman, The
Federal Courts and the Right to Nondiscriminatory Administration of the Criminal
Law: A Critical View, 29 SYRAcusE L. REv. 659, 660 (1978).
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ever, also implicate other constitutional guarantees, including due
process and, in some cases, the first amendment.1" Nevertheless, the
analysis of selective prosecution claims takes place largely within an
equal protection framework."'
2.

How the Proscription Is Enforced

Under current law, a defendant raising a selective prosecution
claim must show two things: first, that she was in fact singled out by
the prosecutor and second, that the prosecutor acted with an improper
purpose in singling her out."' As the Second Circuit explained in its
16
widely followed15 formulation in United States v. Berrios:
To support a defense of selective or disciminatory [sic]
prosecution, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least primafacie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of
conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against
him, he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the
government's discriminatory selection of him for prosecution
has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to
11 "Congress shall pass no law ...
abridging freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
13 See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
14 A defendant bears the burden of proof, that is, both the burden of going forward with evidence and the burden of persuasion, on both of these elements. United
States v. Jennings: 724 F.2d 436, 445 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1227 (1984);
United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978); People v. Walker, 14
N.Y.2d 901, 904 n.*, 200 N.E.2d 779, 781 n.*, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96, 99 n.* (1964)
(Burke, J., dissenting); Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 11, at 676. This is because
"[t]he presumption is always that a prosecution for violation of a criminal law is undertaken in good faith and in [a] nondiscriminatory fashion for the purpose of fulfilling a
duty to bring violators to justice." Falk, 479 F.2d at 620. Once a defendant presents a
prima fade case of selective prosecution, however, the burden of going forward with
some proof of nondiscrimination devolves to the prosecutor. See id. at 621. Some courts
have even suggested that the burden of proof as well as the burden of production shifts
to the prosecutor once the defendant has made out a prima facie case. See United States
v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1078 (4th Cir. 1972); cf. Chance v. Board of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972) (putting burden on school board to prove nondiscriminatory nature of its employment tests).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1289-90 (8th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1234, (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 47475 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1135 (1st Cir. 1981);
United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1017
(1978); United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 426
U.S. 952 (1976).
6 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
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prevent his exercise of constitutional rights."7
The first prong of the Berrios test is reasonably straightforward,
although it is not without its ambiguities"8 or difficulties of proof. 9 A
defendant will usually attempt to show that she has been singled out by
presenting statistical evidence of the infrequency with which others
similarly situated have been prosecuted.20 Although a number of selec17 Id. at 1211. This formulation, while encompassing a broader range of selective
prosecution claims, is consistent with the Court's recent observation that where a
prosecutorial policy is challenged on the basis of selective prosecution, a defendant must
show "both that the [policy] had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (citation omitted).
s For example, it is not clear whether this prong requires that a defendant prove
(1) only that other violators were not prosecuted, (2) that other violators were not prosecuted and that the government was generally aware that there were other violators
who were not being prosecuted, or (3) that other violators were not prosecuted and that
the government knew of other specific violators who were not being prosecuted. See
Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement in the FirstAmendment Context, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 144, 146 (1984). Compare Hazel, 696 F.2d at 475 (allegation that 34 other
violators were not prosecuted was arguably sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing
on the defense) (dicta) and United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.
1983), affd, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (evidence that an estimated 500,000 violators were
not prosecuted was sufficient to meet first prong of test) with Berrios, 501 F.2d at
1211-12 (allegation that other violators existed without identifying any specific individuals was not sufficient to meet first prong of test).
19 First, simply gathering information concerning the extent to which similarly
situated offenders have or have not been prosecuted is an inherently difficult task. See
Applegate, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Discriminationin the Decision to Charge, 55
TEMP. L.Q. 35, 78-85 (1982); cf. Note, Defense Access to Evidence of Discriminatory
Prosecution, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 648, 661-62 (proposing that the court compel the prosecutor to provide the defendant with statistics relating to selective enforcement).
Second, the defendant must prove that the nonprosecuted offenders were in fact
"similarly situated." In effect, this means that the defendant must prove: (1) that the
nonprosecuted offenders engaged in essentially the same act as the defendant, see
United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant's assertion
that others "employ" illegal aliens is not equivalent to assertion that others "shield"
aliens and thus no basis for selective prosecution exists), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063
(1978); (2) as a result of which they violated the same statutes that the defendant is
charged with violating, see United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 571 (3d Cir.)
(failure to allege that others had violated the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976) was
fatal to selective prosecution claim), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979); cf. Wheaton v.
Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1148-49 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (practice of arresting those with
marijuana and not those with alcohol did not violate equal protection clause since each
is regulated under different statutes); and (3) that the magnitude of the nonprosecuted
offenders' violations was not materially different from that of the defendant, see Cook v.
City of Price, 566 F.2d 699, 701-02 (10th Cir. 1977) (since alleged zoning violations
were not of the same magnitude as those attributable to the defendant, there was good
reason for the unequal application of the ordinance).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1984) (en
banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1387-88; United States
v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); United
States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Falk, 472 F.2d
1101, 1106, rev'd, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Carson,
434 F. Supp. 806, 809 (D. Conn. 1977).
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tive prosecution claims have foundered on the first prong of the Berrios
test, especially those relying on small numbers of nonprosecuted offenders,2 1 the focus of most selective prosecution claims has been the second
prong of the test: the motivations behind the prosecutor's decision to
bring the charges against the defendant.
There are effectively three impermissible bases for prosecutorial
selectivity, that is, three factors that may not motivate a prosecutor to
proceed against a particular defendant: (1) race, religion, or other suspect classification;2 2 (2) a desire to impede the exercise of constitutional,
usually first amendment, rights;" and (3) personal animosity towards
the defendant.2 4 To satisfy the intent prong of the Berrios test and succeed on a claim of selective prosecution, a defendant must prove that
one of these factors was instrumental in the prosecutor's decision to
25
proceed against her.
21 See, e.g., United States Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 691 (7th Cir.
1980) ("The isolated incident of another group [violating the statute] is too insignificant
and isolated to raise an equal protection claim."); United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257,
264-65 (5th Cir. 1977) (insufficient evidence of others not prosecuted), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1017 (1978); United States v. Bourque, 541 F.2d 290, 292-93 (1st Cir. 1976)
(same); United States v. Banks, 368 F. Supp. 1245, 1251-52 (D.S.D. 1973) (same);
State v. Holloway, 460 A.2d 976, 979 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) ("a showing of as few as
two or three other prosecutions will negate the assertion that defendant has been singed out for prosecution").
22 See, e.g., United States v. Cammisano, 546 F.2d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1976) (Italian defendant); United States v. Alleyne, 454 F. Supp. 1164, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(black defendant); State v. Bird Head, 204 Neb. 807, 813-14, 285 N.W.2d 698, 701
(1979) (American Indian defendant).
1 See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610-14 (first amendment rights); Eklund, 733
F.2d at 1291 (same); Falk, 479 F.2d at 619-20 (same); United States v. Steele, 461
F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074,
1079 (4th Cir. 1972) (same).
" See, e.g., United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1273-76 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Bourque, 541 F.2d at 292-93.
25 The degree to which the decision to prosecute must be motivated by an impermissible factor is unclear. In Wayte, for example, the Court simply observed that the
defendant had to prove that the prosecutor was "motivated by" a discriminatory purpose. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608. Prior to Wayte, most courts repeated, without elaboration, the Berrios requirement that the prosecution must be "based upon" an impermissible consideration in order to make out a claim of selective prosecution. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473, 474 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Ness, 652
F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981); United States v. Catlett,
584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978). Because of the imprecision of such formulations as
"motivated by" and "based upon," it is uncertain whether the impermissible basis must
be: (1) the sole or dominant factor in the charging decision; (2) a lesser "but for" cause
of the prosecutor's selection of the defendant; or (3) only one of a number of reasons,
however insignificant, for the prosecutor's decision. Cf Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (holding that plaintiff
need not show that challenged action was dominant purpose and including list of evidentiary factors relevant to intent determination); Mount Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977) (holding once initial burden is met,
defendant can show by preponderance that same result would have been reached even
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Ironically, the very concern with impermissibly motivated prosecutions that prompts the examination of ordinarily unreviewable charging
decisions also disables most selective prosecution claims from succeeding, which they almost never do. Because of the myriad of factors
that could affect a prosecutor's decision to bring charges, including the
strength of the evidence, the culpability of the offender, and the need to
send out various enforcement signals, courts are generally unwilling to
infer a discriminatory intent from nonenforcement statistics alone." Yet
it is usually difficult to get evidence of discriminatory intent beyond
such statistics. Prosecutors do not have to explain their decision to bring
or refrain from bringing charges and many prosecution offices lack
even general guidelines governing charging decisions.17 Consequently,
there is usually little in the way of documented administrative decisionmaking for a defendant to utilize. What evidence exists is generally
within the prosecutor's control. Yet because of the intrusive nature of
the discovery necessary to prove an impermissible discriminatory intent,
which may require the examination of the prosecutor under oath,2 the
discovery of internal documents concerning a prosecution,2 9 or the disclosure of confidential law enforcement information,"0 courts are reluctant to allow the discovery that is usually necessary to prove the prohibited intent. A defendant seeking to raise a selective prosecution claim
is thus placed in a Catch-22 type bind. She cannot obtain discovery
unless she first makes a threshold showing (the required strength of
which remains unclear)3 ' of selective prosecution, including the dishad the impermissible purpose not been considered).
26 See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2 (1984); Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor'sCharging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal,
49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 693 (1981).
17 See Abrams, InternalPolicy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion,
19 UCLA L. REv. 1, 8 (1971) (discussing the paucity of prosecutorial standards in
most prosecution offices).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1017 (1978); United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1975).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 180-82 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Falk, 479
F.2d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
30 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
31 Various courts have stated the required showing as the need for the defendant
to raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's purpose, see United States v. Hayes,
589 F.2d 811, 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979), "to take the question
past the frivolous stage," United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978), to
establish a "colorable" basis for the claim, United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564,
570 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979), or to establish a prima facie case, see
United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978). See Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 623-24 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reviewing cases).
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criminatory intent component of the claim.3 2 Yet making a sufficient
preliminary showing of discriminatory intent may be impossible without some discovery.
Moreover, even where a defendant obtains access to evidence concerning the prosecutor's decision to prosecute, it will often be difficult
to determine whether that decision was impermissibly motivated. This
is so both because of the host of reasons why prosecutors legitimately
might choose to prosecute a particular defendant, 3 as well as the prospect that more than one actor was involved in the decision to prosecute." This lack of predictability is amply illustrated by recent decisions evaluating the constitutionality of the government's "passive
enforcement" policy for selecting individuals for prosecution for failing
to register for the draft. Several courts evaluating this same prosecution
policy reached conflicting conclusions as to whether it was intentionally
discriminatory. 5
B.

Vindictiveness in Charging

1. The Nature and Source of the Proscription
Allied to, but distinct from, the question of selective prosecution is
the issue of prosecutorial "vindictiveness" in charging, a due process
concern. 8 The question of vindictiveness arises when the prosecution
increases the number or severity of the charges against a defendant
from those initially contemplated or filed after the defendant takes some
action that the prosecutor disfavors or opposes.37 Because there is usu32 See, e.g., Johnson, 577 F.2d at 1309; United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 54
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976); United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13,
15 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993 (1975).
38See infra notes 386-389, 397 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
85 Compare United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983) (intentionally discriminatory), vacated, 471 U.S. 1001 (1985) and United States v. Wayte,
549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal.) (same), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1982), affd,
470 U.S. 598 (1985) with United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1982) (not
intentionally discriminatory), affid, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) and United States v. Eklund,
733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
31See United States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d 751, 758 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1090 (1984); United States v. Eddy, 737 F.2d 564, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1984); Note,
Two Models of ProsecutorialVindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REv. 467, 471 n.26 (1983).
37 Like claims of selective prosecution, claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness are
typically raised prior to trial on the challenged charges. In the federal courts, a refusal
to dismiss charges on the grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness is not a collateral order
subject to interlocutory review, so appellate review of an unsuccessful vindictiveness
motion must await the final judgment on the contested charges. See United States v.
Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92 (1982
& Supp. III 1985).
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ally a sufficient factual basis to support the increased charges, the vindictiveness doctrine is concerned with delineating the circumstances in
which increased charges may not be brought in a pending case despite
the existence of otherwise sufficient grounds for them.
By its very moniker, the doctrine of prosecutorial "vindictiveness"
purports to be concerned with the prosecutor's state of mind; more specifically, with preventing the prosecutor from retaliating against a defendant for exercising the rights that are her due. The ban on "vindictiveness" has, however, also been variously impressed to serve a second
interest. Often discussed in terms of "perceived" vindictiveness or a
"presumption" of vindictiveness, it has been invoked to prevent a defendant from being "chilled" in the exercise of certain rights because of
the likelihood that the defendant will apprehend a prosecutorial motive
and capacity to retaliate in the event those rights are exercised.
The Court's earliest vindictiveness cases recognized the nature and
38
validity of both of these interests. In North Carolina v. Pearce,
where the Court introduced the concept of vindictiveness, the defendant,
who had succeeded in getting his conviction reversed on appeal, received a harsher sentence after being reconvicted on retrial. The Court
held that while the Constitution does not absolutely bar a higher sentence after an appeal, 9 due process prohibits increasing a sentence on
retrial because of judicial "vindictiveness against a defendant for having
successfully attacked his first conviction." 4 The Court's concern, however, went beyond judicial retaliation in fact, that is, beyond "actual
vindictiveness." Worried that "the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or
collaterally attack his first conviction,"" 1 the Court further held that
"due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of
such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge,""' and
elaborated procedures to ensure that defendants would not be chilled
from exercising their appellate remedies because of such
apprehension.' 3
s 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
3, The Court found that neither the double jeopardy, equal protection, nor due
process clauses prohibited all increased sentences upon reconviction after a successful
appeal. See id. at 719-25.
40 Id. at 725.
41 Id.
42

Id.

The Court prescribed a prophylactic rule that requires a judge who increases
the severity of a sentence after a retrial to state affirmatively her reasons for doing so.
"Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
proceeding." Id. at 726. It is now settled that among the types of postsentencing con43
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The prohibition on vindictive behavior was extended to prosecutors in Blackledge v. Perry," where the Court condemned a prosecutor's institution of a felony charge in response to the defendant's exercise of his statutory right to a trial de novo after being convicted of the
misdemeanor charge originally filed against him. The Court held that
the due process principles first announced in Pearce4 required a reversal of the felony conviction 46 even though there was "no evidence that
the prosecutor in [the] case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking
a felony indictment against Perry.""' Reiterating that "Pearce. . . was
not grounded upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivation
must inevitably exist,' the Court reasoned that reversal of Perry's felony conviction was required because:
A prosecutor clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and thus obtaining a trial de novo in the Superior Court, since such an
appeal will clearly require increased expenditures of
prosecutorial resources before the defendant's conviction becomes final, and may even result in a formerly convicted defendant's going free. And, if the prosecutor has the means
readily at hand to discourage such appeals-by "upping the
ante" through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misduct that may justify an increased sentence after a retrial are convictions for crimes
pending at the time of the first sentencing. See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,
571-72 (1984).
44 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
"' Subsequent to Pearce and prior to Blackledge, the Court handed down two
other decisions dealing with "vindictiveness" in the sentencing context. The first,
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), concerned a challenge to Kentucky's two-tier
system of criminal adjudication which, like the North Carolina system involved in
Blackledge, allowed a misdemeanor defendant convicted in an inferior trial court to
seek a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. Colten claimed that the Constitution prohibited the court of general jurisdiction from imposing a sentence greater than
that imposed by the court in the original trial. The Court rejected this claim, finding an
insufficient likelihood of judicial vindictiveness to discourage the assertion of the right
to a de novo trial because the second sentence was imposed by a different judicial authority. See id. at 116-17.
The second case, Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), upheld a higher
sentence imposed by a jury after a conviction on retrial. The Court found that the
higher sentence could not be the product of actual vindictiveness where the jury was
unaware of the length of the sentence imposed at the original trial and therefore could
not be retaliating for the earlier result. The Court also reasoned that, unlike a judge
who is reversed on appeal, the jury does not have a stake in the prior conviction or a
motivation to discourage criminal defendants from seeking appellate review. See id. at
27. 41 The
defendant pleaded guilty to the new felony
charge. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at
23.
47 Id. at 28.
48

Id.
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demeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy-the State
can insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave
49
the hazards of a de novo trial.
Pearce and Blackledge thus seemed to establish that the prohibition on governmental vindictiveness has two aspects. First, it is unconstitutional for a judge or prosecutor to subject a defendant to greater
punishment in retaliation for her exercise of a legal right, that is, to act
out of actual vindictiveness. Second, the Constitution also condemns
certain judicial and prosecutorial actions that are not in fact retaliatory
or motivated by actual vindictiveness. Because the judicial or
prosecutorial interests at stake could reasonably cause an observer to
perceive that the judge or prosecutor was wrongly motivated, similarly
situated defendants would be deterred from exercising the particular
right at issue.50
Id. at 27-28.
"The precise formulation of the "perceived vindictiveness" prong of Pearce and
Blackledge has caused considerable confusion in the lower courts. See generally Note,
49

Evaluating ProsecutorialVindictiveness Claims in Non-Plea Bargained Cases, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1143-46 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Evaluating ProsecutorialVindictiveness Claims] (describing recurring problems with the purpose of the rule against
prosecutorial vindictiveness, the nature of vindictive charges, and the definition of adequate justification for increased charges); Note, ProsecutorialVindictiveness: An Ex-

amination of Divergent Lower Court Standards and a Proposed Framework for
Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REiv. 431, 442-450 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Divergent Lower
"Court Standards] (the differences among the courts relate to whether a defendant must
show the appearance of vindictiveness, actual vindictiveness, or some intermediate standard of prosecutorial culpability). The disagreement centers on the precise showing a
defendant must make in order for a "presumption" of vindictiveness to arise from the
prosecutors actions. At one end of the spectrum, the D.C. Circuit, see United States v.
Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 415-16 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Fourth Circuit, see United States
v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 368 (1982), and the
Ninth Circuit, see United States v. Spiesz, 689 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d
1342, 1347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980), have held that the defendant's
demonstration of facts giving rise to the appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness is all
that is required to create a presumption of vindictive motive. In the Sixth Circuit, the
"mere appearance" of vindictiveness is not sufficient to trigger a presumption of vindictiveness. Instead, the defendant must show that, judged from the standpoint of a reasonable person, there was a "realistic likelihood" that the prosecutor acted vindictively. See
United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 927 (1981). The Fifth Circuit, after wavering between requiring a showing of
actual vindictiveness, see Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 302 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978), or some lesser showing pegged to the prosecutorial
interests at stake, see United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d 436, 438 n.1 (5th Cir.) (stating that the circuit employed a balancing test in this area), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980); Miracle v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1269, 1276 (5th Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Walker,
585 F.2d 139, 146, 148 (5th Cir. 1978), has finally decided that a presumption of
vindictiveness arises only if "the course of events provides no objective indication that
would allay a reasonable apprehension by the defendant that the more serious charge
was vindictive," United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1365 (5th Cir. 1983) (en
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How the Proscription Is Enforced

Unfortunately, decisions subsequent to Blackledge have been so
inconsistent in their recognition and advancement of these two interests
that enforcement of the proscription on vindictiveness has been utterly
confused. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,51 for example, Hayes was'initially indicted for uttering a forged instrument, a felony that carried a
maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment.5 2 The prosecutor offered
to recommend a five-year sentence if he would plead guilty, but
threatened to seek an indictment under Kentucky's habitual offender
statute, which carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, if
Hayes did not plead guilty and "save the court the inconvenience and
necessity of a trial."" Hayes declined the prosecutor's plea offer and,
true to his word, the prosecutor obtained another indictment charging
Hayes as an habitual offender. After a trial, Hayes was convicted on
the uttering charge, found to be a habitual offender, and sentenced to
life imprisonment.
In habeas corpus, Hayes claimed that the prosecutor's actions violated the principles of Pearce and Blackledge; the Sixth Circuit
agreed. The Supreme Court, however, did not. Despite the fact that
the prosecutor possessed the evidence necessary to indict Hayes as a
habitual offender at the time he procured the initial indictment charging only uttering,5 5 and despite the prosecutor's express admission that
he obtained the habitual offender indictment precisely because Hayes
insisted on his right to trial 5 -in short, despite a crystal clear case of
actual prosecutorial vindictiveness-the Court held that Hayes had not
been denied due process.
The reason the Court found no actual vindictiveness in the prosecutor's blatant retaliation was that it took place in the course of pleabargaining. In the Court's eyes, "in the 'give and take' of plea-bargainbanc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984).
This confusion over the nature of the showing required to trigger a "presumption"
of vindictiveness was a product not only of uncertainty over the strength of the interest
in preventing perceived vindictiveness, but also of a basic analytical flaw common in
these decisions: the failure to specify the ultimate fact to which the "presumption" was
addressed. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
51 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
52 Id. at 358.

5 Id.
" See Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). The district court had rejected Hayes'
petition in an unreported decision. 434 U.S. at 360 n.4.
55 434 U.S. at 359.
1 Id. at 358 n.1; see also id. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 370-73
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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ing, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the
accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." 57 Underlying
this view of plea-bargaining, which is predicated on the assumption
that "the prosecution and defense. . arguably possess relatively equal
bargaining power," ' was an apparent concern that disabling the prosecutor from credibly threatening to bring more serious charges would
potentially undermine the entire plea-bargaining process, 59 upon which
the Court had recently conferred its constitutional blessing."0 However
sound the logic of refusing to find actual vindictiveness where a prosecutor increases charges in response to a defendant's recalcitrance during
plea negotiations," that portion of Bordenkircher at least had the virtue of clarity of application. 2
On the other hand, language in the case seemed to eviscerate the
second Pearce-Blackledgeprinciple while reinterpreting those cases to
be almost exclusively concerned with actual rather than perceived vindictiveness. As the Court saw it, "the due process violation in cases
such as Pearce and [Blackledge] lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, . . . but rather
in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for
lawfully attacking his conviction."6 Unlike in the plea-bargaining context, the lower courts responded to these conflicting signals concerning
the extent to which the Constitution prohibited reasonably perceived
Id. at 363.
58 Id. at 362 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Bren57

nan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting)).
89 See id. at 361-62; United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378 n.10 (1982).
60 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
61 A more persuasive rationale for the decision might be that, unlike other in-

stances of prosecutorial vindictiveness, the tactic approved in Bordenkircher actually
advantages some defendants. Under this view, the imposition of a "penalty" on defendants who do not plead is necessary to preserve the benefit obtained by others who do.
See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 378-80 (holding prosecutor may abandon charges in pleabargaining to the benefit of the defendant); cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521,
526-30 (1972) (stating right to a speedy trial is not imposed rigidly because delay is not
always prejudicial to defendants).
6'2See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. North, 746 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058
(1985); United States v. Mauricio, 685 F.2d 143, 145-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1074 (1982); United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981); Martin v. Blackburn, 606 F.2d 92, 94 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 911 (1980); United States v. Litton Sys. Inc., 573
F.2d 195, 198-200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978); United States v. Allsup, 573 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961 (1978); Montgomery v.
Estelle, 568 F.2d 457, 457-58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978).
63 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (citation omitted).
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prosecutorial vindictiveness with predictable confusion, 4 usually under
the rubric of attempting to determine whether a "presumption of vindictiveness" was warranted in the particular situation under review.
There were three levels to this confusion. First, there was uncertainty whether anything other than a showing of actual vindictiveness
would suffice to make out a due process violation.15 Second, although
most courts assumed that the Constitution still prohibited at least some
instances of reasonably perceived vindictiveness, there was disarray as
to the showing required for a defendant to make out a due process
violation without proving actual vindictiveness. 6 This confusion was
compounded by the propensity of courts to discuss the question in terms
of the showing required to give rise to a "presumption" of vindictiveness without specifying whether the ultimate fact to which the presumption was addressed was actual vindictiveness, the likelihood of vindictiveness, the justifiability of the perception of vindictiveness, or
something else. As a result, courts that asserted in one breath that the
vindictiveness doctrine was designed to stop not only actual vindictiveness but also "to prevent a chilling of the exercise of rights by other
defendants in the future, 61 7 in the next breath formulated the "presumption" of vindictiveness so that the ultimate fact in issue was the
prosecutor's actual vindictiveness, 6 leaving the scope of the doctrine a
6
See, e.g., United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1368 (5th Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("After Bordenkircher,the prosecutorial vindictiveness
doctrine was in disarray."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984); Mauricio, 685 F.2d at
147 (no presumption of vindictiveness where prosecutor's charging decision arose from
formal negotiations, through an intermediary, with defense counsel); Andrews, 633
F.2d at 455 (absent factual situation that poses realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, the
mere apprehension of vindictiveness is insufficient to trigger sanctions); Note, supra
note 36, at 477-78 (stating that some lower courts determined that due process provides
varying degrees of protection depending on the circumstances); Note, Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness in the Criminal Appellate Process: Due ProcessProtection After United
States v. Goodwin, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 194, 201-207 (1982) (stating that several circuits
avoided a perceived vindictiveness test and an actual vindictiveness test by employing a
balancing test).
5 See United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d 436, 438 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 841 (1980); Note, Divergent Lower Court Standards,supra note 50, at 448
(indicating that the Fifth Circuit will employ an actual vindictiveness standard).
" See supra note 50.
17 United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1981).
68 In Motley, for example, the Ninth Circuit, implying that the ultimate fact in
issue was actual vindictiveness, observed:
If the government increases the severity of the charges following a defendant's exercise of a procedural right, the sequence of events gives rise to an
appearance of vindictiveness, shifting the burden to the government to
prove that the decision to re-indict with more severe charges did not result
from any vindictive motive.
Motley, 655 F.2d at 188 n.1; accord United States v. Spiesz, 689 F.2d 1326, 1328 (9th
Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980) (en
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mystery. Finally, there was disagreement as to the stage of proceedings
at which a "presumption" of prosecutorial vindictiveness might arise.
While some courts, interpreting Bordenkircher to apply not just to
plea-bargaining but to all pre-trial charging actions, limited the availability of the presumption to claims based on post-trial prosecutorial behavior,6" others allowed for the possibility of the presumption based on
pre-trial as well as post-trial prosecutorial conduct."0
The Court attempted to resolve the last of these issues in United
States v. Goodwin. 1 Goodwin was initially charged with several misdemeanors, including assault, growing out of an incident in which he
used his car to knock down and flee from a police officer who had
stopped him for speeding and then had indicated that he believed
Goodwin might have drugs in his car. Goodwin was arrested and arraigned, but he absconded before trial and was not taken into custody
for three years. When he was returned to stand trial on the misdemeanor charges, Goodwin's case was given to a Justice Department
attorney who was assigned to try petty crimes and misdemeanors before
a magistrate, but who had no authority to try felony cases or seek indictments from the grand jury. 2 Although Goodwin initiated plea negotiations with that prosecutor, he ultimately decided not to plead
guilty and insisted on his right to a jury trial. Because the magistrate
had no statutory authority to try jury cases, Goodwin's file was transferred to the district court and responsibility for his prosecution was
given to an Assistant United States Attorney. After reviewing the case,
that prosecutor obtained a four-count indictment charging Goodwin
with the felony of forcibly assaulting a federal officer as well as three
misdemeanors. After a jury convicted him of the felony and one misdemeanor, Goodwin moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds of
prosecutorial vindictiveness. Responding to this motion, the prosecutor
submitted an affidavit detailing his nonvindictive reasons for obtaining
the indictment. 3
bane) ("Once a court has found the existence of a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness
the burden of disproving it is on the government."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
69 See, e.g., Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 885 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc),
modified on other grounds, 646 F.2d 902 (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 840
(1981); United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 457 (Merritt, J., dissenting); State v.
Stevens, 96 N.M. 627, 630-31, 633 P.2d 1225, 1228-29 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1109 (1982).
70 See, e.g., Andrews, 633 F.2d at 456 ("Bordenkirchermust be confined to the
plea-bargaining context in which it arose.").
1

457 U.S. 368 (1982).

The charges against Goodwin were federal because the incident took place on a
Maryland parkway under jurisdiction of the Federal Parks Service and involved a
United States Park Policeman. See id. at 370.
S Those reasons were as follows: (1) he considered Goodwin's conduct to be a
7
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Persuaded by this affidavit, the district court found that "the prosecutor in this case has adequately dispelled any appearance of retaliatory intent,"7' and denied the motion. Although the Fourth Circuit
agreed that "the prosecutor did not act with actual vindictiveness in
seeking a felony indictment, '7 5 it reversed because it found that the
situation gave rise to a "per se violation of the due process clause, absent proof by objective evidence that the increased charges could not
have been brought in the first instance."'7' The Court too found that
there was no evidence of actual vindictiveness 7 but it disagreed that the
situation nevertheless called for a prosecutorial refutation of the claim
of vindictiveness and reinstated Goodwin's conviction.
In doing so, the Court for the first time lapsed into the unfortunate lower court habit of discussing vindictiveness in terms of undefined
presumptions. Without elaborating upon either the nature of the ultimate fact in issue or the relationship of the presumption to that
fact-failings bound to disable resolution of the scope of the vindictiveness doctrine 7 -the Court held that a presumption of vindictiveness
was not warranted under the circumstances in Goodwin. It explained:
"The possibility that a prosecutor would respond to a defendant's pretrial demand for a jury trial by bringing charges not in the public interest that could be explained only as a penalty imposed on the defendant
is so unlikely that a presumption of vindictiveness certainly -is not
'7 9
warranted.
Even taken at face value, the presumption analysis in Goodwin
sheds little light on the nature of the proscription on vindictiveness.
The Court's refusal to allow the presumption rested largely on the
sharp distinction it perceived between pre-trial and post-trial
prosecutorial responsibilities and interests."0 In its review of the differserious violation of the law; (2) Goodwin had a lengthy history of violent crime; (3) the
prosecutor believed that the underlying incident was related to a major narcotics transaction; (4) the prosecutor believed that Goodwin committed perjury at his preliminary
hearing; and (5) Goodwin had failed to appear for trial as originally scheduled. In
addition, the prosecutor stated that his decision to seek a felony indictment was not
motivated in any way by Goodwin's request for a jury trial. Id. at 371 n.2.
74 Id. at 371.
75 United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1981).
71 Id. at 255. The court interpreted Pearce and Blackledge to prohibit the institution of more serious charges after a defendant has invoked her right to a jury trial
unless the prosecutor demonstrates with objective evidence that the increased charges
could not have been brought prior to the defendant's insistence on her rights. Id.
7

See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380-81.

See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
11 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384.
" The Court recognized several bases for this distinction. See infra notes 81-83.
The persuasiveness and even the underlying truth of some of these bases have been
sharply questioned. First, the Court's rejection of an "inflexible presumption of vindic78
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ences between pre- and post-trial charging decisions, however, the
Court was not clear as to the extent to which its skepticism towards
pre-trial vindictiveness claims stemmed from the exigencies of a prosecutor's pre-trial responsibilities,"1 the absence of systemic biases against
the defendant that may arise only after conviction, 2 or the decreased
likelihood that such prosecutorial behavior will, in fact, be vindictively
motivated.83 As a result, the Court was not clear whether a presumption of vindictiveness was always inappropriate where the challenged
charge increase occurred pre-trial, no matter what right the defendant
claims the prosecutor retaliated against, or was only inappropriate
where, as in Goodwin, the defendant claims that the prosecutor's pretrial charge increase was in retaliation for her insistence on her right to
a jury trial rather than some other right, such as a change in venue or
the suppression of unconstitutionally seized evidence.8"
Not only did Goodwin fail to resolve whether a presumption of
tiveness" was based on a concern that the prosecution may uncover new evidence at the
pre-trial stage; but this concern does not mean vindictiveness does not occur at the pretrial stage and new evidence may simply rebut the presumption. Second, the Court
believed that prosecutors were less likely to retaliate at the pre-trial stage since defendants commonly assert their rights at that time, but the Court failed to support this
assumption with empirical evidence. Third, the Court referred to an "institutional
bias" against retrial of decided questions at the post-trial stage that may give rise to
vindictiveness, but that turns on the psychological make-up of the individual prosecutor.
If a prosecutor is vindictive, then the institutional pressures existing post-trial will not
make her less vindictive pre-trial. See Schwartz, The Limits of Prosecutorial Vindic-

tiveness, 69

IOWA L. REv. 127, 184-93 (1983).
" For example, the Court in Goodwin recognized both that the initial charges

filed against a defendant may not reflect the extent to which she is subject to prosecution, 457 U.S. at 382, and, relatedly, that a prosecutor's assessment of the case may not
have crystallized until the time of trial, id. at 381.
82 As
Goodwin recognized, retrial requires a duplicative expenditure of
prosecutorial resources. Id. at 383. Moreover, the doctrines of stare decisis, res judicata,
the law of the case, and double jeopardy represent an institutional bias against the
retrial of decided questions. Id. at 376, 383.
8 According to the Court, a prosecutor expects a defendant to exercise her procedural rights before trial, and is therefore unlikely to penalize a defendant for their
invocation. Id. at 381. In contrast, post-trial motions and appeals ask the prosecution
"'todo over what it thought it had already done correctly.'" Id. at 383 (quoting
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972)).
" See id. at 380-84; see also Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 568 (1984)
(noting that Goodwin held that a presumption of vindictiveness is unwarranted where
the prosecutor added a felony charge pre-trial although after the defendant demanded a
jury trial, but applying the presumption when a trial judge increased a sentence after
appeal); Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 30 n.4 (1984) (noting that Goodwin held
that no presumption arose when charges were enhanced following a pre-trial demand
for a jury trial, but applying the presumption where charges were enhanced after exercise of a statutory right by appealing a misdemeanor conviction). The narrower interpretation of Goodwin would render it simply a variant of Bordenkircher and, in fact,
Goodwin has been viewed by some as essentially a plea-bargaining case. See United
States v. Barker, 681 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1982).
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vindictiveness could ever be based on pre-trial prosecutorial behavior,8 5
but, by approvingly quoting the statement in Bordenkircher that
Pearce and Blackledge were concerned not with "'the possibility that a
defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right . . . but
rather [with] the danger that the State might be retaliating . . .,'88

the Court also continued the uncertainty over the extent to which the
Constitution prohibited reasonably perceived vindictiveness based on
post-trial prosecutorial actions-an uncertainty aggravated by the
Court's failure to explicate the nature of the "presumption" that the
Court declined to apply. Indeed, in Thigpen v. Roberts,87 a case factually identical to Blackledge argued less than a year after Goodwin was
decided, the state contended that Goodwin had overruled Blackledge.88
The Court, in a brief opinion, disagreed and held that at least on the
precise facts of Blackledge and Thigpen-where the prosecutor brought
a felony charge after a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor before a
court of limited jurisdiction exercised his statutory right to a trial de
novo-a "presumption" of unconstitutional vindictiveness arose.89
Again the Court failed to clarify whether the presumption went to the
existence of actual vindictiveness and, instead, gave conflicting signals.9 0
85 Post-Goodwin lower court decisions reflect this uncertainty. While some cases
indicate that a presumption of vindictiveness based on pre-trial prosecutorial behavior
may still be available, see, e.g., United States v. Grabinski, 727 F.2d 681, 685 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Allen, 699 F.2d 453, 460-461 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982), others indicate that it is not, see,
e.g., United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1368-70 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984); United States v. Hinton,
703 F.2d 672, 678-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1121 (1983); Fardella v. Garrison, 698 F.2d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 1982); Rowe v. Grizzard, 591 F. Supp. 389, 401
(E.D. Va. 1984).
88 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 378 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363
(1978)).
87 468 U.S. 27 (1984).
" Id. at 30 n.4.
89 The Court noted that the presumption is rebuttable, but that the state, despite
an opportunity, had made no attempt to demonstrate a lack of vindictiveness. See id. at
32 n.6.
90 In addressing the state's argument that Pearce was distinguishable because the
same prosecutor brought all of the charges there while the manslaughter charge against
Thigpen was brought by a different prosecutor than the one who initially filed the
misdemeanor charges against him, the Court recognized:
It might be argued that if two different prosecutors are involved, a presumption of vindictiveness, which arises in part from assumptions about
the individual's personal stake in the proceedings, is inappropriate. On the
other hand, to the extent the presumption reflects 'institutional pressure
that . . . might . . . subconsciously motivate a vindictive prosecutorial
.. . response to a defendant's exercise of his right to obtain a retrial of a
decided question,' it does not hinge on the continued involvement of a particular individual.
Id. at 31. Because the Court found that the same prosecutor was, in fact, involved in
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The Court's ambivalence over whether the Constitution bars any
type of perceived vindictiveness or reaches only actual vindictiveness
surfaced more visibly only a week later in its decision in Wasman v.
United States.91 Wasman involved the question whether, under Pearce,
a judge could give a defendant convicted on retrial after a successful
appeal a greater sentence than she received following her original trial
because of an intervening criminal conviction for acts committed prior

to the original sentencing. All Justices agreed with Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the lead opinion for the Court, that the answer was yes.
Five Justices," however, refused to join that portion of the Chief Justice's opinion expressly limiting the constitutional concern in Pearce
and Blackledge to actual vindictiveness and characterizing the presumptions approved in those cases as presumptions of actual judicial
and prosecutorial vindictiveness respectively. As Justice Powell, who
joined the other portions of the Chief Justice's opinion, observed: "The
Pearce presumption is not simply concerned with actual vindictiveness,
but also was intended to protect against reasonable apprehension of
vindictiveness that could deter a defendant from appealing a first
conviction.""
the prosecution of Thigpen on the manslaughter charge, the Court found it unnecessary
to "determine the correct rule when two independent prosecutors are involved." Id.
91468 U.S. 559 (1984).
91 See id. at 573 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 574 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 574 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
93 According to the Chief Justice:
In Pearce and Blackledge, the Court "presumed" that the increased sentence and charge were the products of actual vindictiveness aroused by the
defendants' appeals. It held that the defendants' right to due process was
violated not because the sentence and charge were enhanced, but because
there was no evidence introduced to rebut the presumption that actual vindictiveness was behind the increases; in other words, by operation of law,
the increases were deemed motivated by vindictiveness.
Id. at 568-69.
I" Id. at 574 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court's failure to confront squarely the
nature of the ban on governmental vindictiveness continued in Texas v. McCullough,
106 S.Ct. 976 (1986), the Court's latest vindictiveness decision. McCullough was convicted of murder and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by the jury. The trial judge
granted his motion for a new trial, which the prosecutor did not oppose because he
believed that a new trial might result in a harsher sentence. Id. at 983 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). McCullough was convicted again. This time he opted to be sentenced by
the judge rather than the jury, as Texas law allowed, because under Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the jury would have been free to impose a higher
sentence. Under Pearce, however, the judge would have been limited by the 20-year
sentence imposed by the jury at the earlier trial. See id. at 984 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the judge imposed a 50-year sentence, and McCullough challenged
the increase under Pearce. Despite the fact that the increased sentence was imposed by
the same judge who presided over McCullough's first trial, the Court held the sentence
constitutional. Covering all bases, the majority (comprised of the members of the Chief
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The vice of the Court's equivocation on the extent to which the
Constitution prohibits perceived vindictiveness, couched in terms of determining when an undefined "presumption" of vindictiveness should
arise, is not limited to the considerable confusion the Court's meanderings have caused on that question.95 For several reasons, the Court's
pronouncements on vindictiveness have also left unresolved the extent to
which due process is truly concerned with actual prosecutorial
vindictiveness.
First, the Court's resolution and analysis of the two prosecutorial
vindictiveness cases, in which the existence vel non of actual vindictiveness was clear, turned on considerations other than the prosecutor's actual vindictiveness. In Bordenkircher, where it was indisputable that
the prosecutor was actually retaliating against the defendant for exercising his right to trial, the Court focused on the requisites of pleabargaining and found no due process violation.9" In Goodwin, where it
was uncontroverted that the prosecutor was not acting out of actual
97
vindictiveness in bringing more serious charges against the defendant,
Justice's Wasman plurality plus Justice Powell) held that the situation did not give rise
to a presumption of vindictiveness; but even if it did, the prosecution overcame the
presumption because the testimony of two witnesses who had not testified at McCullough's first trial shed new light on his culpability. Again, the Court did not elucidate
the ultimate fact to which the presumption is directed. The Court's failure to apply the
presumption in a situation in which a defendant almost certainly would perceive vindictiveness strongly indicates that it is actual vindictiveness.
15 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. The law of perceived
prosecutorial vindictiveness in the lower courts has been described as "chaotic." See
United States v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358, 361 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Andrews,
612 F.2d 235, 257 (6th Cir. 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 633
F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
" Although the Court subsequently indicated that a defendant still might make
out a constitutional deprivation based on a prosecutor's actions during plea-bargaining
by showing "through objective evidence an improper prosecutorial motive," United
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.12 (1982); see also Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569
(Burger, C.J.) ("Where the presumption does not apply, the defendant must affirmatively prove actual vindictiveness."), it is difficult to imagine what more compelling
showing of actual retaliation a defendant could make than the showing the defendant
made in Bordenkircher. For example, in State v. Hailing, 66 Or. App. 180, 672 P.2d
1386 (1983), the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of additional charges
brought during the course of plea negotiations because it agreed with the trial court
that the charges were brought "in reprisal" for the defendant's rejection of a plea offer.
Both courts based their finding of actual vindictiveness on (a) the prosecutor's statement
to defense counsel that she would charge the defendant with additional crimes unless he
accepted her plea offer, (b) the prosecutor's expressed intention "to cause further evil"
to the defendant in the event that he did not plead guilty, and (c) the fact that the
additional charges the prosecutor brought were not mentioned until the defendant made
clear his determination to go to trial on the original charge. See id. at 184, 672 P.2d at
1388. These factors, however, do not distinguish the case from Bordenkircher, for all
three factors were also present there, although the second may not have been stated
quite so graphically.
" Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380-81 (1982).
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the Court nevertheless examined at length whether a presumption of
vindictiveness was warranted. If, as Chief Justice Burger wrote for the
plurality in Wasman and implied in Texas v. McCullough,8 the Constitution condemns only actual vindictiveness, then this exploration was
entirely unnecessary.9 9
Second, were actual vindictiveness the dispositive focus of the vindictiveness cases, then a valid claim by the prosecutor that the original
charges against a defendant were the product of a mistake, an oversight, or a prosecutor's inexperience should suffice to resolve in the
prosecutor's favor a vindictiveness challenge based on the prosecutor's
subsequent augmentation of the charges. Such increased charges would
merely be brought to correct an error and could hardly be said to be the
product of purposeful retaliation."' 0 Yet there has been considerable reluctance to accept these excuses as adequate justifications for increasing
the charges against a defendant.1 0 1
Finally, it is simply unclear what actual prosecutorial vindictiveness is. 102 Ensuring the infliction of deserved punishment is part and
parcel of the prosecutor's job, so that "the prosecutor's attitude toward
the defendant in a hard-fought criminal case is seldom benign or neutral."1' ' Thus, many entirely legitimate prosecutorial actions could be
said to be punitively or retaliatorily motivated.'" The notion of constitutionally impermissible retaliation therefore would appear to have little substance without reference to some set of judicially developed rules
determining what prosecutorial concerns are and are not sufficient to
OSSee supra note 94.

See Schwartz, supra note 80, at 181-83.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining kinds of culpability).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 189-90 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 927 (1981); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Twiggs v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 360, 374, 667 P.2d 1165, 1174, 194 Cal. Rptr. 152, 161 (1983);
Note, A "Realistic Likelihood of Vindictiveness:" Due Process Limitations on
ProsecutorialCharging Discretion, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 693, 711. But see United
States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) ("A mistake or oversight in the
prosecutor's initial decision is a sufficient explanation to negate a subsequent claim of
vindictiveness."); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1977) (same),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978).
02 Indeed, the term "prosecutorial vindictiveness" has been described as "an unfortunate choice of words," United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1367 (5th Cir.
1983) (en banc) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984), a
"term[] of art," Schwartz, supra note 80, at 195, and "a conclusionary term rather
than an analytic tool," Note, Divergent Lower Court Standards, supra note 50, at
451.
103 Andrews, 633 F.2d at 459 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
104 See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372-73 (1982).
"
10
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justify particular prosecutorial actions or reactions. Yet once such concerns are identified10 5 and found in a given situation, an examination of
the prosecutor's actual intent hardly seems worth the candle. The finding of a legitimate ground for the prosecutor's action is so likely to be
decisive of the question whether the prosecutor acted on it that this
finding might as well be treated as the end of the inquiry rather than
the beginning.10 6

C. ProsecutorialMisconduct With the GrandJury
Unlike claims of selective or vindictive prosecution, in which the
prosecutorial action challenged-the institution or augmentation of
charges-is always the same, constitutional challenges based upon a
prosecutor's misconduct with the grand jury may involve a wide array
of prosecutorial behavior. Among the prosecutorial grand jury actions
frequently complained of are the use of the grand jury to help prepare
an already pending indictment for trial, 107 violations of the secrecy
rules governing grand jury proceedings, 0 8 the failure to present exculpatory evidence,' 0 9 the use of perjured testimony, 1 0 the use of unreliaSeveral commentators have concluded that the courts have been too quick to
accept as legitimate the justifications offered by prosecutors. See, e.g., Note, supra note
64, at 207 n.62; Note, Divergent Lower Court Standards,supra note 50, at 455.
1' This is especially so given the practical problems with determining whether a
prosecutor's actions were really motivated by legitimate concerns or by impermissibly
"vindictive" ones. See Texas v. McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 976, 986 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (finding of legitimate ground to rebut presumption of vindictiveness "effectively eviscerates" previous efforts to ensure that vindictiveness against a defendant
played no part in the sentence she receives after a new trial). Moreover, the difficulty
in determining what motive was the driving force behind a particular prosecutorial
action is likely to be exacerbated by the fact that many prosecutorial actions are likely
to be the product of "mixed" motives. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372-73 ("The presence of a punitive motivation . . . does not provide an adequate basis for distinguishing
governmental action that is fully justified as a legitimate response to perceived criminal
conduct from governmental action that is an impermissible response to non-criminal,
protected activity."); infra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985
(Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Doss, 563 F.2d 265, 274
(6th Cir. 1977) (en banc); United States v. Sellaro, 514 F.2d 114, 121-22 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 336
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
108 See, e.g., United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1334-35 (D. Colo.
1984); United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 159, 167 (D. Md. 1980); United States
v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1337, 1351 (N.D. Il. 1979); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)
105

("A grand juror. . . [or] an attorney for the government.
occurring before the grand jury . .
").

. .

shall not disclose matters

109 See, e.g., United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 75 (1985); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 936-37 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v. Levine, 700 F.2d
1176, 1180-81 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623-25 (2d
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ble hearsay in lieu of readily available live testimony,"' and the prosecutor's acting as a witness.1 12 Diverse though these forms of
misbehavior are, prosecutorial grand jury improprieties may be
grouped into two general categories: those involving an abuse of the
grand jury's process 1 3 and those concerning a prosecutor's evidentiary
presentation to the grand jury. 4 These categories correspond to the
two basic functions of the grand jury: its function as an investigatory
body, which presupposes that its process will be used only to gather
evidence of uncharged criminal activity,11 5 and its function as a screen-

ing body, which requires that it be able fairly to evaluate evidence to
prevent the institution of unjust or unfounded charges.1 1
1. Abuse of Grand Jury Process

a. The Nature of the Proscription
The grand jury's investigatory powers, which flow from its historical common law function and the grand jury clause of the fifth amendment, 17 are supposed to be used by the prosecutor to gather informaCir. 1979); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Loraine, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968); Lawson, 502 F. Supp. at 163; Gold, 470 F. Supp.
at 1352-53; United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 618-19 (N.D.
Okla. 1977).
110 See, e.g., Adamo, 742 F.2d at 927; United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759
(2d Cir. 1983); Levine, 700 F.2d at 1180; Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623-24; United
States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d
268, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 654-55 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1978); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743,
752-53 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977); United States v. Basurto,
497 F.2d 781, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1974); Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 131
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963).
I'l See, e.g., United States v. Jacobson, 691 F.2d 110, 115 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880-84 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Chanen, 549
F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1133-35 (2d
Cir. 1972).
112 See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 551, 559-61 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); Gold, 470 F. Supp. at 1351-52.
113 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
115 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-46 (1974); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701-02 (1972).
116 See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343; United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759
(2d Cir. 1983).
11" The clause provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This right is not
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See
Hurtardo v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); see also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
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tion about as yet unindicted criminal activities."1 ' When a prosecutor
uses the grand jury process for some other ends-such as uncovering
evidence to be used in a civil action, 9 gathering evidence to prove the
charges of an indictment that has already been returned,1 20 or inducing
a prospective defendant to commit perjury 2X-her misuse of the grand
jury's process may result in the invalidation of its proceedings 2 2 and
the evidence gathered through them. 2
273 (1919) (investigatory powers flow from the grand jury clause). There is some
scholarly controversy over the extent to which the grand jury clause enshrined the
grand jury's investigatory function as opposed to its screening function. See 1 W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 26, at § 8.2; Comment, Federal GrandJury Investigations of Political Dissidents, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 432 (1972) (arguing
against unrestricted grand jury investigatory power and proposing limitations).
"IsSee Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686-88; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
362 (1956); Blair, 250 U.S. at 282; United States v. Zarattini, 552 F.2d 753, 756 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 942 (1977); 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 26, at
§ 8.1; 8 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
6.0411] (2d ed. 1984).
19
See, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96, 104-05 & n.19 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (discussing procedures followed by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department to ensure that it does not conduct any criminal investigative proceedings
before a grand jury that relate to civil cases already initiated in district court); United
States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying Internal Revenue Service
agents access to witness's grand jury testimony to determine civil tax liability); see also
United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 311-13 (1978) (inherently intertwined nature of criminal and civil elements of a tax fraud case suggests that it is
unr'alistic to attempt to build a partial information barrier between the Internal Revenue Service and Department of Justice); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 681-84 (1958) (government may use a grand jury transcript in a case in
which no indictment was brought to prepare a civil suit brought under the Sherman
Act; defendant only entitled to discovery when defendant can show "good cause" based
on prosecutor's subversion of the criminal process).
20 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985
(Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Johanson),
632 F.2d 1033, 1041 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Doss, 563 F.2d 265, 274 (6th
Cir. 1977) (en banc); Zarattini, 552 F.2d at 756; United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d
261, 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977); United States v. Sellaro, 514
F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975); United States v.
Star, 470 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 336
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
121 See, e.g., Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1080 n.10 (9th Cir. 1972);
Brown v. United States, 245 F.?di 549, 554-55 (8th Cir. 1957).
"I See, e.g., Doss, 563 .'.2d at 276-77 (Stewart, J., concurring) (grand jury proceeding that has as its "substantial purpose" the questioning of a secretly indicted defendant about the cr'.aes for which she has already been indicted is void).
128 See In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985
(Simels), 767 F.2d at 30 (remedy against a grand jury subpoena used predominantly for
trial preparation is either the quashing of the subpoena or the exclusion at trial of any
evidence obtained pursuant to it); United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270, 1276 (1st Cir.
1972) (where a witness is called before the grand jury to enable the prosecutor to
gather information about a pending indictment, an available remedy is to "proscribe the
calling of [the] witness" at the trial on the pending indictment).
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How the Proscription is Enforced

The prosecutor's intent is the critical determinant of claims that
the prosecutor abused the grand jury process. Despite uncertainty over
just how impure the prosecutor's motive must be to warrant remedial
action,"2 ' it is clear that the inquiry in abuse of grand jury process
claims is one centered on the prosecutor's motive. For example, the paradigm complaint of prosecutorial abuse of grand jury process is that the
prosecutor used the grand jury to obtain impermissible discovery 25-especially
to gather evidence for the trial of a pending, previously returned indictment. With virtually no explanation or analysis,
the federal courts have adopted the view first expressed in United
States v. Dardi'2 that the issue in such claims, either in the context of
challenging a conviction127 or moving to quash a subpoena, 28 is the
intent-centered question whether the acquisition of such improper pretrial discovery was the prosecutor's "sole or dominating purpose. 1 29
There is, however, a sufficient number of prosecutorial interests other
than pre-trial discovery that are so frequently implicated in post-indictment efforts to gather information-including identifying unindicted
conspirators,13 0 determining the disposition of contraband involved in
the pending indictment, 11 and ascertaining whether there were efforts
to obstruct the apprehension or prosecution of those under indictment 1 3 2-that the prosecutor will almost invariably be able to advance
at least one of them as the basis for her post-indictment use of the
grand jury's process. Consequently, as has been recognized, the intentCompare In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Miller Brewing Co.), 687 F.2d 1079,
1086-87 (7th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that the grand jury can be used only to conduct
investigations that, at least at the outset, are "exclusively criminal") and United States
v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) with Universal Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 508 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejecting an abuse of process challenge because the subpoenaed material was "not being sought primarily for another purpose").
125 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
29 330 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
124

'2 See, e.g., United States v. Zarattini, 552 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 942 (1977); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); United States v. Sellaro, 514 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1973),

cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975); United States v. Star, 470 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir.
1972).
128 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985
(Simels), 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632
F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).
129 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels),
767 F.2d at 29; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d at 1041; Zarattini, 552 F.2d at 757; Woods, 544 F.2d at 250; Sellaro, 514 F.2d at 121.
130 See Woods, 544 F.2d at 250.
11
12

See Zarattini,552 F.2d at 756-57
See United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir. 1964).
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based Dardi prohibition "is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce."
2.
a.

'3

Misconduct in the Presentation of Evidence

The Nature and Source of the Proscription

Although a prosecutor's misconduct in presenting evidence to the
grand jury may take many forms, the legal questions most often raised
by such actions are whether the indictment should be dismissed because
the prosecutor's behavior has deprived the defendant of her constitutional rights under either the due process clause or the grand jury
clause of the fifth amendment"" and, if not,' 3 5 whether the prosecutor's
behavior is sufficiently improper to warrant the dismissal of the indictment under the court's supervisory powers.13 6 The constitutional analysis tends to be similar regardless of whether it is discussed in terms of
the due process clause,' 3 7 the grand jury clause,1 8 or both.13 9 Proceed'33 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels),
767 F.2d at 30 (quoting 8 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, supra note 118, at
6.04[5]).
13
See supra note 117.
135 Challenges to grand jury proceedings have also been premised on violations of
a defendant's rights under the fourth amendment, see United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974), the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment, see Lawn v.
United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958), and various statutory provisions, such as the federal electronic surveillance statutes, see Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
The first two types of challenge have lost much of their force in the wake of the Court's
decisions in Calandraand Lawn, which effectively held that an indictment may not be
challenged on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of information secured
in violation of the defendant's fourth and fifth amendment rights respectively. See Calandra,414 U.S. at 354; Lawn, 355 U.S. at 355. Nevertheless, some lower courts have
recognized that an indictment may be dismissed when the grand jury itself violates the
constitutional privilege in obtaining the evidence upon which the indictment was based.
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (en banc)
(plurality opinion); United States v. Pepe, 367 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (D. Conn. 1973).
M Supervisory powers enable the federal courts to "formulate procedural rules
not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress." United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). Two purposes are served by such power: deterring
illegality and protecting the integrity of the judicial process. See United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980). In deciding whether to invoke its supervisory
power to dismiss an indictment, the courts have "consider[ed] the egregiousness of the
prosecutor's misconduct and the availability of less drastic sanctions." United States v.
McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing prosecutorial behavior
leading to the court's exercise of its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment, including the provision of transcripts of a witness of doubtful credibility when the prosecutor
could have subpoenaed live testimony), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 75 (1985); see also
United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1979); infra notes 166-69 and
accompanying text.
137 See, e.g., Samango, 607 F.2d at 884; United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781,
785-86 (9th Cir. 1974).
138 See, e.g., United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1391 n.7 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984); United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d
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ing from the Court's seminal observation in Costello v. United States140
that "[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased
grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the
charge on the merits,''141 that analysis focuses on whether the
prosecutorial actions complained of deprived the defendant of an "unbiased" grand jury. The "bias" rubric, while responsive to Costello, is
misleading; the constitutional inquiry is really whether the prosecutor's
grand jury presentation was so unfairly skewed against the defendant
that the grand jury's decision to indict was not an informed, independent one.142 Thus, although Costello and its progeny 143 bar a federal
court from inquiring into the sufficiency of the evidence before the
grand jury, 44 the constitutional requirement of an "unbiased" grand
jury has been read to allow judicial examination of the manner in
1 45
which evidence was presented to it.
629, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
139 See, e.g., McClintock, 748 F.2d at 1284 n.2; United States v. Samango, 450
F.
Supp. 1097, 1102 & n.9 (D. Haw. 1978), affd, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
140 350 U.S. 359 (1956). Costello held that an indictment based solely on hearsay
evidence was a valid indictment under the fifth amendment. See id. at 363.
141

Id. at 363.

See United States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[A] grand
jury indictment will not be dismissed unless the record shows that the conduct of the
prosecuting attorney was flagrant to the point that the grand jury was 'deceived' in
some significant way. The conduct must significantly infringe upon the ability of the
grand jury to exercise independent judgement." (citation omitted)).
14l E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment is admissible before the grand jury); United
States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 n.2 (1966) (indictment valid even if secured on basis
of information obtained in violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination);
Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 355-58 (1958) (same).
144 In Costello, the Court explained the rationale for precluding such inquiries:
"4I

If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there
was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that
before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of
preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by the Fifth
Amendment.
350 U.S. at 363.
14 There is obviously some tension between these two principles. For example, a
claim that the grand jury was "biased" because the prosecutor both failed to inform the
grand jury of significant exculpatory evidence and presented unreliable hearsay in lieu
of readily available live testimony can easily be characterized as a claim that the evidence the grand jury did hear was inadequate to support the indictment. Nevertheless,
the focus of the sufficiency and bias inquiries are different. The essential claim in a
sufficiency challenge is that no reasonable grand juror could have found an adequate
basis for indicting the defendant from the evidence that the prosecutor presented. On
the other hand, where the prosecutor's actions are claimed to have "biased" the grand
jury, the complaint is that while the evidence may have permitted a reasonable grand
juror to return the indictment, the prosecution's presentation of the evidence was so
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How the Proscription is Enforced

Despite the consensus as to the framework for analyzing constitutional challenges to a prosecutor's behavior before the grand jury, there
is little certainty as to what results this analysis should yield in a particular case. Indeed, courts confronted with such challenges frequently
bemoan the lack of any established standard by which to decide
whether a prosecutor's misbehavior in presenting evidence to the grand
jury warrants dismissal of an indictment.14 6 The inability of courts to
define with precision the circumstances in which dismissal is warranted
is due to several factors. First, the prosecutorial grand jury actions that
may generate constitutional challenges to an indictment are very diverse. 47 Second, the Costello line of cases, which greatly restricts review of evidence-based challenges to grand jury proceedings, has inhibited the formulation of a corpus juris defining a defendant's substantive
rights in connection with the prosecutor's presentation of evidence to
the grand jury. Third and consequently, it remains considerably unclear which prosecutorial grand jury practices constitute violations of a
148
defendant's rights.
The grand jury presentation area thus bears important similarities
to the charging vindictiveness area. In both, the situations that may
generate claims are diverse, and in both there are impediments to judicial review of the prosecutor's behavior for constitutional improprieties.1 49 Yet, although the prosecutor's intent in performing challenged
distorted that it "undermined the grand jury's ability to make an informed and objective evaluation of the evidence presented to it." United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
719 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984).
146 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d at 1391 n.6 (characterizing the
standard for dismissing the indictment applied by that court as "vague and conclusory"); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1309, 1311 (9th Cir.) (finding
holdings of cases addressing the issue as "difficult to reconcile"), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
725 (1977).
147 See Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1309.
148 For example, the courts seem hopelessly confused over the nature of a prosecutor's obligation to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. While some courts
have held that the prosecutor has no legal obligation to disclose exculpatory material to
the grand jury, see, e.g., United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1285 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 75 (1985); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927,
937 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985), others have held that a prosecutor "is under legal and ethical obligations to present evidence which is exculpatory of
persons under investigation, since the grand jury cannot protect citizens from malicious
prosecutions if it is not given information which is material to its determination,"
United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1979); see also United States
v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Where a prosecutor is aware of any
substantial evidence negating guilt he should, in the interests of justice, make it known
to the grand jury, at least where it might reasonably be expected to lead the jury not to
indict.").
"" In the charging area, these impediments to judicial review of prosecutorial
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grand jury actions has been accorded significance sporadically, 50 the
courts have not viewed it as the lodestar in determining whether a defendant's rights have been violated by improprieties in a prosecutor's
grand jury presentation. Indeed, some courts have expressed the view
that the prosecutor's intent is unimportant to the inquiry.15 1
There are three factors that apparently account for the failure of
courts to accord prosecutorial intent in this context the preeminent role
it is supposed to play in the evaluation of claims of selective and vindictive prosecution. The first is the amenability of grand jury bias claims
to a harm-based analysis that focuses on the probable effect of the challenged prosecutorial behavior rather than the prosecutor's intent in engaging in it.1 52 The selective and vindictive prosecution areas do not

lend themselves to such analysis. Those claims are characterized by effects-the institution or augmentation of criminal charges-that can always be said to harm the defendant; for even a defendant ultimately
acquitted of the challenged charges will suffer the anxiety of exposure
to them and the ordeal of defending against them.
The second factor is the existence of reasonably clear ethical rules
misconduct are largely derived from separation of powers considerations. See supra
note 10. In the grand jury presentation area, they flow from concerns over interfering
with the grand jury's independence, violating grand jury secrecy, and the administrative
burden that review of the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation to the grand jury would

entail. See Arenella, Reforming the Federal GrandJury and the State Preliminary
Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463, 487-96
(1980).
150 The one area in which there is general agreement as to the significance of the
prosecutor's intent involves claims that the indictment was based on perjured testimony.
For the presentation of perjured testimony to warrant the dismissal of an indictment on
constitutional grounds, the courts consistently hold that the prosecutor must have
known that the grand jury testimony was perjurious. See, e.g., Adamo, 742 F.2d at
940; Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623; United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 292 (1st
Cir. 1979); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 752-753 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785-86 (9th Cir.
1974). See generally United States v. Levine, 700 F. 2d 1176, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1983)
(reviewing circuit case law regarding prosecutorial use of perjury in grand jury
proceedings).
151 See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir.
1983) ("The relevant inquiry. . . focuses not on the degree of culpability of the prosecutor, but on the impact of his misconduct on the grand jury's impartiality."), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182, 1188 (9th
Cir.) ("[U]nintentional misconduct can cause improper influence and usurpation of the
grand jury's role."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); United States v. Samango, 607
F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. McKenzie, 524 F. Supp. 186, 189, 195
(E.D. La. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 678 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982).
i51 See United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (6th Cir. 1985) (dismissal of indictment inappropriate unless the prosecutorial misconduct resulted in
prejudice to the accused), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 114 (1986); Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
719 F.2d at 1392; United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983).
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governing a prosecutor's grand jury behavior, 53 or at least the existence
of recurring prosecutorial practices that clearly violate those rules.l In
evaluating challenges to a prosecutor's presentation to the grand jury,
the federal courts repeatedly make reference to and adopt those guidelines. 5 5 Although violation of the rules alone generally is not sufficient
to warrant dismissal of an indictment,""8 the existence of ethical guidelines readily applicable to common grand jury abuses enables the courts
to condemn certain unacceptable prosecutorial behavior there without
having to resort to an examination of the prosecutor's mental culpability in taking the improper actions. Indeed, in the one situation where
courts agree that the prosecutor's mental state is relevant to a constitutional challenge to the manner in which the prosecutor presented the
case to the grand jury-the use of perjured testimony-"' their consensus that the testimony must be used "knowingly" to be actionable error
is likely the product of ethical rules that define the prohibition on the
use of perjured testimony expressly in terms of an advocate's knowledge
of the perjury. 5
18 See, e.g.,

I STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

§§ 3-3.5 to .6 (2d ed. 1980)

[hereinafter REVISED ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS]; STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 3.5-.6 (1971) [hereinafter

ABA

PROSECUTION STANDARDS]; NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS OF THE NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N Standards 14.2(D), 14.4 (1st ed. 1977) [herein-

after NDAA NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
184 See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 555 (3d Cir. 1979) (prosecutor acting as a witness), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v. Gold
470 F. Supp. 1336, 1351-52 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (same).
15 United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (referring
to 1 REVISED ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 3-3.6(d)), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 75 (1985); United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir.
1983) (referring to.1 REVISED ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at
§ 3-3.6); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 818 (3d Cir. 1979) (referring to 1
REVISED ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 3-3.5(b)); Birdman,
602 F.2d at 555 (referring to ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at
§ 3.5(b)); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979) (referring to
ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 3.6); United States v. Crisconi,
520 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D. Del. 1981) (noting that "[i]n defining the boundaries of
proper prosecutorial conduct before the Grand Jury, courts have looked to the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function"); Gold, 470 F.
Supp. at 1351 (referring to ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at
§ 3.5(b)); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 618-19 (N.D.
Okla. 1977) (referring to ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at
§ 3.6(b)).
1"
See McClintock, 748 F.2d at 1285-86; United States v. Trass, 644 F.2d 791,
797 (9th Cir. 1981); Birdman, 602 F.2d at 555-56. But see United States v. Serubo,
604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979) (dismissal of indictment may be the only way to
encourage compliance with ethical standards).
15
See supra note 150.
158 1 REVISED ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 3-5.6(a)
provides: "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly to offer false evidence, whether by documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or to fail
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Although there are a variety of ethical guidelines applicable to a
prosecutor's decisions concerning whether and what to charge, the actions at issue in selective and vindictive prosecution claims, they provide
little basis for condemning or condoning challenged charging behavior.
Ethical rules governing charging decisions are of two types: those which
set forth the factors prosecutors 'should consider in exercising their
charging discretion, 159 and those which prohibit the filing of charges
to seek withdrawal thereof upon discovery of its falsity." Similarly, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which is applicable to all lawyers, provides that "a lawyer

shall not [kinowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence," MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY DR 7-102(a)(4) (1982) (footnote omitted), and the new
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, also applicable to the bar in general, provide
that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false,"
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983).
159 For example, 1 REvISED ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at
§ 3-3.9(b), provides:
The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence
might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good
cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider
in exercising his or her discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact
guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to
the particular offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of
others; and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another
jurisdiction.
Similarly, NDAA NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at Standard
8.2, which deals with whether to prosecute, provides:
The prosecutor should utilize his discretion in screening to eliminate those
cases from the criminal justice system in which prosecution is not justified.
The factors to be considered in this decision are:
A. Doubt as to the accused's guilt;
B. Undue hardship caused to the accused;
C. Excessive cost of prosecution in relation to the seriousness of the
offense;
D. Possible deterrent value of prosecution;
E. Aid to other prosecution goals through non-prosecution;
F. The expressed wish of the victim not to prosecute;
G. The age of the case;
H. Insufficiency of admissible evidence to support a case;
I. Attitude and mental state of the defendant;
J. Possible improper motives of a victim or witness;
K. A history of non-enforcement of the statue [sic] at issue;
L. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice authority;
M. The availability of suitable diversion programs;
N. Any mitigating circumstances; and
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that are not adequately supported by the evidence.1 60 Neither type is of
much utility in assessing claims of selective or vindictive prosecution.
Rules of the first type expressly recognize the discretionary nature of
the prosecutor's charging decision and are simply advisory. While rules
of the second type are prohibitory and condemn a fairly specific type of
charging conduct, the conduct they condemn is rarely at issue in selective and vindictive prosecution claims; for there is generally adequate
evidence to support the challenged charges where such claims are
raised. It is not surprising, then, that one commentator found that "no
court has dismissed an indictment or other criminal charge for failure
to comply with written [charging] guidelines.""
The third factor that accounts for the subsidiary role prosecutorial
intent plays in the evaluation of constitutional challenges to a prosecutor's grand jury presentation is the greater freedom courts have to use
their supervisory power to control prosecutorial behavior before the
grand jury. This wider latitude is a product of the independent stature
that the fifth amendment confers on the grand jury as an institution.16 2
Because the grand jury cannot properly be "pigeonholed" into either
the executive or judicial branches of government, 6 ' but instead has a
0. Any provisions for restitution.
NDAA NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at Standard 9.3, which
deals with what charges to bring, provides that "[tihe prosecutor may properly exercise
his discretion to present only those charges which he considers to be consistent with the
best interests of justice," and lists 15 factors similar to those set forth in Standard 8.2
that may properly influence the prosecution's selection of charges.
160 REVISED ABA PROSECtTON STANDARDS,
supra note 153, at § 3-3.9(a)
provides:
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or cause to
be instituted, or to permit the continued pendency of criminal charges
when it is known that the charges are not supported by probable cause. A
prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction.

NDAA

NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS,

supra note 153, at Standard 9.4(A)

provides that "[tihe prosecutor shall file only those charges which he believes can reasonably be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial."
161 Gifford, supra note 26, at 704.
162 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (noting that the fifth
amendment guarantees that "no civilian may be brought to trial for an infamous
crime" without a grand jury indictment or presentment); Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 218 (1960) (function of the grand jury system is "to limit [a defendant's]
jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of
either prosecuting attorney or judge"); United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182,
1184 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); United States v. Chanen, 549
F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
16s See Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1312 (The grand jury "is not relegated by the Constitution to a position within any of the three branches of government.").
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substantial relationship with and dependence upon both,"" the impediments to judicial interference with prosecutorial actions before the
grand jury are weaker than they are with respect to judicial oversight
of prosecutorial charging decisions,16 5 which are purely executive
actions.
Accordingly, the federal courts have consistently assumed and asserted the legitimacy of the use of their supervisory power to oversee
the prosecutor's presentation before the grand jury.""6 Even in the wake
of Supreme Court decisions generally limiting the ability of lower federal courts to exercise supervisory power over law enforcement activities outside the grand jury context,167 the federal courts have "increasingly exercised [their] supervisory power.

. .

to regulate the manner in

which grand jury investigations are conducted '"6 8 and have used the
power to dismiss indictments because of prosecutorial misbehavior
before the grand jury. 6 '
This supervisory power, especially when coupled with the exis16 For example, the grand jury is generally dependent upon the prosecutor, the
representative of the executive branch, to determine what evidence the grand jury
should hear to conduct the presentation of that evidence. See United States v. Hogan,
712 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1983); Note, The GrandJury as an InvestigatoryBody, 74
HARV. L. REv. 590, 596 (1961). On the other hand, the grand jury is dependent upon
the judiciary's power of process to summon witnesses and to compel them to testify if
they refuse to do so. See Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959).
165 See supra note 10.
166 See United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 114 (1985); United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 75 (1985); Hogan, 712 F.2d at 761; United States v. Pino, 708
F.2d 523, 531 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1315-19
(9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 464 U.S. 806 (1983); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807,
816 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 558 & n.43 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132,
1136 (2d Cir. 1972). But cf. United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939,
942-43 (N.D. 111. 1979) (stressing supervisory power is to be used rarely).
167 See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (supervisory power
does not eliminate the applicability of the harmless error rule to justify reversal of a
criminal conviction); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (supervisory power
does not permit the suppression of otherwise admissible evidence that was seized unlawfully from third party).
...Serubo, 604 F.2d at 816; see also United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719
F.2d 1386, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983) (Norris, J., dissenting in part from the judgment)
(court's decision in Hasting does not preclude court from exercising supervisory power
over prosecutor's actions before the grand jury), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984);
Hogan, 712 F.2d at 762 n.2 (same).
16 See Hogan, 712 F.2d at 761-62; Gonsalves, 691 F.2d at 1319-20; United
States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Basurto, 497
F.2d 781, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., concurring); Estepa, 471 F.2d at
1136; United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1352 (D. Colo. 1984); United
States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 579 F. Supp. 1055, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 1984); AsdrubalHerrera, 470 F. Supp. at 942-43; United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F.
Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
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tence of ethical rules enforceable through its exercise, enables the courts
to maintain some direct control over prosecutorial improprieties before
the grand jury without having to resort to constitutional doctrine to
allow for such judicial intervention. 7 0 In the absence of this supervisory power, judicial control would likely be exercised either through the
formulation of constitutionally derived rules governing the prosecutor's
presentation to the grand jury or by the incorporation of the prosecutor's culpability into the calculus for assessing whether the prosecutor's
actions before the grand jury violated the defendant's constitutional
rights.171 It might be argued that in the absence of judicial supervisory
responsibility over grand juries there would not be, and courts would
not perceive, any need to regulate prosecutorial conduct before the
grand jury-and certainly not without primary regard to its impact on
the defendant. However persuasive this contention might be in a world
in which grand juries truly functioned as an independent screen between the prosecutor and the accused rather than as a captive, investi170 This point is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. and Basurto. In Basurto, the prosecutor discovered just prior to trial that a witness
he had presented to the grand jury had perjured himself. Although the prosecutor informed defense counsel of this fact, he did not inform the grand jury or take steps to
correct the testimony there. The majority held that the prosecutor's failure to "cure"
the indictment by informing the grand jury violated the defendant's due process rights
and reversed his conviction. See Basurto, 497 F.2d at 784, 787. Specially concurring,
Judge Hufstedler found the majority's conclusion that the defendant's constitutional
rights had been violated "not persuasive" because the prosecutor notified both defense
counsel and the trial court of the problem. See id. at 793. She found, however, that "it
would be an appropriate exercise of our power to supervise the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts to impose upon federal prosecutors the duty to notify
the grand jury described by the majority." Id. The majority's unnecessary reliance on
the Constitution to impose on the prosecutor the duty to notify the grand jury upon
learning that testimony presented to it was perjurious may have contributed to the fact
that "Basurto has not fared well in the ensuring [sic] years." 8 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, supra note 118, at
6.04[2].
In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the majority held that the cumulative effect of a variety
of prosecutorial grand jury abuses did not violate the defendant's rights under the fifth
amendment and reversed the district court's dismissal of the indictment. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d at 1393-95. However Judge Norris, who wrote the court's opinion, also wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part from the judgment and recommending that the case be remanded so that the district court could consider whether the
indictment ought to be dismissed under its supervisory powers. See id. at 1394. Despite
the majority's outright reversal of the district court's initial decision dismissing the indictment, the district court on remand again dismissed the indictment, this time expressly exercising its supervisory powers. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 579 F. Supp. at
1056.
171 This assumes the continued absence of legislation governing the prosecutor's
grand jury presentation, a very reasonable assumption. The courts could exercise indirect control over a prosecutor's misdeeds before the grand jury, for example, by referring the incident to a relevant professional disciplinary body, such as the prosecutor's
bar association or employer. See, e.g., Serubo, 604 F.2d at 819 (suggesting discipline by
the Attorney General).
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gative arm of the government, that day has long since passed.' The
increasing willingness of courts to monitor prosecutorial actions before
the grand jury in large part reflects their skepticism that the grand jury
meaningfully restrains the prosecutor."' 3
The courts are freer to use their supervisory power over grand
juries to disapprove a prosecutor's grand jury actions without making
the prosecutor's personal culpability the linchpin of their disapprobation because one of the dominant rationales for exercising supervisory
power is the protection of judicial integrity;"7 4 and judicial integrity
may be impaired by inadvertent or negligent prosecutorial actions no
less than by intentional ones.1 7 5 Consequently, although the courts have
indicated that their supervisory power is most appropriately exercised
to correct a pattern of prosecutorial grand jury abuse that must, by its
172 See Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
174, 182 (1973) (The grand jury "has degenerated into nothing but a convenient shield

for the prosecutor."); Comment, The Improbability of Probable Cause-The Inequity
of the GrandJury Indictment Versus the PreliminaryHearing in the Illinois Criminal Process, 1981 S. ILL. L.J. 281, 282-88 (1981) (detailing the history of the grand

jury system); see also GrandJury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Citizenship, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 738 (1977) (statement of Benjamin Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice) (In 1976, 123 no-true bills were returned by

federal grand juries compared with 23,000 indictments.).
173 See Basurto, 497 F.2d at 785 (dismissing indictment as unconstitutional when
based on testimony that the prosecutor knows to be perjured); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1973) (Seitz, J., concurring) (noting the
potential for arbitrary exercise of prosecutorial power in the grand jury system); 1 W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 26, at § 8.4.
174 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980) (stating that
the interest in protecting judicial integrity outweighs the societal interest in presenting
probative evidence); United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that the purpose of using supervisory powers is to protect judicial integrity and
deter illegality), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 75 (1985); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d
927, 942 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating that "the power to exercise supervisory control over
the prosecutor to protect the integrity of the judicial system" still exists), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1193 (1985); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d at 1394 (Norris, J., dissenting
in part from the judgment) (stating that the court may use its supervisory power to
dismiss an indictment in order to protect judicial integrity); United States v. Pino, 708
F.2d 523, 531 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that use of suppressed testimony in grand jury
proceedings does not justify exercise of supervisory power to protect judicial integrity);
United States v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir. 1982) (acknowledging that
an important purpose of the court's supervisory power is to preserve judicial integrity),
vacated, 469 U.S. 806 (1983); United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939,
943 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (stating that where the totality of circumstances permits, supervisory power may be employed to protect judicial integrity). The other major rationale
for a court's exercise of its supervisory powers is to determine illegality. See McClintock, 748 F.2d at 1285; Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d at 1394 (Norris, J., dissenting
in part from the judgment).
117 See Asdrubal-Herrera,470 F. Supp. at 943 (N.D. Ill. 1979); cf Mesarosh v.
United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9 (1956) ("The dignity of the United States Government
will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony.").
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institutional nature, be intentional,1 70 they have also evinced a willingness to use that power to correct individual grand jury improprieties of
serious magnitude regardless of the particular prosecutor's mental state
17 7
in committing the abuses.
D.

The Prosecutor's Obligation to

Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
1. The Nature and Source of the Proscription
Under some circumstances, the prosecution has a constitutional obligation, derived from the due process clause, to reveal to a defendant
information in its possession that is favorable to the defendant.17 8 Commonly called the "Brady doctrine" after the case in which the duty was
first explicitly recognized, 7 9 this obligation applies not only to evidence
that would affirmatively negate a defendant's guilt or tend to reduce
her punishment ("exculpatory" evidence), but also to evidence that
17I See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 114 (1985); Adamo, 742 F.2d at 941; United States v. Serubo, 604
F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 564 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1983); United
States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932
(1983); United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
McKenzie, 524 F. Supp. 186, 189, 195 (E.D. La. 1981), vacated, 678 F.2d 629 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); Asdrubal-Herrera,470 F. Supp. at 943
(N.D. 1Il. 1979); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 618
(N.D. Okla. 1977).
1 8 There are, of course, other nonconstitutionally based disclosure obligations imposed on prosecutors. In federal prosecutions, for example, these obligations include
those imposed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982). Rule 16 generally provides for the disclosure, upon
request, of any statement made by the defendant, the defendant's criminal record, relevant documents and other tangible evidence, and reports of examinations and tests. The
Jencks Act provides for disclosure of any previous statement made by a witness called
by the government at trial. Under the Act, which is a codification of the Court's decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the prosecutor must turn over
such material only after the witness has testified on direct examination. In practice,
however, "Jencks material" is often turned over prior to a government witness's testimony in order to afford the defense adequate time to digest the material in preparing
for the witness's cross-examination.
Many states have provisions that parallel Rule 16 and the Jencks Act as well as
additional criminal discovery procedures. See 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note
26, at § 19.3. Nevertheless, because a prosecutor's obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), are constitutionally derived and concern all types of evidence
in all criminal cases, Brady remains a critical source of a prosecutor's discovery obligations. See United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 1984) (if evidence is
covered by both the Jencks Act and the prosecutor's obligations under Brady, the timing of its production is governed by the latter).
179 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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could discredit prosecution witnesses ("impeachment" evidence)."' s A
prosecutor's failure to reveal Brady material may result in the reversal
of a defendant's conviction. 1
The Brady doctrine has its roots in an earlier line of cases that
held various knowing uses of perjured testimony by a prosecutor to violate a defendant's due process rights.18 2 As Brady's acknowledged foundation in these perjury cases suggests, 8' the Brady d octrine's ,overriding purpose is to ensure that the prosecutor's suppression of favorable
evidence in its possession does not deny a defendant who goes to trial a
fair trial. The doctrine apparently does not reach the prosecutor's suppression of favorable evidence where, as in the vast majority of criminal
cases, the defendant does not go to trial but instead pleads guilty."8
The Court's unwillingness to define a prosecutor's constitutional disclosure obligations in terms other than a defendant's right to a fair trial
stems from its concern that a broader, constitutionally based right to
discovery "would entirely alter the character and balance of our present
180 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
18I See, e.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1464-66 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a prosecutor's use of false evidence that is material requires reversal);
United States v. Srulowitz, 785 F.2d 382, 387-389 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that refusal
to allow defendant access to files held by the government violated Brady); Lindsey v.
King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1043 (5th Cir. 1985) (reversing conviction where'police withheld
a specifically requested police report); State v. Cohane, 193 Conn. 474, 496, 479 A.2d
763, 777 (stating that failure to disclose erculpatory evidence was reversible error), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); State v. Lukezic, 143 Ariz. 60, 65, 691 P.2d 1088, 1092
(1984) (ordering new trial where prosecutor failed to disclose that state aid was given
to witness).
182 In the earliest of these cases, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), the
Court condemned as unconstitutional a prosecutor's deliberate use of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction. The Mooney holding, which was reaffirmed in Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (4942), was first expanded in Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28
(1957), where the Court held that a prosecutor's knowing failure to correct unsolicited
perjured testimony also violated due process. Alcorta, in turn, was expanded in Napue
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), where the Court extended a prosecutor's obligation to
correct known, unsolicited, perjured testimony to testimony that relates solely to the
credibility of the witness.
183 The Court in Brady characterized its ruling as "an extension of Mooney v.
Holohan." 373 U.S. at 86.
14 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 ("[T]he prosecutor is . . .required . . . only to
disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial."); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) ("[T]he prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of
sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial."); id.
at 112 n.20 (rejecting the argument that the focus should be on "the impact of the
undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, rather than the
materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence"); cf. United States v.
Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (indicating that Brady is inapplicable
where, despite the prosecutor's nondisclosure of favorable evidence, the defense obtains
it from another source immediately prior to trial).
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systems of criminal justice."18' 5
2.

How the Proscription Is Enforced

Because the courts have derived the prosecutor's constitutional disclosure obligation from the right to a fair trial and have limited it to
securing that right, they define the obligation by reference to the probable effect of the suppressed evidence on the defendant's trial. Unless the
evidence had a sufficient potential to influence the verdict, its suppression by the prosecutor does not amount to constitutional error.18 The
capacity of the undisclosed evidence to affect the verdict is, in the parlance of the Brady cases, phrased as a question of the "materiality" of
the suppressed evidence. 187 Nondisclosure does not violate due process
unless the unrevealed evidence is sufficiently "material." Given its
overriding concern with the putative effect of the undisclosed evidence
"' Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted
in Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.7.
188 It is possible to take the view that a defendant's interest in being informed
about information helpful to her case is so substantial that any failure by the prosecutor
to disclose favorable material in its possession constitutes a constitutional violation. See
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 693 (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d
1298, 1311 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying admissibility standard), vacated and remanded
sub nom., United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, rev'd, 774 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d
Cir. 1985) (applying Bagley). Under this view, the materiality of the evidence and,
perhaps, the prosecutor's motivation in failing to turn it over would be relevant to the
remedy for the violation-whether the failure warrants reversal-rather than to the
question whether a constitutional violation exists. The Court, however, has viewed the
materiality of the suppressed evidence as a necessary element of the constitutional violation itself. As the Court observed in Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, "the prosecutor will not
have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient
significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." This is
consistent with the Court's recent insistence in other contexts that prejudice to the defendant is a necessary element of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984) (ineffective assistance of counsel); United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1982) (compulsory process); see
also United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1981) (remarks by federal
agents disparaging defendant's attorney did not interfere with defendant's right to assistance of counsel absent showing of prejudice).
187 The choice of the term "materiality" is unfortunate. In evidence, at least as
used by McCormick and his followers, the term simply refers to "the relation between
the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case." E.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 541 (3d ed. 1984). So long as the
proposition to which the evidence is applicable has a reasonable bearing on an issue in
the case, the evidence is material. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 703 n.5 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
It is rarely the case that evidence that is the subject of a Brady claim is not material in this sense. As used in the Brady context, however, materiality is concerned not
with the logical connection between the proposition for which evidence is offered and
the issues in the case, but with the broader and more speculative question of the likely
effect of the suppressed evidence on the outcome of the trial. Thus, evidence may be
material in the traditional sense, but lack materiality for Brady purposes.
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on the defendant's trial, the Court has emphasized that a prosecutor's
mental state in failing to reveal Brady material is irrelevant to whether
the failure constitutes a constitutional violation. Indeed, the central
holding in Brady itself was that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." ' This holding has been reiterated verbatim in subsequent cases 18 9 and underscored
by the Court's observations that "the misconduct's effect on the trial,
not the blameworthiness of the prosecutor, is the crucial inquiry for due
process purposes,"' 9 0 and "[i]f the suppression of evidence results in
constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not
the character of the prosecutor."191
The Court's insistence on the irrelevance of prosecutorial culpability is, if not inaccurate, at least misleading. This is because the Court
has been unwilling to evaluate all suppression claims under a single
standard of materiality but has, instead, varied the level of materiality
required in accord with the prosecutor's culpability or knowledge. This
development is manifest in two of the Court's most recent pronouncements in the Brady area.
In United States v. Agurs,1 92 the Court indicated that there is a
constitutionally significant difference between a prosecutor's knowing
use of perjured testimony and a prosecutor's refusal or failure to reveal
favorable evidence to the defense."9 In addition, with respect to undisclosed evidence favorable to the defense, the Court held that the Constitution imposes different obligations upon the prosecutor depending
upon whether the evidence in its possession is the subject of a "specific"
defense request on the one hand, or only a "general" request or no
request at all on the other. 194 The Court distinguished these three situ188 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; accord Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 n.17.
189 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S. Ct. 989, 1001 (1987); Valenzuela-

Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982); Agurs, 427 U.S.
at 104 n.10, 110 n.17; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794, 808 (1972) (Marshall, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153
(1972).
190 Smith, 455 U.S. at 220 n.10.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110.
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
See id. at 103-04.
1
See id. at 106-07. Earlier cases had generally alluded to the fact that a defense
request for the favorable evidence might factor into the constitutional analysis. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). Prior to Agurs, however, the Court had neither elaborated upon what constituted a "defense request," nor formalized the constitutional consequences of the presence or absence of such a request.
191

'22
193
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ations-(a) the knowing use of perjured testimony, (b) the failure to
disclose specifically requested evidence, and (c) the failure to disclose
generally requested or unrequested evidence-in terms of the showing
of materiality required for each type of suppression to constitute a due
process violation.
In the first situation-where "the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and . . . the prosecution knew, or should have known,
of the perjury"19 5 -the Court held that the lowest standard of materiality applies and that a conviction must be reversed "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." 96 In the second situation-where the prosecutor
fails to disclose specifically requested evidence-the Court indicated
that a low standard of materiality would suffice to warrant reversal,
but it did not specify what that standard was.19 In the final situation-where the undisclosed evidence was not requested by the defense
or was encompassed only within a general request, such as one for "all
exculpatory evidence," or "all Brady material"-the Court held that
reversal was warranted only where the undisclosed evidence met a high
standard of materiality, which the Court seemingly set at "creat[ing] a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist .... "198
This tripartite scheme was subsequently modified in United States
v. Bagley."' The Court there confirmed that the most lenient material'" Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
196 Id.
'"
Relying on the Court's observations that this category of cases was "illustrated
by the Brady case itself," id. at 104, and that "[a] fair analysis of the holding in Brady
indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial," id., a number of courts and
commentators interpreted the standard of materiality to be applied in specific request
cases as whether the undisclosed evidence "might have affected the outcome of the
trial." See, e.g., Walker v. Lockhart, 598 F. Supp. 1410, 1431 (E.D. Ark. 1984), rev'd,
763 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3332 (1986); United
States v. Stifel, 594 F. Supp. 1525, 1539 n.14 (N.D. Ohio 1984); State v. Cohane, 193
Conn. 474, 497, 479 A.2d 763, 776, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Comment, The
Prosecutor'sDuty of Disclose [sic]: From Brady to Agurs and Beyond, 69 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 197, 201 & n.78 (1978). In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985), the Court modified the standard of materiality in "specific request" cases. It
held that the same standard applies regardless of whether there was a specific request,
a general request or no request. In all cases of prosecutorial nondisclosure, "[tlhe evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Id. at 682.
198 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112; see also Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1041 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citing Agurs); Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 1984)
(same).
19 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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ity standard applies in situations involving "the prosecutor's knowing
use of perjured testimony or, equivalently, the prosecutor's knowing
failure to disclose that testimony used to convict the defendant was
false." ' 00 The Court also confirmed that this low standard of materiality is confined to such cases and is not applicable to other types of
prosecutorial suppression. 0 1 The Court in part, however, disavowed
the distinction in Agurs between specific request cases and general or
no request cases. A bare majority held that the same standard of materiality applies for determining whether a prosecutor's nondisclosure
constitutes a due process violation regardless whether the unrevealed
evidence was the subject of a specific request, a general request, or no
request at all.20 2 Nevertheless, two of the five Justices in the majority
indicated that a prosecutor's nondisclosure was more likely to meet this
standard of materiality 203 when the evidence was the subject of a specific defense request.2 0
It is clear, then, that under the Agurs-Bagley scheme a prosecutor's mental state is not, as the Court has insisted, wholly irrelevant to
determining when the nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the defense
amounts to constitutional error. Were the constitutional concern truly
limited to "the misconduct's effect on the trial, 2 0 5 then the same standard of materiality would be applicable to all nondisclosures. If some
types of prosecutorial suppression are more likely than others to affect
a trial, then such nondisclosures are more apt to meet the requisite
standard of materiality and will more frequently result in a constitutional violation. There is no need to evaluate their effect under a different standard of materiality.
The distinctions the Court has drawn in the Brady area reflect
200 Id. at 678. The Court noted that the materiality standard to be applied in
perjury cases, as set forth in Agurs, is effectively the same as the constitutional harmless error standard established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 & n.9. Thus, another way to view the materiality standard applicable where a conviction was obtained through the prosecutor's knowing use of
perjured testimony is that such a conviction must be set aside unless the use of the
perjured testimony is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
201 See id. at 680-83; see also United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1309-10,
1312 (7th Cir. 1986).
202 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.); id. at 685
(White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
a01 For the standard of materiality applicable to all nondisclosure cases other than
cases involving the prosecutor's knowing use of perjury, see supra note 194.
20" Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.); see also
Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1041 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Viewing the opinions [in
Bagley] as a whole, it is fair to say that all of the participating Justices agreed on one
thing at least: that reversal for suppression of evidence by the government is most likely
where the request for it was specific . . ").
205 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 n.10 (1982).
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differences in the prosecutor's culpability with respect to different types
of suppression. First, the lenient, pro-defense standard of materiality
applicable where a prosecutor has knowingly used or failed to correct
perjured testimony reflects the high degree of prosecutorial culpability
inherent in this situation.20 6 Although the Court has acknowledged
this, 207 it has contended that the "more important[]" reason for treating
perjured testimony so strictly is that it involves "a corruption of the
truth-seeking function of the trial process." 20 8 The Court has never explained the precise nature of the "corruption" rationale. If its concern
is with the integrity of the evidence that the government utilizes to
prove its case, the rationale is not a persuasive basis for treating perjured testimony differently from other types of prosecutorial suppression-a point readily seen from the Court's decision in Giglio v. United
20 9
States.
In Giglio, a government witness denied at trial that he had been
promised that the government would not prosecute him in exchange for
his testimony. In fact, such a promise had been made by the prosecutor
who presented the case to the grand jury. The prosecutor who tried
Giglio's case did not, however, know about the first prosecutor's promise. At the time Giglio was decided, neither the perjury decisions nor
Brady reached Giglio's situation-the perjury cases because the trial
prosecutor did not know that the witness' testimony was false and
Brady because it had not yet been expanded by Bagley to cover impeachment evidence. Rather than choosing between the perjury cases
and Brady for the relevant analysis, a unanimous Court relied upon
both. It held that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose information relating to the credibility of an important government witness, and that a
failure to inform the jury of such information required reversal "if 'the
false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected
the judgment of the jury . ..'"210-the standard of materiality appli-

cable in perjury cases. Thus, Giglio correctly recognized that the prosecutor's suppression of evidence and the prosecutor's use of false evi'
dence "are sides of a single coin." 211
The integrity of the prosecutor's
20 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 121 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the purpose of the lenient materiality standard may be to deter deliberate prosecutorial misconduct).
207 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-80 (Blackmun, J.); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-04.
208 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
209

405 U.S. 150 (1972).

Id. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)).
211 Babcock, FairPlay: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1151 (1982). But see Note, A Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose Promises of FavorableTreatment Made to Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARV. L. REV. 887, 896 (1981) ("[A] jury that hears nothing is better in210
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case is impaired whether the jury hears that no promises
were made or,
21 2
instead, does not hear that promises were made.
In addition to the corollary relationship between the obligation to
refrain from using perjured testimony and the duty to reveal favorable
evidence, there is another reason to doubt the "corruption" rationale for
treating perjury cases differently. That is the Court's insistence that the
prosecutor's use of the perjured testimony must be "knowing" for the
most lenient standard of materiality to apply.213 Putting aside the unformed than one that is actively misled.").
212 See Babcock, supra note 211, at 1151. This point is buttressed by the fact that
whether a witness's testimony amounts to perjury or simply implicates a nondisclosure
by the prosecutor is often largely a matter of characterization. Id. at 1151 n.70; Comment, supra note 197, at 204-05. For example, in Scott v. Foltz, 612 F. Supp. 50 (E.D.
Mich. 1985), a prosecution witness who testified against the defendant in exchange for
a plea agreement disposing of the charges against her denied that she was "promised
anything in return for the plea of guilty," or for her testimony. Id. at 52. The witness's
plea agreement did, however, require the prosecutor to make certain recommendations
concerning the witness's sentence. Despite the fact that the witness's answer was, arguably, technically true and therefore not perjury, the court held that the case was
governed by the perjury cases and granted the defendant's habeas petition. The court
reasoned: "[w]hether [the witness] could properly be charged with perjury under state
law or not, the jury was clearly misled. This 'false evidence' is precisely what the rule
of Napue and Giglio was designed to prevent." Id. at 57; see also Babcock, supra note
211, at 1151 (arguing that the prosecutor's failure to disclose promises of favorable
treatment should always be treated as the knowing use of perjury).
In contrast, in Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984), where the key
government witness testified that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had
promised him nothing despite the fact that DEA agents had promised that they "would
put in a good word for him," id. at 878, the court held that the testimony should not be
viewed as perjurious. The court observed: "[w]hile [the witness] might have been more
forthcoming in his testimony, neither can he be charged with defense counsel's failure
to ask penetrating questions on cross examination." Id.
Similar problems of characterization arise when a prosecution witness testifies inconsistently with a prior statement that the prosecutor has in her possession, but which
she has failed to disclose to the defense. Whether the prosecutor's case includes known
perjury in this situation depends upon (a) whether the witness's trial testimony is truly
inconsistent with the witness's previous statement, (b) whether any inconsistency that
does exist is deliberate rather than due to mistake, and (c) which of the statements, the
trial testimony or the previous statement, is, in fact, true. Compare United States v.
Hutcher, 622 F.2d 1083, 1088 n.3 (2d Cir.) (when it was the witness's prior testimony,
rather than the testimony at defendant's trial, that was false, the perjury standard of
materiality does not apply), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980) with State v. Cohane,
193 Conn. 474, 497-99, 479 A.2d 763, 776-77 (regardless of whether it was the witness's prior statement that was false, the perjury standard applies), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 990 (1984).
21s See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679-80 (1985) (Blackmun, J.); id.
at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 n.10 (1982);
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (Since Mooney, "the Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and
must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury."); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112
(1935) (a criminal conviction procured by state prosecuting authorities solely by the use
of perjured testimony known by them to be perjured and knowingly used to procure the
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certain extent to which knowledge on the part of other members of the
prosecution team will be imputed to the trial prosecutor, 21 4 if the prosecutor did not in some sense "know" that the state's case included perjury, then, presumably, the defense must demonstrate that the perjured
testimony meets a standard of materiality higher than that set forth in
Bagley and Agurs for perjury cases, in order to obtain relief. 215 The
effect, however, of perjured testimony on the "truth seeking function of
the trial process" is the same whether or not the prosecutor knows of
the perjury. The prosecutor's knowledge does not change what the jury
hears.
The second way in which the prosecutor's culpability is reflected
in the Brady area is the disparate treatment accorded the nondisclosure
of favorable evidence depending upon whether the evidence was specifically requested by the defense, a disparity that was reduced, but not
conviction violates the fourteenth amendment's due process clause).
214 Under Giglio, knowledge possessed by one prosecutor in a given office is imputed to another prosecutor in the same office. 405 U.S. at 154. In addition to treating
the prosecutor's office as a single entity, the courts are generally willing to impute to a
prosecutor the knowledge of investigatory law enforcement personnel who work closely
with the prosecutor. See e.g., United States v. Kaufmann, 783 F.2d 708, 709 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1986) (noting that "other courts have held that the knowledge of a public officer or
government agent may be attributable to the prosecution"); Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Martinez, 780 F.2d 302, 308 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing cases where Brady
applied despite the fact that prosecutor had no personal knowledge of the existence of
evidence); Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717-18 n.1 (2d Cir.) (imputing police
officer's knowledge to prosecutor if officer acted as an arm of the prosecutor), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1109 (1982). Beyond this, however, the extent to which a prosecutor
will be charged with knowledge on the part of other state actors-even law enforcement
personnel-is unclear, and seems largely a function of the strength of the connection
between the prosecutor and the person possessing knowledge of the evidence. See Pina
v. Henderson, 752 F.2d 47, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to impute parole officer's
knowledge to prosecutor since he did not work in conjunction with either the police or
the prosecutor and thus could not be regarded as an arm of the prosecutor); Walker v.
Lockhart, 598 F. Supp. 1410, 1432 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (since police officer was not
involved in general investigation of crime, but was instead given a limited investigative
assignment, it was unreasonable to charge prosecutor with having suppressed material,
the significance of which was lost upon police officer), rev'd, 763 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3332 (1986).
15 See United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245 (2d Cir. 1975) (government
witness's perjury was not the product of governmental misconduct justifying the application of the looser standards of post-trial review), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
The standard of materiality most likely to be applied is the standard applicable where a
defendant seeks a new trial on the ground that newly discovered evidence demonstrates
that a witness at trial committed perjury. Under the leading case of Larrison v. United
States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928), that standard is whether the newly discovered
evidence might have produced a different verdict. See Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d
507, 512 (2d Cir. 1961) (contrasting the Larrison standard with the stricter standard
that the evidence would "probably" produce a different verdict), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
909 (1964).
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eliminated, in Bagley.2 " The Court's greater willingness to find specifically requested evidence to be material stems in part from a sense that
the nondisclosure of such evidence affirmatively misleads the defense to
believe that it does not exist, while the nondisclosure of generally requested or unrequested evidence is less likely to have this effect.2"' As
valid as this concern may be, it is one directed to the effect of the prosecutor's actions on a defendant's preparation for trial, a concern that is
not the focus of the Brady doctrine,"" rather than to the effect of the
evidence on the trial itself. More to the point of the doctrine's fair trial
focus, inherent in the greater solicitude for specifically requested evidence is the recognition that a specific request puts the prosecutor on
notice of the importance of the evidence to the defense. 1 9 Where specifically requested evidence is not disclosed and consequently is not
presented or utilized at trial, the prosecutor "knows" that the jury has
not received information that the defense deems meaningful in much
the same way that the prosecutor "knows" that the jury has received
220
misinformation where the prosecutor's case includes known perjury.
Conversely, in the absence of a specific request, it will often be unfair
to impute such knowledge to the prosecutor.2 21
Indeed, the prosecutor's Brady obligations with respect to generally requested or unrequested evidence are, to a significant degree,
driven by notions concerning when an inference of prosecutorial knowledge may be drawn. As Justice Stevens explained in Agurs, the vice
shared by a general request and the absence of any request is their lack
216 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681-83 (Blackmun, J.); see also Martinez, 780 F.2d at
307 (post-Bagley case noting that "[i]f the suppressed information was specifically requested, review of its materiality must take that fact into account"); Lindsey v. King,
769 F.2d 1034, 1041 (5th Cir. 1985) (post-Bagley case noting that "reversal for suppression of evidence by the government is most likely where the request for it was
specific"); supra note 204.
211 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Babcock, supra note 211, at 1150.
218 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
219 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106, 121-22 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Martinez,
780 F.2d at 307 n.5.
220 In his dissent in Bagley, Justice Stevens, who authored Agurs, argued that the
Brady doctrine was only applicable to "the prosecution's deliberate nondisclosure."
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his view, other types of nondisclosure "simply fall 'outside the Brady context.'" Id. at 712 (quoting the majority opinion
at 681).
221 The less stringent treatment of Brady evidence that has not been specifically
requested may also reflect a related concern with fairness to the prosecutor. According
to this notion, just as appellate reversal is generally forbidden unless an error is raised
at trial so that the trial judge can correct it, a prosecutor should not have to suffer the
reversal of an otherwise valid conviction because of error that the defendant was able
to, but did not, bring to the prosecutor's attention prior to the verdict.
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of notice to the prosecutor.22 2 Consequently, the prosecutor's obligation
to disclose evidence in these situations arises only "if the evidence is so
clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution
notice of a duty to produce. '223 That is, the disclosure is required only
if the evidence is such that the prosecutor's knowledge of both its existence and its exculpatory character may be inferred. If, however, the
prosecutor actually does not have knowledge of the exculpatory information in her possession, a duty of disclosure does not arise.224
In addition to shaping the structure of analysis in the Brady area,
See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07.
Id. at 107; see also id. at 103 (describing the Brady rule as arguably applicable in three situations, each of which "involves the discovery, after trial, of information
which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense"). Although
Bagley modified the standard of materiality Agurs set forth for general and no request
cases, see supra note 202 and accompanying text, Bagley did not alter the analysis in
Agurs as to when a prosecutor's duty to disclose information in these situations arises.
It is not clear what standard of materiality applies to undisclosed evidence in the
prosecutor's possession of which she had no knowledge. On the one hand, it would
appear that because no Brady disclosure obligation would attach to such evidence, the
appropriate standard would be the standard for granting a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence-namely that the evidence "probably would have resulted in acquittal." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111 & n.19. On the other hand, because the new trial
standard is generally applicable to all newly discovered evidence regardless of its
source, application of this standard to evidence in the prosecutor's possession would
eviscerate "'the prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice.' " Bagley, 473 U.S.
at. 680 (Blackmun, J., quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111). In any event, the question is
probably academic. It is highly unlikely that unrequested evidence that is not sufficiently favorable to trigger a constitutional disclosure obligation would nevertheless
meet either the new trial standard of materiality or the standard of materiality Bagley
makes applicable to constitutionally required prosecutorial disclosures. See United
States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 1985) (calling it "altogether improbable" that the production of evidence containing cumulative impeachment material
would have changed the jury's verdict and thus would not mandate reversal of a conviction pursuant to Brady standards), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 861 (1986).
22 See, e.g., Halliwell v. Strickland, 747 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1011 (1985). Halliwell illustrates how far a court is willing to go in
insisting that the prosecutor actually know about exculpatory evidence before imposing
constitutionally based disclosure obligations upon it. The defendant there was convicted
of the first degree murder of his lover's husband. His lover had confessed that she had
killed her husband with a spear gun, but, after talking with her, the defendant confessed that he alone was the killer. During its investigation, the state had seized a large
tool box from the defendant's dive shop which was ultimately found to contain a pair of
bloody women's tennis shoes-evidence that certainly bore on who did the killing given
the initial confession of the victim's wife. The prosecutor, however, claimed that it did
not discover that the tool box contained the bloody shoes until after the trial was over.
Despite the clearly exculpatory nature of the evidence, and despite the fact that the
"the prosecution . . . was at least technically in possession of the evidence" prior to
trial, id. at 609, the court found that "no Brady violation has occurred" because no one
on the prosecution team actually knew of the evidence before the trial. See id. at 610;
see also United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 559-60 (10th Cir.) (holding that prosecutor was not required to disclose to the defense that a key witness had been paid by
DEA agents), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
222

223
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a concern with the prosecutor's culpability also influences the application of that analytical structure in two ways. First, the prosecutor's
good or bad faith may affect the Agurs-Bagley category into which a
court places a challenged nondisclosure. 225 The courts have considerable leeway in this determination because of the malleability of the categories.2 2 Second, especially in close cases, the prosecutor's culpability
may color a court's decision as to whether the evidence in issue meets
the applicable standard of materiality. 227 As one post-Bagley court has
observed, "the existence of bad faith is . . . a factor a court may con'228
sider in making its materiality determination.
Thus, prosecutorial intent is clearly an important factor in claims
that the prosecutor violated her constitutional disclosure obligations,
notwithstanding the Court's seeming insistence that, as a matter of doctrine, it should be irrelevant.22 9 Indeed, were the framework governing
the prosecutor's constitutional disclosure obligations designed to turn on
230
"the blameworthiness of the prosecutor," as the Court urges it is not,
225 See, e.g., Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1980) (A request's
"'specificity' is a function of several factors, including . . . the reasonableness of the
explanation, if any, for which the evidence was not exposed or was not considered to be
material by the prosecution.").
226 With respect to the "fuzziness" of the perjury category, see supra note 212.
With respect to the difficulty of distinguishing "specific' from "general" requests, see
Comment, supra note 197, at 206-07. A common question in drawing the line between
specific and general requests is whether a request for a particular type of evidence, for
example, all prior statements made by prosecution witnesses, constitutes either a specific or only a general request. See, e.g., United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204, 20708 (3d Cir. 1976) (regarding defense request for exculpatory material as specific for
impeachment purposes).
227 The apparent rationale for factoring a prosecutor's intent into this determination is that a prosecutor is unlikely to suppress evidence intentionally unless the prosecutor believes that the evidence is material. See United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d
1305, 1311 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986). This rationale is not persuasive. A prosecutor may
intentionally choose not to disclose material in her possession precisely because she believes that it is not material and therefore not subject to compelled disclosure under
Brady. Moreover, because it remains unsettled whether admissibility is a precondition
to the prosecutor's disclosure obligations under Brady, see Comment, supra note 197,
at 209-11, an alternative explanation for a prosecutor's intentional nondisclosure is the
prosecutor's belief that the evidence is inadmissible. See Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d
1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1985) (prosecutor failed to produce a statement in a police report
because he thought that the statement had never been made and that its inclusion in the
report was error).
228 Jackson, 780 F.2d at 1311 n.4; see also Talamante v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784,
788 (10th Cir.) ("although the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant if
the evidence is material, the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor may well bear on
the materiality determination" (quoting United States v. Disston, 582 F.2d 1108, 1112
(7th Cir. 1978)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877 (1980)); United States v. Disston, 612
F.2d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Since the information was not withheld in bad faith,
we are less inclined to hold the unproduced evidence material.").
229 See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
220 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 n.10 (1982).
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that structure would look much like the existing Agurs-Bagley regime.
Under such a framework, the prosecutor's culpability in failing to reveal evidence would be the key determinant of the existence of a constitutional violation. However, unless the prospect of harmless error were
eliminated,"' at least some showing that the undisclosed evidence
might have helped the defendant at trial would be required even in the
most egregious instances of prosecutorial suppression. Thus, a culpability-based scheme would link the extent to which a defendant must show
that the unrevealed evidence could have favorably affected his trial to
the degree of the prosecutor's fault in not disclosing the evidence: the
greater the prosecutor's culpability, the less probative the evidence need
be for its suppression to amount to a constitutional violation.23 2 This
scheme tracks the Agurs-Bagey structure, although its application
might vary in minor respects. 233
E.

The Prosecutor's DiscriminatoryUse of
Peremptory Challenges

1. The Nature and Source of the Proscription
A peremptory challenge is an arbitrary blackball which a litigant
may cast against a prospective juror during the selection of the petit or
"I This is unlikely given the Court's current inclination to make prejudice to the
defendant a precondition for the existence of a constitutional violation in the criminal
procedure area. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984) (holding
that, in the context of sixth amendment, error by counsel "must be prejudicial to the
defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution"); United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-74 (1982) (in determining materiality
of testimony made unavailable to defense by government deportation of a witness, defendant must show reasonable probability that testimony could have affected judgment
of trier of fact).
2S2 An intent-based framework similar to this was utilized by the Second Circuit
prior to the Court's decision in Agurs. See United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 553
(2d Cir. 1975); Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 513-15 (2d Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964). Although Agurs' insistence that the relevant inquiry was
"the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor," 427 U.S. at 110,
caused the Second Circuit to abandon its focus on the prosecutor's culpability in United
States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980), that
focus was seemingly resurrected in United States v. Petito, 671 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982), where the court cited and discussed the Kyle-Morell
principle with approval.
25" For example, the courts would likely be less inclined to impute to an otherwise
unaware prosecutor knowledge of suppressed evidence possessed by other members of
the prosecution team. See supra note 214. A prosecutor's failure to turn over evidence
in this situation would probably be deemed negligent rather than knowing, and the
required showing of materiality would reflect this. See Kyle, 297 F.2d at 515 ("If the
hearing should lead to a finding of such negligence plus deliberate misstatements to the
court and the petitioner, petitioner's burden would be less than in the case of negligence
alone but more than in a case of deliberate suppression.").
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trial jury. Such challenges are generally used against jurors who, while
not sufficiently biased to be excused for cause,2" 4 are believed by the
side exercising the peremptory strike to be predisposed against it. Although not constitutionally required, 3 5 the right to make peremptory
challenges has long been associated with the right to a fair trial,2" 6 and
is an integral part of jury selection in both civil2"' and criminal 8' trials
in all state and federal courts.239
Until recently, the only constraint on the prosecutor's use of her
allotted peremptory challenges was an institutional one. As set forth in
Swain v. Alabama,240 the equal protection clause of the Constitution
barred only the systematic use of peremptories by a prosecutor's office
"incase after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and
whoever the victim may be . . .with the result that no Negroes ever
serve on petit juries."241 In any particular case, a prosecutor, like other
trial lawyers, was free to strike peremptorily a prospective juror for any
reason, including "grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. '' 242 This virtu243
ally unfettered discretion was curtailed in Batson v. Kentucky.
234 Although a litigant may make an unlimited number of challenges for cause,
the grounds for such challenges are relatively narrow. Challenges for cause are generally "restricted to eliminating bias that is admitted or clearly implied by the juror's
connections with the case or parties." Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Stan-

dards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1493,
1500 (1975); see also Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Be-

tween Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 340 (1982).

235 See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919); see also Batson v. Kentucky,
106 S.Ct. 1712, 1720 (1986) (referring to Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965));
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Stilson, 250 U.S. at 586); United States v. Wood, 299
U.S. 123, 145 (1936) (quoting Stilson, 250 U.S. at 586).
36 See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1720; Swain, 380 U.S. at 219; Babcock, Voir Dire:
Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 555-56 (1975).
237 See FED.R. Civ. P. 47(b) (allowing up to three peremptory challenges against
alternate jurors, depending on how many alternate jurors the court appoints).
238 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (entitling each side to a certain
number of
peremptory challenges depending on the offense).

239 See Note, The Defendant'sRight to Object to ProsecutorialMisuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770, 1773 (1979).
24- 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
241 Id. at 223.
42 Id. at 220.

243 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). Prior to Batson, a number of state courts and lower
federal courts had placed constitutional limits on the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges in a particular case. In the state cases, generally courts found limitations in
state constitutional law. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d
748, 761-62 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1009 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 3339 (1986); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486-87 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth
v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486-88, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515-16, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979); State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 397-99, 489 A.2d 1175 (1985), ajfjd,
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Responding to the fact that it had proved almost impossible for defendants to show that peremptory challenges were systematically used by
the prosecutor to keep blacks off juries24 despite evidence that "the
practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases
with black defendant [sic] remained widespread," 2" the Court for the
first time imposed constitutional restraints on the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges in a particular case. It held that "the Equal
Protection Clause . . . forbids the States to strike black veniremen on
the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black." 246
2.

How the Proscription Is Enforced

The constitutional restriction on the prosecutor's use of her
peremptory challenges turns on the prosecutor's intent in exercising the
strikes. To make out a constitutional violation, a minority defendant
103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986). In the federal cases, it was done pursuant to the
sixth amendment's "fair cross section" guarantee that a jury be representative of the
community from which it is drawn. See Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 770-71 (6th Cir.
1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3289, affd on remand, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986);
McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1128 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3289
(1986).
244 See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1720-21 & n.17; see also Johnson, Black Innocence
and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1658 (1985); Saltzburg & Powers, supra
note 234, at 345 & n.42 (stating that "no defendant could satisfy" the Swain standard);
Case Comment, A New Standardfor Peremptory Challenges: People v. Wheeler, 32
STAN. L. REV. 189, 192 n.20 (1979) (same).
1'5 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1725 (White, J., concurring).
246 Id.
at 1723; see also id. at 1725 (White, J., concurring) (asserting that Batson
creates a rule whereby the prosecutor's use of peremptories "to strike blacks from the
petit jury panel in the criminal trial of a black defendant. . . in a given case may, but
does not necessarily, raise an inference, which the prosecutor carries the burden of
refuting, that his strikes were based on the belief that no black citizen could be a satisfactory juror or fairly try a black defendant.").
Although it might be possible to view Batson as broadly condemning any consideration of race in the prosecutor's use of her peremptory strikes, the tenor, analysis, and
language of the opinion suggest that Batson applies only where a prosecutor strikes
jurors of the same racial minority as the defendant, and possibly only where a prosecutor strikes black jurors in a case against a black defendant. See id. at 1737 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (analyzing the majority opinion's equal protection analysis as limited
to members of "cognizable racial groups" excluded from the petit jury "on account of
their race"). Batson thus may be inapplicable to cases involving white defendants, see
Schreiber v. Salamack, 619 F. Supp. 1433 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the use of peremptories
against white jurors, and even the use of peremptories against minority jurors of a
different racial minority than the defendant. See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722-23. (To
"establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury
solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the
defendant's trial . . . the defendant . . . must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race.").
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must show that the prosecutor purposely struck members of the defendant's race from the petit jury because of their race. A defendant may
make out a prima facie showing that this has occurred by, among other
means, pointing to a pattern of strikes against minority jurors in the
venire.247 If the trial judge agrees that a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown,24 8 the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come
forward with a neutral explanation for challenging the minority jurors. 249 A prosecutor may not meet this burden simply by denying any
discriminatory intent or by pointing to an assumed affinity between the
defendant and the struck juror based on their shared race.2 5 Instead,
the prosecutor must give meaningful reasons for challenging the minority jurors.25 1 If these explanations are found wanting, the trial judge
may reinstate the improperly discharged jurors252 or discharge the en25 3
tire venire and begin petit jury selection anew.
247 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. A pattern of strikes sufficient to make out a prima
facie constitutional violation may take a number of forms. See, e.g., People v. Motton,
39 Cal. 3d 596, 607 n.3, 704 P.2d 176, 182 n.3, 217 Cal. Rptr. 416, 422 n.3 (1985)
(use of peremptories against an otherwise heterogeneous group of prospective jurors
whose only common characteristic is that they share the defendant's race); Riley v.
State, 496 A.2d 997, 1013 n.20 (Del. 1985) (disproportionate use of peremptories
against members of the defendant's racial group), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986);
State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 395, 489 A.2d 1175, 1178 (use of peremptories
against all members of the defendant's racial group), affd, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d
1150 (1986). The Batson Court noted that "the prosecutor's questions and statements
during voir dire and in exercising challenges may support or refute an inference of
discriminatory purpose." Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
248 The trial judge, however, has considerable discretion in this determination, as
evidenced by the fact that even a demonstrable pattern of prosecutorial strikes against
jurors of the defendant's race is not always sufficient to make out a prima facie case of
prohibited discrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 136, 142 (7th
Cir. 1985) (use of four of seven peremptories to exclude all four black members of the
venire from the jury did not demonstrate discrimination because prosecutor wanted an
educated jury that could understand letters of credit, and the four blacks had very little
education or commercial experience), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3338 (1986).
249 Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.
250 Id.
21 Presumably, once a prima facie case showing that the prosecutor has used her
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion has been made, the prosecutor must
justify her strike of every minority juror even though, in the absence of a prima facie
case, she would not have to justify her challenge to any of them.
252 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 474 (D. Conn. 1976),
mandamus granted sub nom., United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir.
1977) (disallowing prosecutor's challenge to four black veniremen and ordering the
prosecutor's office to maintain a record of the number of black jurors in the selection
pool and the number stricken in each criminal trial). Although the Court in Batson
declined to elaborate on the appropriate remedy where the prosecutor is found to have
used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion, see Batson, 106 S. Ct.
at 1724 n.24, reinstating struck jurors would present problems concerning the jurors'
ability to be fair to the prosecutor if the struck jurors knew who struck them.
253 See, e.g., Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S.
Ct. 3289, affd on remand, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750
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The focus in Batson on the motives of a prosecutor in striking
particular jurors in a specific case represents, for several reasons, a concern with prosecutorial intent in its most concentrated form. First, Batson erected a boundary of impermissible motive in the exercise of a
prerogative that, both by definition and long tradition, could previously
be exercised for any reason, no matter how misguided or irrational.2 "
Batson thus injects a concern with prosecutorial intent into an area
where it was long thought to be irrelevant.
Second, Batson makes the presence of the impermissible motive
not only relevant to, but dispositive of the defendant's constitutional
claim. On one hand, apparently no degree of prosecutorial necessity, a
compelling state interest or otherwise, can justify the behavior of a
prosecutor who has acted with the prohibited intent.2 55 On the other
hand, the prohibited use of peremptories cannot be excused on the basis
of lack of harm to the defendant, as, for example, where the petit jury
retains a disproportionate number of jurors of the defendant's race despite the prosecutor's discriminatory use of the challenges. 2 5' Harm is
either conclusively presumed to flow from the exercise of peremptories
based on improper intent,257 or is not an element of the constitutional
F.2d 1113, 1132 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3289 (1986); see also Riley v.
State, 496 A.2d 997, 1013 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986) (denying
claim that prosecutor used peremptories in a racially discriminatory manner but noting
that remedy for such use was dismissal of jury); State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389,
414, 489 A.2d 1175, 1186 (1985) (involving prosecutor who admitted to striking blacks
based on his supposition that they would be predominantly Baptist and likely to be
swayed by the expected testimony of a Baptist minister, and to striking black women in
particular because of their strong "maternal instincts"), aff'd, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d
1150 (1986).
25 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-17 (1965) (discussing and accepting
the historically accepted definition of peremptory challenges).
"5 For example, it appears that under Batson, a prosecutor could not justify
striking minority jurors on the ground that statistics gathered by the prosecuting office
demonstrate that minority jurors almost invariably refuse to return guilty verdicts
against minority defendants accused of that particular crime. See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at
1723.
25 Moreover, it may be argued that any harm a defendant suffers as a result of
the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptories is constitutionally immaterial, so
long as the jury is not otherwise unfairly biased against the defense. A prosecutor has
only a limited number of peremptories with which to remove the most defense-prone
members of the venire who cannot successfully be challenged for cause. Thus, the exercise of each racially discriminatory strike entails an opportunity cost. Cf United States
v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (discussing exclusion of blacks
from the venire). To the extent that race is an inaccurate proxy for determining those
who would be most sympathetic to the defense, a defendant may actually benefit from
the prosecutor's ill-conceived discrimination because the prosecutor will have forgone
the opportunity to strike more defense-prone jurors from the jury.
15 This presumed harm may affect not only the defendant, but also the community. The community has interests in having defendants tried by representative juries
and in the abolition of practices that undermine confidence in the fairness of the crimi-
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violation at all.2" "
Third, the exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the
defendant's petit jury that prompted the Batson holding is not in and of
itself prohibited.2 5 9 So long as the absence of minority trial jurors results from a reason other than the prosecutor's discriminatory use of
peremptory strikes, whether it be a small minority population, chance,
or even the permissible use of peremptory challenges, there is no constitutional infirmity. Finally, the procedure for challenging a prosecutor's
use of peremptories places a spotlight on the prosecutor's motives in the
most immediate, dramatic, and intrusive fashion. That procedure requires that a prosecutor reveal and explain his motivations in court, on
the record, and in the presence of defense counsel, immediately after
the prosecutor has engaged in the challenged behavior.260
This stark focus on the prosecutor's subjective intent is bound to
make Batson difficult to administer. As an initial matter, it is unclear
just how reasonable or persuasive a prosecutor's "neutral explanation"
nal justice system, which may, in turn, be harmed by the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1717-18; Johnson, supra note 244, at 166667.
258 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617, 623 (1986) (deliberate exclusion of
blacks from grand jury cannot be harmless error).
259 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) ("[I]n holding that
petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we
impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and
reflect the various distinctive groups in the population."); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d
1113, 1128-29 (2d Cir. 1984) (same), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3289 (1986); Koenig v. State,
497 So. 2d 875, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (rule against exercising peremptory
challenges on the basis of race does not mean that judges may take affirmative steps to
ensure minority representation on petit juries); Note, supra note 239, at 1780
("[T]here is no right to a fair cross section on any particular petit jury" because such a
right could be violated simply by the principle of random selection.).
20 It remains to be seen whether prosecutors will be called upon to justify each
peremptory strike of a venireman of the defendant's race as each such strike is made.
One federal district judge has suggested that this prospect may be avoided by using the
"struck panel" method of selecting the petit jury rather than the "jury box" method.
Sand, Jury Selection and Race Discrimination,N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
Under the struck panel system, a panel of jurors cleared for challenge for cause and
large enough to yield a petit jury after counsel exercise all of their peremptories is
drawn. Counsel then exercise their peremptory challenges in some pattern of alternation against this panel until the allotted number of challenges is exhausted and a petit
jury of twelve remains. Counsel thus know who will remain in the jury box as a result
of their exercise of peremptory challenges. Under the jury box system, twelve members
of the array of potential jurors are selected by lot to be seated in the jury box. Both
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are exercised against those seated in the
box. Because replacements for challenged jurors are drawn by lot from the pool each
time a challenge is exercised, counsel have no way of knowing who will be the next
replacement. See Sand & Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District
Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 425-26 & nn.16-17
(1985).
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for challenging a black juror must be.2" 1 All Batson does is delineate
the borders of a spectrum. At one end is the prohibited assumption that
a black juror will favor a black defendant solely because of their shared
race; at the other are justifications so probative that they would compel
the removal of the juror for cause. 2 6' The field spanning these boundaries is immense. To the extent that any explanation within the spectrum remains available, prosecutors may seek to justify a strike by arbitrary factors such as the juror's dress, hair style, speech pattern or
demeanor. A prosecutor may believe that the cited trait indicates a dislike of authority or a streak of individuality that makes it more likely
that the juror is predisposed against the prosecution, or less likely that
the juror will join the consensus-usually unanimity-necessary to
convict.
Of course, the more arbitrary the basis of the strike, the more
likely it is to be pretextual. If reasons just inside the border can be
"neutral" despite their arbitrary character, however, then identifying
pretextual strikes will be difficult, and Batson may have little effect.
This is especially so given the self-generating quality of motivation. If
the only thing required to justify the exercise of a peremptory against a
black is any purpose other than the assumption that blacks will favor
blacks, such a purpose is likely to materialize whenever the peremptory
is exercised. 263 So long as the prosecutor's reason for exercising the peremptory need not be very persuasive to be "neutral," courts will be
hard-pressed to find that the prosecutor did not subjectively harbor the
professed purpose in striking the juror.
Consequently, it can be expected that defendants will attempt to
narrow the spectrum of justifications towards the challenge-for-cause
line. In these efforts, defendants are likely to challenge not only the
most idiosyncratic justifications, but also the prosecutor's use of seemingly more neutral factors that may, in fact, prove to be race-linked,
such as economic status, education, home ownership, political affiliation, and residence. These challenges will force courts to confront a
number of elusive issues, including whether and under what circumstances such factors may serve as the "neutral" basis for a peremptory
26 See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1723 (stating that although "the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of the challenge for cause. . .[,] the
prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case . . . by stating merely that
he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race").
202 Id.; see also id. at 1739 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
263 See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 437 (1974).
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strike. 28

F. The DoubleJeopardy Bar to Retrial After a Mistrial
Due to ProsecutorialMisconduct
1. The Nature and Source of the Proscription
During the course of a trial, there are numerous actions a prosecutor may take that are legally improper. They include making unwarranted assertions during an opening statement, 65 obtaining the admission of evidence that should not be admitted, 6 engaging in the
267
improper cross-examination of the defendant or defense witnesses,
and making various inappropriate statements during a closing argu26

See, e.g., People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 168-69, 672 P.2d 854, 858-59, 197

Cal. Rptr. 71, 78-79 (1983) (noting that the trial court has a duty to attempt to evaluate seriously the prosecutor's explanation to determine whether it is bona fide). On a
more practical level, the more a prosecutor's ability to exercise peremptories on the
basis of highly subjective judgments is restricted, the more pressure prosecutors may
place on courts to expand their participation in the voir dire of prospective jurors. Most
federal courts do not allow counsel to question jurors directly during the voir dire. See
Sand & Reiss, supra note 260, at 427-28. It will often be difficult, however, for a
prosecutor to demonstrate case-specific bias on the part of a minority juror unless the
prosecutor is allowed to put directly to the juror particular questions designed to elicit
that bias. See id. at 432-33.

'"5Such improper assertions usually involve overstating the prosecutor's case by
reference to facts the prosecution cannot or does not intend to prove. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Oliver, 360 F.2d 297, 299 (3d Cir. 1966) (finding prejudicial error when prosecutor improperly referred to defendant's prior arrest for assault
and escape from custody); Leonard v. United States, 277 F.2d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 1960)
(finding prejudicial error when prosecutor improperly referred to 83 other crimes allegedly committed by defendant, but not charged in the indictment); State v. Colvin, 425
A.2d 508, 512 (R.I. 1981) (finding prejudicial error when prosecutor's improper remarks were reinforced by inadmissible testimony despite limiting instruction); CALi-

FORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE SERIES, PROSECUTORIAL AND JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT 41-42 (1979) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA PRACTICE SERIES].
16e For example, a prosecutor may introduce evidence conditionally, subject to

later satisfying foundation or relevancy requirements, and then fail to satisfy those requirements. See, e.g., Reimnitz v. State's Attorney, 761 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1985)
(admission of evidence that defendant committed a homosexual assault was clearly improper and warranted retrial); Bryson v. Alabama, 634 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir. Unit B
Jan. 1981) (erroneous admission of defendant's prior criminal record was sufficiently
prejudicial to entitle defendant to habeas corpus relief); United States v. Martin, 561
F.2d 135, 139-41 (8th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's reading of grand jury transcript containing biased and prejudicial material rose to the level of bad faith prosecutorial overreaching that warranted both a mistrial and preclusion of retrial).
267 See, e.g., United States v. Garza, 603 F.2d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's calling a witness to the stand despite knowledge that the witness would assert a
fifth amendment privilege contributed to prejudicial conduct warranting a mistrial);
United States v. Broderick, 425 F. Supp. 93, 96 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (prosecutor's eliciting
of hearsay testimony despite explicit prohibition by court constituted reversible error);
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE SERIES, supra note 265, at 45-48.
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ment. 268 If sufficiently serious, such trial improprieties may prompt a
motion for a mistrial by the defendant, or a sua sponte declaration of a
mistrial by the trial judge.
When the prosecutor's misbehavior results in a mistrial, a retrial
of the defendant may implicate double jeopardy concerns. These concerns arise because
[t]he constitutional prohibition against 'double jeopardy' was
designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the
hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for
an alleged offense. . . . The underlying idea, one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.2 6 9
The double jeopardy goal of "protect[ing] an individual from being
subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than
once" does not amount to a guarantee that a defendant will have to
undergo only one trial on the charges against him. As a matter of practical necessity, the clause generally does not prohibit the retrial of a
defendant after the reversal of his conviction on appeal:170 "[it would
be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted
2" See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 150 U.S. 76, 81-82 (1893) (prosecutor's attempt in closing argument to induce jury to assume defendant's guilt of another crime
for which he had actually been acquitted was reversible error); United States v. Green,
786 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor's accusation in his closing argument that
defendant had attempted to make a "charade" of the trial, though highly improper, was
not reversible error); United States v. Capone, 683 F.2d 582, 585 (1st Cir. 1982) (prosecutor's assertion during closing argument that the case was proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" was improper in light of the "invisible cloak of credibility" resulting from

his position); Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's
Closing Argument, 64 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 24 & n.18 (1973)
("[I]mproper argument alone may be sufficient grounds for reversal."); Note,

ProsecutorialMisconduct: The Limitations upon the Prosecutor'sRole as an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1095, 1104 (1980) ("Appeals to prejudice and bias are
improper; convictions must stand on the evidence presented at trial.").
269 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); see also United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132-37 (1980) (distinguishing the double jeopardy bar to a
second prosecution from that of a review of sentence, and declaring legislation granting
the prosecutor a review of a criminal sentence did not violate double jeopardy).
270 See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896). When the conviction
is reversed on the grounds of insufficient evidence, however, the double jeopardy clause
does bar retrial. See United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1978).
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immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceeding leading to conviction." ' Similarly, the double jeopardy clause does not absolutely bar retrial after
the declaration of a mistrial. 2
However, because a mistrial aborts a defendant's first trial prior to
the return of a verdict, retrial following a mistrial implicates a second
double jeopardy concern that retrial following a reversal does not involve. That concern is the defendant's "valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal. 27 8 "[T]he crucial difference between reprosecution after appeal by the defendant and reprosecution
after a . . . mistrial declaration is that in the first situation the defendant has not been deprived of his option to go to the first jury and,

perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal."274 The
Court has recognized that a defendant's double jeopardy interest in receiving a verdict from the first tribunal chosen to decide his case is
entitled to considerable solicitude. Thus, in contrast to the common law
principle that jeopardy does not attach until a final verdict is rendered,273 the Court has ruled that jeopardy attaches as soon as the jury
is impaneled and sworn,2 78 and it has barred reprosecution when a jury
was improperly dismissed only hours after being sworn and without
hearing any evidence. 77 As a result of this recognition that a defendant
has a cognizable interest in proceeding to verdict before the "particular
tribunal" impaneled to decide the charges against her, there are greater
double jeopardy strictures against retrying a defendant after the declaration of a mistrial than after the reversal of her conviction on appeal.
The question of exactly when a retrial may follow a mistrial has
troubled the Court for over 160 years. The most important determinant
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964); see also United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion) ("The determination to
allow reprosecution [after a successful appeal] reflects the judgment that the defendant's
double jeopardy interests, however defined, do not go so far as to compel society to so
mobilize its decisionmaking resources that it will be prepared to assure the defendant a
single proceeding free from harmful governmental or judicial error.").
'72 See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1949) ("The double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment. . . does not mean that every time a defendant is put to
trial before a competent tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a
final judgment."); see also supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text; infra notes 278271

84 and accompanying text.

273 Wade, 336 U.S. at 689.
274
275

Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484.

See 4 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*361.

See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38 (1978) (holding that the federal rule
that jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn is an integral part of the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and is, therefore, applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment).
277 See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
271
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of whether a retrial can follow a mistrial is the defendant's role in the
declaration of the mistrial. When a mistrial is granted without the defendant's request or consent, the rule, as first announced by Justice
Story in United States v. Perez, 78 is that a retrial can occur only if
there existed a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial.2 79 Although this
principle has been repeated ad nauseam by the Court, 80 the Court's
decisions provide notably little guidance as to what constitutes "manifest necessity. '281 The Court, however, has allowed retrials after the
declaration of mistrials to which defendants did not consent and whose
necessity was far from manifest. 282 Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear
that when a mistrial is declared over a defendant's objection, a retrial is
permissible only when the problem that prompted the mistrial is not
susceptible to prosecutorial manipulation, 8 and the mistrial is consistent with the fair administration of criminal justice.
When, however, a mistrial is granted at the defendant's request,
there is no double jeopardy predisposition against retrial. A defendant's
request for a mistrial may be viewed as "a deliberate election on his
part to forego his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined
before the first trier of fact."28 4 Yet, it cannot be that double jeopardy
protection is completely and automatically forsaken as a consequence of
a defendant's mistrial motion. Otherwise, prosecutors would have both
the leeway and the incentive to force the abortion of trials that were not
going as they wished by engaging in improper conduct that would leave
217822
279

U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).

Id. at 580.

280 See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461 (1973);
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 481 (1971); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364,
368-69 (1961); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689-90 (1949).
21 See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 (1971) (Harlan, J., plurality
opinion) ("[T]his Court has, for the most part, explicitly declined the invitation of litigants to formulate rules based on categories of circumstances which will permit or preclude retrial."); Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 449, 451
(1977) ("In the more than 150 years since formulation of the Perez test, the course of
adjudication has provided little clarification of its meaning.").
282 See, e.g., Washington, 434 U.S. at 511 (permitting retrial after trial court
granted prosecutor's motion for mistrial because of improper opening statement by defense despite fact that "[in a strict, literal sense, the mistrial was not 'necessary' ");
Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611-12 (allowing retrial after trial judge's expulsion of one of defendant's lawyers despite option to stay proceedings pending appellate review of expulsion); Gori, 367 U.S. at 367-69 (retrial permissible after trial judge prematurely declared a mistrial sua sponte because of belief that prosecutor was about to elicit
improper testimony from a witness).
283 See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963) (barring retrial
where mistrial was granted at prosecutor's request because one of prosecutor's witnesses failed to appear for trial).
284 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978).
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a defendant little choice but to request a mistrial if the trial judge did
not grant one sua sponte. A defense motion for a mistrial in these circumstances could hardly be deemed a meaningful decision by the defendant to relinquish her right to a verdict by the first fact-finder chosen to hear her case. Thus, in some situations the double jeopardy
clause prohibits the retrial of a defendant whose first trial ends in a
mistrial because of prosecutorial misbehavior, even if the mistrial was
granted at the defendant's behest.
2.

How the Proscription Is Enforced

In Oregon v. Kennedy,28 5 a five-to-four decision, the Court held
that
the circumstances under which [a defendant who successfully
moves for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct] may
invoke the bar of double jeopardy in a second effort to try
him are limited to those cases in which the conduct giving
rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to
provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 8 6
Eschewing indications in earlier cases that retrial might be barred if the
mistrial was due to prosecutorial "overreaching" 217 or "harassment, ' 28,
the Court made clear in Kennedy that "[p]rosecutorial conduct that
might be viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to
justify a mistrial on defendant's motion

. .

.

does not bar retrial absent

intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded
by the Double Jeopardy Clause."2 9
Kennedy's focus on prosecutorial intent is especially dramatic. The
Court ruled that no matter how egregious, a prosecutor's misbehavior
at trial will not bar a subsequent retrial so long as the prosecutor did
not act with the specific intent to deprive the defendant of the protection of the double jeopardy clause, and the defendant did not object to
the mistrial.29 0 In effect, not only is a defendant's double jeopardy protection from prosecutorial improprieties at trial defined solely in terms
of the prosecutor's intent, but the prohibited intent is itself defined in
285 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
288 Id. at 679.
137 See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (Harlan, J., plurality
opinion).
28 See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); Downum v. United
States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963).
28' Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76.
110 See id.
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terms of the specific interests protected by the double jeopardy
guarantee.
When a defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal"2 9 is threatened by serious prosecutorial misbehavior at trial, Kennedy does much to deny any protection of the right.
First, the decision eliminates any double jeopardy concern with
prosecutorial overreaching prompted by improper motives other than
the intent to provoke a mistrial.29 2 Thus, a defendant faced with a prosecutor who is willing to commit reversible error for other improper reasons such as an overriding desire to obtain the defendant's conviction at
trial,2 93 or to subject the defendant to repeated or protracted criminal
proceedings, 9 4 has no redress under the clause. In addition, even when
a prosecutor's improprieties are prompted by an intent to provoke a
mistrial, Kennedy is unlikely to afford a defendant relief. Despite the
Court's palliative statement that discerning whether a misbehaving
prosecutor has acted with the prohibited intent simply implicates the
"familiar" process of "[ilnferring the existence or nonexistence of intent
from objective facts and circumstances, 295 the nature and specificity of
the prohibited intent make it almost impossible to prove.29 Not only is
it "almost inconceivable that a defendant could prove that the prosecutor's deliberate misconduct was motivated by an intent to provoke a
mistrial instead of an intent simply to prejudice the defendant, 2 91 7 but,
given the severe professional and personal consequences likely to follow
a finding that a prosecutor's misbehavior at trial was done with the
purpose of provoking a mistrial,"'8 a judge will likely be reluctant to
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
2 See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-76.
291

293 This situation may arise in a highly publicized or political case. The prosecutor may believe that the benefits of obtaining a conviction after trial will not be greatly
reduced if the conviction is reversed on appeal. See Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be

Irrelevant: Government Overreachingas a Bar to Reprosecution Under the Double
Jeopardy Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 76, 97 n.107 (1983)
(arguing that after Kennedy prosecutors will be careful to demonstrate that they actually intended to convict).
'" See, e.g., Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390, 400 (E.D. La. 1971), affd,

467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).

" Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675; see also id. at 679-80 (Powell, J., concurring)
("Because 'subjective' intent often may be unknowable, I emphasize that in considering
a double jeopardy motion, a court should rely primarily upon the objective facts and
circumstances of the particular case.").

I

See Note, MistrialsArisingfrom ProsecutorialError: Double Jeopardy Pro-

tection, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1074 (1982).
Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 688 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
29
As the Oregon Supreme Court observed in rejecting the Kennedy standard
under Oregon's double jeopardy clause in reviewing Kennedy on remand from the
Court:
[A] finding that a prosecutor initially pursued a course of prejudicial mis-
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make such a finding.""' This is especially true if, to make the finding,
the judge must completely discredit a prosecutor's sworn assertions3 00
that she acted with an intent other than that prohibited by Kennedy.
The stringency in Kennedy, moreover, is not greatly ameliorated
by the two other mechanisms available for protecting the double jeopardy interests threatened by a prosecutor's prejudicial misconduct at
trial: a sua sponte declaration of a mistrial by the trial judge and appellate reversal of any resulting conviction. With respect to the first mechanism, a trial judge may respond to a prosecutor's misbehavior with a
sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, after which any retrial would have
to be justified on the basis of "manifest necessity" if the defendant did
not agree to the mistrial."0 1 However, due to understandable caution,
trial judges are unlikely to declare a mistrial without obtaining the defendant's acquiescence on the record, which then would trigger the
Kennedy standard. Moreover, even without the defendant's consent to
the mistrial, it is doubtful that a court's sua sponte mistrial declaration
would bar retrial. In the one instance in which the Court evaluated the
"manifest necessity" of a mistrial declared sua sponte by the trial judge
in response to perceived prosecutorial misbehavior at trial, the Court,
giving great deference to the trial court's discretion, found retrial permissible even though the mistrial declaration was premature and of dubious necessity.3 °2
Under the second mechanism available for ensuring double jeopardy protection, the defendant may opt to have the tainted trial proceed
to verdict despite the presence of serious prosecutorial overreaching. Alconduct for the purpose of forcing a mistrial is a grave matter. Such behavior is a contempt of court. It is also a violation of professional standards that can lead to disbarment or other discipline, and perhaps of
federal civil rights statutes. A judge prepared to make such a finding properly would not only declare a mistrial without possibility of reprosecution
but also report the episode to the Oregon State Bar.
State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 275-76, 666 P.2d 1316, 1325-26 (1983) (citations
omitted).
299 See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 482 n.1 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
200 Because the double jeopardy inquiry focuses on the prosecutor's subjective intent, the prosecutor likely would have to take the stand if there were a hearing in
connection with a defendant's double jeopardy motion. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 688
n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Thomas v. Sumner, 610 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D.
Nev. 1985) (noting that trial judge properly conducted full and fair hearing as to the
prosecutor's intent behind improper questioning). Even in the absence of a hearing, it
would seem prudent, if not necessary, for a prosecutor to respond to a defendant's
double jeopardy motion with an affidavit setting forth the prosecutor's motives in taking
the improper action. See United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 138 n.4 (8th Cir.
1977).
301 See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
302 See Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 365-66, 369 (1961).
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though this choice superficially preserves a defendant's right to a verdict from the first fact-finder chosen to hear his case, it does so largely
in form, because prosecutorial misbehavior sufficiently serious to warrant a mistrial is apt to induce a conviction at trial. Nor are the defendant's double jeopardy interests likely to be vindicated on appeal of the
conviction. A reversal will not preserve the defendant's interest in being
judged by the first tribunal because reversal ordinarily does not prevent
the defendant from being retried. 3 '
Summary
There is a pervasive inclination to analyze constitutional challenges to a prosecutor's actions in terms of the prosecutor's motives or
knowledge when taking them. This preference exists no matter when
during the criminal process the challenged prosecutorial action occurred, from the initiation of charges through the trial itself. It also cuts
across a wide range of constitutional provisions, including the double
jeopardy, due process, equal protection, and grand jury clauses, under
which a prosecutor's actions may be challenged.
'o' Even if the defendant can convince an appellate court that the prosecutor acted
with the intent prohibited by Kennedy, it appears that the double jeopardy clause may
not bar the defendant's retrial after the reversal of his conviction on appeal. The Court
in Kennedy indicated that where a conviction is reversed on appeal on account of a
prosecutor's misbehavior, a retrial is permissible even if the conviction is reversed on
grounds that would have warranted a mistrial and barred a retrial had the mistrial
been granted. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 & n.6; id. at 687 n.22 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although this is consistent with the Court's statement in United States v. Scott,
437 U.S. 82 (1978), that "[tihe successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any
ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses no bar
to further prosecution," id. at 90-91 (citations omitted), it is at odds with the logic of
the Court's decision in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). In Burks, the Court
held that the double jeopardy guarantee precludes the retrial of a defendant whose
conviction is reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence, reasoning that "to hold otherwise would create a purely arbitrary distinction between those [who have their convictions reversed on appeal because of insufficient evidence] and others who would enjoy
the benefit of a correct decision by the District Court [to direct a verdict of acquittal]."
Id. at 11. At least where the trial court erroneously denies a defendant's mistrial motion that would bar retrial under Kennedy, this logic would seem to bar retrial after a
conviction is reversed on appeal because of prosecutorial misbehavior that prompted the
erroneously denied mistrial motion.
The courts of appeals have recognized the strength of this argument, but have
declined to rule on its merits. See, e.g., United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 238-40
(8th Cir.) (permitting retrial after conviction reversed because of judicial misconduct),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 273 (1986); Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d 298, 306 (5th Cir.
1982) (permitting retrial because trial errors did not evince a deliberate attempt to
provoke a mistrial required to bar reprosecution); United States v. Singleterry, 683
F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir.) (upholding trial court finding that prosecutor's references to
defendant's prior convictions were not intended to provoke mistrial, a prerequisite to
barring retrial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982).
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One area, however, remains somewhat resistant to the preference
for intent-based analysis: challenges to a prosecutor's grand jury presentation. In that context, the preference is undercut by the presence of
three factors-a basis for objective assessment of the harm to the defendant, the existence of objective rules governing some of the commonly challenged actions, and the enhanced judicial authority over that
sphere of prosecutorial behavior. The extent to which the absence of
these factors dictates a concern with intent is discussed in Part III.
II.

THE SYSTEMIC COSTS OF INTENT-BASED ANALYSIS

The difficulties and confusion in such areas as selective prosecution, vindictive charging, and the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges are symptomatic of the dysfunctional consequences of an intent-based analysis. No matter what the particular area of prosecutorial
activity at issue, there are certain systemic costs that are apt to flow
from an unreflective preference for analyzing constitutional challenges
to prosecutorial behavior in terms of the prosecutor's intent. This section will discuss these systemic costs.'"
A. Fostering Ad Hoc Adjudication
at the Expense of Rule Formation
Because intent-based analysis focuses on what the prosecutor
thought rather than on what the prosecutor did, it impedes the formulation of rules governing prosecutorial behavior.3 °5 This is especially so
because prosecutorial intent is the bellwether of constitutionality, 0 6 and
not, as in the fourth amendment area, a determinant of remedy once a
violation is found. Consequently, courts lack the leeway to evaluate the
constitutionality of the prosecutor's action apart from the question of
intent that exists in the adjudication of fourth amendment challenges to
3" Of course, the mere fact that the costs exist is not reason enough to eschew
intent-based analysis. Such costs and, consequently, the preference for intent-based
analysis, might be justified by the systemic benefits that accrue from intent-based analysis, an issue examined in Section III, or because within each area of prosecutorial
activity, the alternatives to intent-based analysis, including rule formulation, generate
even greater dysfunctional consequences. The latter inquiry is reserved for Section IV.
305 Cf Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335, 359-62 (1983)
(focusing on police behavior).
30 This is true whether prosecutorial intent is (a) the sole basis for finding a
constitutional violation, as it is in the grand jury process, peremptory challenge, and
double jeopardy mistrial areas, (b) a necessary element of the constitutional violation,
as it is in the selective and, perhaps, vindictive prosecution areas, or (c) an additional
reason for finding a constitutional violation, as it is in the grand jury presentation and
Brady areas.
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police activity, 0 7 an area considerably less amenable to judicial control."' The result is a corpus juris that provides remarkably few hard
and fast rules governing prosecutorial activity.
There are several reasons why such rules are desirable. First, from
a systemic standpoint, prosecutors exercise extraordinary power.309
There is no other "single official [who] can invoke society's harshest
sanctions on the basis of ad hoc personal judgments." 1 ° Not only does
the prosecutor exercise power virtually unparalleled in terms of both
breadth and consequences, she remains largely unaccountable in so doing.311 Simply put, the expansive terrain of prosecutorial discretion
needs more visible boundary markers.
Second, there is an inherent tension in the prosecutor's role. That
tension flows from the prosecutor's responsibility to function both as a
quasi-judicial official and as the state's advocate against the defendant. 1 2 Prohibitions couched in terms of the prosecutor's mental state
tend to exacerbate this tension by forcing the prosecutor to justify, in
neutral terms, actions that often are prompted by adversarial instincts.
Nonintent-based rules, on the other hand, relieve this tension by defining the prosecutor's adversarial framework."1 The more a prosecutor
knows about the constraints on her activities, the better she is able to
evaluate discretionary choices such as whether to prosecute or what
31 4
charges to bring in the first place.
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984).
See infra note 345 and accompanying text.
309 As Justice Jackson, himself a former prosecutor, once put it: "The prosecutor
has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America."
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 18, 18 (1940).
310 Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1555.
311 See id. at 1554-56; Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges:A
Quantitative Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 47 U. CH. L. REv. 246, 303 (1980)
("the huge discretion of the U.S. Attorney can distort or swallow up all but the most
massive reform efforts").
312 See infra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
1 See Adlerstein, Ethics, FederalProsecutors, and FederalCourts: Some Recent
10
308

Problems, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 755, 758 (1978) (according to a former prosecutor,
"[i]n view of the ethical dilemma that is often faced, it would be helpful for the prosecutor to have a body of standards to which he could refer for guidance in particular
situations").
31, Similar concerns over broad discretion and the need for dispassionate evaluation by the official exercising it have led to a preference for bright-line rules in the
fourth amendment area. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982)
(permitting search of closed containers in motor vehicle if there is probable cause to
search the vehicle); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (allowing detention of persons found at the scene of the execution of a warrant to search for contraband); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (requiring probable cause for
any detention or custodial interrogation); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 10911 (1977) (finding that a motorist can be ordered out of vehicle following a traffic
arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (permitting a search inci-
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Finally, the process of prosecution is full of uncertainty for the
defendant, which both provokes anxiety and hinders informed decisionmaking. Intent-based limitations are ill-suited to alleviate this uncertainty. Instead, when the prosecutor's mental state is the fulcrum of the
constitutional restrictions on her actions, a defendant will draw the conclusion naturally and commonly drawn by defendants. That is, a defendant will believe that her fate is largely tied to the prosecutor's subjective feelings towards her. Moreover, because many defendants are
less than confident in the purity of prosecutorial motives, they are apt
to view intent-based restrictions with a good deal of skepticism. In contrast, nonintent-based rules provide concrete restraints on prosecutorial
behavior that are likely to make the system seem more rational and
fair, regardless of whether the rules are ultimately more advantageous
to defendants.31 5
The development of rules governing prosecutorial behavior is unlikely to occur at significant levels outside the context of constitutional
adjudication during the criminal process.3" 6 Prosecutors' offices have
not rushed to adopt guidelines on their own.1 The rules they do issue
tend to be sufficiently general and hortatory that deviations are difficult
to prove. Moreover, even when deviations are demonstrable, voluntarily
adopted guidelines usually contain the neutering caveat that the rules
are solely for the guidance of the prosecutors and do not confer any
enforceable rights upon defendants. 8 ' This may account for the fact
dent to a lawful arrest).
313 Experience with indeterminate sentencing supports the notion that defendants,
like most people, place a good deal of value on certainty. Under indeterminate sentencing schemes, a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for an indefinite period of time,
with her release determined by a board that periodically reviews the defendant's suitability for release. Regardless of whether defendants as a group serve less time than they
would have under a more "determinate" scheme, a commonly perceived vice of indeterminate sentencing is the "prolonged and cruel suspense for the prisoners affected."
Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 737 (1980).
3s16Civil suits are effectively unavailable as a rulemaking mechanism because
prosecutors have absolute immunity for acts performed in "initiating a prosecution and
.. . presenting the State's case." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); cf.
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-16 (1978) (giving federal agency officials performing prosecutor-like duties absolute immunity from damages liability arising from
their actions in initiating an administrative proceeding).
3I Cf. Gifford, supra note 26, at 673 (proposing a requirement that prosecutors
prepare written reasons for declining to proceed with a particular criminal charge, and
the use of guidelines by the prosecutor's office in order to facilitate review of these
explanations).
"' For example, the U.S. Department of Justice Principles of Federal Prosecution provides:
The principles set forth herein, and internal office procedures adopted
pursuant hereto, are intended solely for the guidance of attorneys for the
government. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon
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that courts consistently refuse to dismiss criminal charges because of the
prosecutor's failure to comply with written charging guidelines."' 9
Ethical rules promulgated by professional associations may provide a needed external enforcement mechanism, as well as occasional
guidance.320 Nevertheless, for the most part, ethical guidelines are too
general, too infrequently revised, and too rarely refined through actual
applications2" to serve as the primary vehicles for delineating the constraints on prosecutorial activity. Moreover, ethical rules have historically had a reactive rather than a generative relationship with constitutional decisionmaking. That is, they tend to codify rather than evolve
apart from established constitutional principles. 2 2 Although this sort of
development is understandable given that the thrust of ethical rules is
defining the grounds for professional discipline, their reactive orientation is hardly conducive to rule development.
to create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
by a party to litigation with the United States.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION Part A, Rule
5, [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE PRINCIPLES] reprintedin 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)
3277 (1980).
310 See Gifford, supra note 26, at 704.
320 See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text. The Code of Professional Responsibility should guide Department of Justice Attorneys. See Standards of Conduct
for the Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1(b) (1986).
321 Not only are prosecutors rarely subjected to disciplinary action as a result of
their prosecutorial activity, but one commentator found that "[n]o published federal
decision has ever granted relief based solely upon a prosecutor's failure to adhere to

.. . advisory standards," such as the ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note
153, or the NDAA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153. Holderman, Preindictment ProsecutorialConduct in the Federal System, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1980).
322 For example, the original version of REVISED ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 3-4.2(c), dealing with the situations under which a prosecutor could fail to live up to a plea agreement, was revised because it conflicted with
the Court's subsequent decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). REVISED

ABA

PROSECUTION STANDARDS,

supra note 153, at § 3-4.2, History of Stan-

dard, at 3.66. Similarly, the original ABA Prosecution Standard § 4.3, requiring that
"[a] prosecutor may not properly participate in a disposition by plea of guilty if he is
aware that the accused persists in denying guilt or the factual basis for the plea, without disclosure to the court," was deleted from the revised standards because of the
Court's decision in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). REVISED ABA
PROSECUTION STANDARDS,

supra note 153, at § 3-4.2, Histoy of Standard, at 3.66.

This is especially revealing since the old standard was not inconsistent with, but simply
more restrictive than, Alford, which held that a court may accept a guilty plea even if a
defendant persists in denying guilt, so long as the plea is knowingly and voluntarily
entered.
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B. Fostering Inconsistent Adjudication
Because of Problems of Ascertainability
Although inquiries into mental state are undeniably common
under American law, it remains true that it is easier to determine what
someone did than what she thought while doing it. Thus, unless governed by highly structured rules of proof, 2 ' an intent-based analysis is
likely to lead to less predictable results than a nonintent-based approach. When the intent in question is prosecutorial intent, two commonly recurring issues exacerbate the difficulty of obtaining consistent
results.
The first issue concerns whose intent is legally significant. Especially in larger prosecution offices, different prosecutors may be responsible for various phases of the same case. The prosecutor who seeks
increased charges after some defense maneuver may simply disagree
with the charging decision of the prosecutor who initially handled the
case. The prosecutor who fails 'to reveal that a trial witness made inconsistent statements during a pretrial interview may be unfamiliar
with those statements because a different prosecutor conducted that interview. Moreover, the participation of multiple prosecutors is but one
aspect of the problem. There is also the issue of the extent to which
prosecutors should be held accountable for the intention of other actors
in the law enforcement process. This problem poses even more difficult
and less predictably answered questions. Does a prosecutor act with
discriminatory intent when she relies upon citizen complaints to bring
violations to her attention if suspect selectivity is exercised by the complaining citizenry?3 2 4 Does a prosecutor "know" about exculpatory evidence if such evidence is known to the police but does not appear in the
prosecutor's files?25
The second obstacle to consistent results is the question of mixed
motives. Frequently, there are several reasons behind a prosecutor's decision to file or increase charges, call someone before the grand jury, or
exercise a peremptory strike against a prospective juror; and prosecutors rarely document their reasons for taking such actions. Thus, even
assuming agreement on both the precise nature of the prohibited intent
and the causal role that that intent must play to invalidate the prosecuSee infra text following note 337.
See People v. Tornatore, 46 Misc. 2d 908, 910, 261 N.Y.S.2d 474, 478-79
(Poughkeepsie City Ct. 1965); Alexander, Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 925, 946 (1978); Bice, Motivational Analysis as a Complete Explanation of the Justification Process, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1131, 1132 n.6 (1978).
325 See supra note 214.
323

324
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tor's action-difficult issues in their own right 2e--the recurrence of
mixed motive problems and the difficulty in securing probative evidence
to resolve them virtually ensure the inconsistent resolution of challenges
evaluated under an intent-based scheme. 2 7
C.

The Costs of Efficiency, Integrity, and Legitimacy

Ascertaining prosecutorial intent often entails discovery.2 8 and
may require an evidentiary hearing or other subsidiary proceedings 32 9-procedures that prolong the adjudicatory process. Such proceedings burden not only the prosecutor's time, but also her integrity.
When a prosecutor is questioned about her intent, and that intent is
dispositive of a claim that the prosecutor opposes, the prosecutor faces
enormous pressure to rationalize her actions as permissibly motivated.
This dynamic is unlikely to be lost on defendants. Consequently, even
if the prosecutor's disclaimer of any improper intent is entirely truthful,
which will often be the case, a defendant on the losing end of a motion
will be reluctant to accept it as such. From a defendant's standpoint, a
ruling that turns on accepting the prosecutor's professed "good" intentions at her word loses much of its legitimacy.
D.

The Disincentive to ProsecutorialCompetency

To the extent that careless or ignorant prosecutorial actions remain beyond the ambit of intent-based constitutional restraints, such
restraints disserve the goal of promoting responsible prosecutorial behavior. For example, making an illicit motivation the only bar to filing
increased postindictment charges provides no incentive to rationalize
charging practices. Haphazard charging practices will remain unchecked. Similarly, tying a prosecutor's obligation to reveal exculpatory
evidence to her knowledge of the existence of such evidence discourages,
rather than encourages, thorough prosecutorial investigation and full
police candor with the prosecutor. Conditioning double jeopardy protection on the prosecutor's intent to provoke a mistrial, moreover, does
not spur training concerning impermissible trial practices, since a prosecutor's ignorance that the maneuver was impermissible will prevent
31' See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.

Indeed, as decisions evaluating the constitutionality of the government's "passive enforcement" policy for selecting individuals for prosecution for failing to register
for the draft illustrate, even when reasonably good evidence concerning the prosecutor's
intent is available, determining what that intent is may still be difficult. See supra notes
31-32 and accompanying text.
328 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
32
See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
311
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the imposition of the double jeopardy bar to retrial if a mistrial is declared. Nor does intent-based double jeopardy analysis dissuade prosecutors who do know the rules from engaging in improper trial tactics
when the temptation to do so is strongest: in weak cases when the prosecutor is willing to risk reversal on appeal in order to bolster her
chances of obtaining a conviction at trial. The prosecutor's intention in
such situations is to obtain a conviction, not to prompt a mistrial.
E.

The Cost of Hypocrisy

If, as we have seen, the prosecutor's intent determines the constitutionality of a considerable spectrum of actions, the question arises as to
why all prosecutorial actions are not subject to challenge on the
grounds of impermissible motivation. Actions challengeable on the
grounds of improper intent are neither the only, nor necessarily the
most, important ones a prosecutor may take in determining a defendant's fate. A prosecutor's refusal to accept a defendant's plea offer can
be as crucial to a defendant as the prosecutor's institution of additional
charges against her. A prosecutor's decision to immunize one codefendant rather than another may affect each defendant no less than the
prosecutor's decision to institute charges in the first place. Yet, like
many other prosecutorial actions, refusals to accept plea offers and decisions concerning who to immunize generally remain beyond defense
challenge and judicial scrutiny, whatever the motivations involved. If
purity of prosecutorial intent is truly the pre-eminent concern in evaluating the constitutionality of prosecutorial actions, then it could well be
argued that all prosecutorial decisions of consequence should be subject
to challenge on the ground of improper motivation.
III.

THE SYSTEMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTENT-BASED ANALYSIS

As demonstrated in Section II, there are a number of costs inherent in making prosecutorial intent the linchpin of constitutional challenges to the prosecutor's behavior. There are, however, several systemic considerations that might be advanced to justify these costs and,
consequently, create a systemic preference for intent-based analysis.
This section examines these justifications.
A.

Fostering the Reality or the Appearance of Fairness

The preference for intent-based analysis is at least partially driven
by an assumed connection between prosecutorial intent and fairness.
This linkage is weaker than meets the eye. The prosecutor's role con-
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tains both adversarial and judicial. 3 elements. 3 1 These dual characteristics yield the most important benchmarks of the fairness of
prosecutorial behavior: the adequacy of the procedural safeguards surrounding the behavior and its apparent evenhandedness. 2
Prosecutorial intent has little to do with procedural adequacy. If
certain actions are prohibited, it is because those actions interfere to an
unacceptable degree with the fair formulation or disposition of the
charges against the defendant. The objective circumstances of the
prosecutorial action, such as whether charges added post-indictment are
based on newly discovered evidence or on information known to the
prosecutor at the time of the initial indictment, may affect this determination.33 3 The prosecutor's motivations in taking the action, however,
do not. The very idea of procedural safeguards is to erect mechanisms
that ensure just adjudication against improper state maneuvers,
whatever the motivation behind them.
Evenhandedness, the second gauge of fairness in a criminal proceeding, is primarily a function of two factors: the impartiality of the
prosecutorial decisionmaker and the objective consistency of the results
that the prosecutor's decisionmaking yields. Impartiality may be
330 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-24 (1976) (analogizing the common law immunity of prosecutors to that of the judiciary, and noting the prosecutor's
duty as the public's adversary).
331 The most oft-quoted acknowledgment of the dual nature of a prosecutor's responsibilities is found in Berger v. United States:

The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
332 A defendant's interest in evenhanded treatment is, however, a limited one.
This is because of the essentially nonrational and haphazard nature of crime detection
and apprehension. A defendant caught selling a small quantity of narcotics in an undercover drug operation has no valid claim that she ought to be treated like other similarly situated dealers, the vast majority of whom are never caught. Her claim is that
she ought to be treated like others in her position who are caught.
"s8There are, of course, a variety of basic procedural guarantees that are not
circumstance-dependent. Among them are the right to counsel, see Gideon v.
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and the right to a jury trial for any offense punishable
by more than six months, see Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), where the
jury must be composed of at least six persons, see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978).
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achieved through the use of nonintent-based mechanisms that ensure
the removal of a biased prosecutor. In protecting the goal of judicial
impartiality, the Court has frequently focused not on-the subjective bias
of the assertedly partial judge, but on whether the objective factors present create an intolerable potential for the judge to act in a nonneutral
fashion. 3 4 Given that judicial impartiality is even more central to fairness concerns than prosecutorial neutrality 35 a similar approach could
be used to ensure against prosecutorial bias. 3 6
Objective consistency is best achieved through rule-oriented,
nonintent-based constraints rather than an intent-based analysis. The
most expeditious way to ensure equal treatment when an intolerable
potential for disparate treatment exists is to formulate objective rules
that limit prosecutorial actions. Constitutional prohibitions couched in
terms of the prosecutor's mental state are inherently less likely to yield
consistent results because of the problems of proof and ascertainable37
ness that attend them.
When, however, the proof problems can be alleviated, intent-based
analysis may promote consistency, albeit indirectly. The best means of
easing proof problems where intent is at issue is through the use of
objectifying presumptions which require the prosecutor to articulate a
verifiable justification for a challenged action once the defendant makes
a specified showing. Such presumptions encourage consistency both because the prospect of. public explication they raise spurs rational decisionmaking, and because the justification they require exposes the considerations that affect the challenged action to judicial as well as public
scrutiny. An intent-based analysis that focuses only on the existence vel
non of a specified improper motive is unlikely to generate such benefits
with any regularity.
B.

Disciplining the Prosecutor

A second reason to consider the prosecutor's intent in evaluating
3" See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250 (1977) (per curiam) (due
process denied when justice of the peace received payment only for the issuance of a
warrant and not for denial); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57 (1975) (due process
not denied when adjudicatory and investigative functions combined within an agency);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (due process denied when judge has direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the trial); see also Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 495503 (1986) (suggesting various structural mechanisms to ensure adjudicatory
independence).
See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1980).
For a discussion of such an approach, see infra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
337 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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the constitutionality of her actions is the disciplinary function that a
declaration of unconstitutionality might serve. Because of the strong
link between culpability and mental state,3 38 to the extent that disciplinary considerations are part of the constitutional calculus, the prosecutor's mental state arguably should be as well. A prosecutor who has
purposefully violated a defendant's rights is, according to this notion, a
more fitting candidate for constitutional disapprobation than one who
has done so unwittingly.
As a preliminary matter, it is doubtful that disciplining law enforcement officials is a function of the constitutional guarantees protecting defendants in criminal proceedings. The disciplinary notion is
strongly undercut by the Court's increasing insistence that a defendant
demonstrate harm as a necessary element of claiming a constitutional
violation, no matter how egregious the behavior of the government's
agents. 8 ' Disciplinary action also runs counter to the standing requirements of the fourth" 0 and fifth 4 1 amendments, which prevent a defendant from challenging the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained
from others. Even assuming that a decision on the constitutionality of
prosecutorial behavior will serve some disciplinary interest, it may do
so ineffectively. An important reason for punishing an official, including declaring her behavior unconstitutional, is to deter similar misconduct in the future. Disciplinary action, however, seeks to deter the repetition of unacceptable behavior, not the harboring of bad intentions.
Turning the constitutionality of the prosecutor's actions on what the
prosecutor thought as opposed to what the prosecutor did diminishes
the disciplinary force of declarations of unconstitutionality by making it
more difficult for prosecutors to ascertain what behavior is
prohibited."4 2
This may be why the subjective intent of law enforcement personnel does not factor into the question whether their actions violate the
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Official Draft 1962).
33' See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361
SIB

(1981).

34 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
34 See People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 529 (1968); People v. Condley, 69 Cal. App. 3d 999,
138 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1977).
See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 154 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(when a statute is vague as to what actions it prohibits, a court cannot remedy the
vagueness by manipulating the mens rea requirement); Ashdown, supra note 305, at
338.
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fourth amendment.4 3 In the event a violation is found, the good or bad
faith of the police is relevant only to the question of remedy, that is,
whether the exclusionary rule should apply. 44 In that context, moreover, the "good faith" of the police is determined by a highly objective
standard that turns on the degree to which the police action was consistent with fourth amendment rules as they appeared at the time the
action was taken."' In effect, the good faith "exception" to the exclusionary rule works as a cushion to protect law enforcement personnel
against being penalized because of "fuzziness" in the then existing
fourth amendment rules. Consequently, intent in the fourth amendment
area serves not as a vehicle for avoiding a substantive decision on the
propriety of a challenged police action, but as a determinant whether
punishment is warranted if that action is found to be constitutionally
impermissible. Second, finding their actions unconstitutional is a haphazard means of disciplining prosecutors. In a number of constitutional
challenges to prosecutorial behavior, harm is either a component of the
constitutional claim itself, as in the Brady area, 46 or the claim is subject to some formulation of the harmless error rule, 47 as it is when a
prosecutor's grand jury presentation is at issue.3 48 When a claim turns
on harm, its disposition largely depends upon factors divorced from the
prosecutor's culpability, most notably the strength of the evidence
against the defendant. The disciplinary effect of declaring the prosecutor's actions unconstitutional is, therefore, undercut.
Harm is not, however, a factor in all constitutional challenges to
prosecutorial behavior. There are certain claims, generally those which
implicate a right "cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction,"3 49 in which a finding that the prosecutor acted improperly and
violated the right requires automatic reversal. In such instances, any
disciplinary force that inheres in a declaration of unconstitutionality is
not diluted by the filter of harmlessness analysis. Thus, to the extent
that disciplinary considerations militate for intent-based analysis, they
11 See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-39 (1978) (rejecting argument
that subjective intent makes an otherwise lawful action unconstitutional); see also
United States v. Rowell, 612 F.2d 1176, 1177-79 (7th Cir. 1980) (validity of arrest
dependent on probable cause); Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 302-03 (8th
Cir.) (validity of arrest dependent on probable cause), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859
(1969).
-14 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-17 (1984).
345 See id. at 922-24 & n.23.
a" See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Whitely v. Warden,
401 U.S. 560 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Anderson v. Nelson,
390 U.S. 523 (1968); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
34 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
39 Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970).
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do so when harm to the defendant plays no role in the constitutional
inquiry, either because it is presumed, as in the selective and vindictive
prosecution areas, or because it is irrelevant, as in the peremptory challenge discrimination area.
C. Respecting Institutional Competence
Finally, it might be argued that by alleviating the need for courts
to formulate more objective rules, intent-based analysis prevents judicial
meddling into areas appropriately left to the executive and enables
courts to avoid immersion into matters beyond their institutional competence. There is little doubt that the courts view this concern as a
powerful one. This is evident not only from their preoccupation with
3 50
separation of powers issues when charging decisions are involved,
but also conversely from their increasing willingness to disapprove, on a
nonintent basis, certain prosecutorial practices before the grand jury, an
institution over which the courts exercise supervisory authority.
Yet to the degree that institutional competence concerns drive the
judicial inclination towards intent-based restraints to circumscribe
prosecutorial improprieties, it is hard to square the contrary preference
the courts have displayed for objective rules to govern police behavior.
The latter preference is visible in the fourth amendment area, where
the courts have increasingly eschewed a concern with the subjective
motivations of police in favor of rule-oriented adjudication governing
the conduct of searches and seizures, 51 as well as in decisions under
the fifth amendment governing police interrogation practices. The
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona3 52 inaugurated a nonintentbased regime for regulating questioning by law enforcement personnel;
the Court has insisted that the key elements of that scheme-whether a
defendant is "in custody" and whether the police conduct towards the
defendant constitutes "interrogation"-turn on objective considerations
rather than the intent of the police. 53
See supra note 10.
See supra notes 344-45 and accompanying text. See generally Ashdown, supra
note 305, at 335 (discussing the judicial belief in both the need to provide concrete
guidelines and the need to maintain flexibility through a case by case determination of
the reasonableness of police conduct).
350
351

352

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

"' In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the Court considered whether
a motorist stopped for a routine traffic stop was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda.
After evaluating the degree to which traffic stops in general are coercive, see id. at 43739, the Court held that a motorist detained by a policeman during a traffic stop was not
"in custody," even if the policeman involved in a particular stop actually intended to
take the motorist into custody. See id. at 442.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Court held that the inquiry
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Whatever one may think about the current state of fourth or fifth
amendment law, surely the courts are no more institutionally competent
or constitutionally empowered to "police the police" than they are to
regulate the practices of prosecutors who practice before them daily.
The police, like prosecutors, are creatures of the executive branch. The
range of factual variation and nuance possible in the situations to
which the police must respond is such that many prosecutorial decisions
seem binary by compayison. Moreover, the problems confronting the
police are likely to be dynamic in nature because the context in which
police work is performed is constantly changing in response to new
methods and strategies of committing as well as detecting crime. In contrast, the problems raised by prosecutorial practices tend to be somewhat static because the legal process which provides the context for a
prosecutor's activities is apt to change little over time. Prosecutorial
practices thus would seem to provide a more hospitable terrain for objective restraints than police practices.
Comparison with the regulation of police behavior aside, institutional competence is not a persuasive reason to prefer intent to
nonintent-based restraints as the means for controlling prosecutorial
abuses. The notion that institutional competence creates this preference
rests on two premises: first, that intent-based restraints intrude less on
prosecutorial prerogatives than objective restraints; and second, that
prosecutorial behavior is generally unsusceptible to objective restraints,
leaving prosecutorial intent as the only available basis for constitutional
regulation.
Both of these premises, however, are questionable. With respect to
the first, it is important to remember that when a prosecutor's behavior
implicates constitutional guarantees, the question is not whether the
prosecutor's actions are subject to judicial scrutiny, but how the necessary judicial supervision will be exercised. There is nothing inherently
unobtrusive about intent-based restraints. Procedurally, as is evident
from the selective prosecution, vindictive charging, and peremptory
challenge areas, such restraints may require collateral proceedings, the
disclosure of prosecutorial files, and the cross examination of prosecutors in open court. Substantively, intent-based restraints may subject a
broader range of prosecutorial behavior to judicial scrutiny than
nonintent-based restrictions. For example, the current law of charging
vindictiveness allows a defendant to challenge a wide array of postindictment charge increases as vindictive. The range of such challenges
into whether police behavior constitutes "interrogation" should be conducted "without
regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police." Id. at 301.
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would almost certainly shrink under a nonintent-based scheme that
clearly delineated both the procedural rights that could support a vindictiveness claim, as well as the circumstances, such as the discovery of
new evidence, that would justify increased charges in the wake of a
defendant's exercise of such rights."
With respect to the second premise, the issue of whether intentbased analysis is compelled by the lack of objective alternatives is best
examined area by area, as it is in the next section, rather than answered on a systemic basis. Nevertheless, it is worth making the general observation that claims that an area is not susceptible to objective
restraints but is susceptible to intent-based regulation should be viewed
cautiously. The ascertainability of impermissible intent is largely dependent upon the existence of some objective benchmarks governing the
challenged action. The less clear it is that the prosecutor should not
have done what she did, the more difficult it is to conclude that she took
the action for impermissible reasons. 55
For example, in the prosecutorial vindictiveness area, a good deal
of the confusion stems from the failure of courts, other than in the plea
bargaining context, to set forth the objective circumstances under which
charges may be increased postindictment. In the peremptory challenge
area, questions will undoubtedly arise concerning the propriety of the
prosecutor's striking jurors on the basis of factors that correlate strongly
with race, such as economic status or location of residence. It is obviously difficult to decide whether such strikes have been prompted by an
impermissible discriminatory intent without first deciding whether peremptory strikes may be exercised on the basis of race linked factors
such as economic status or residence.
The notion that the difficulty of formulating objective rules to govern prosecutorial behavior in a particular area should be examined,
rather than assumed, is confirmed by developments in the grand jury
presentation area. On the surface, that area would seem difficult to regulate through rule formulation because of the broad variety of challenged prosecutorial actions. Yet it is the grand jury presentation area
in which the courts have been least inclined to focus on prosecutorial
intent.
Summary
In sum, systemic considerations appear inadequate to justify a
'" See infra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.
3' See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 149-57 (1945) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
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general preference for intent-based analysis in deciding constitutional
challenges to prosecutorial behavior. They do, however, point to two
factors that might justify intent-based analysis in a particular area: the
absence of a concern with harm and the unavailability of objective constraints. The first is of limited force, however, because it is pegged to
the questionable proposition that findings of unconstitutionality should
serve a disciplinary function. In addition, systemic considerations also
point to the type of intent-based analysis-that which utilizes objectifying presumptions to require the prosecutor to justify the challenged
action-which should be preferred when intent-based analysis is
warranted.
IV.

THE RESIDUAL CASE FOR INTENT-BASED ANALYSIS

It is clear that, far from being the preferred mode of evaluating
constitutional challenges to prosecutorial behavior, intent-based analysis
should be used only if there are identifiable reasons to do so. There are
three reasons why an area may not be susceptible to nonintent-based
restraints. First, doctrinal principles, especially equal protection, may
compel a concern with prosecutorial intent. Second and related, intentbased analysis may, despite its problems, be necessary to conform a
defendant's right to the constitutional interest at stake. This may be
either because it is not possible to reach all behavior that is of constitu.tional concern through the use of objective constraints, or because to do
so would significantly alter the scope of the right at issue. Finally,
echoing institutional competence concerns, objective restraints may be
too difficult for the courts to formulate or administer.
This Section returns to the six areas discussed in Section I and
examines whether an intent-based test is justified in each area by any
of these three considerations. When intent-based analysis appears to be
warranted, it examines the feasibility of using objectifying presumptions to require the prosecutor to justify the challenged action, which is
the mode of intent-based analysis that systemic considerations favor.
This Section is designed not to analyze exhaustively the feasibility of
formulating constitutionally derived rules to govern the prosecutor's behavior, but only to adumbrate the areas that might be explored and to
indicate, in a preliminary way, the conclusions that might be expected
to follow.
A.

Selective Prosecution

Due to doctrinal and practical considerations, the strength of the
case for requiring an inquiry into the prosecutor's actual motive in se-
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lective prosecution claims varies somewhat according to the asserted basis of impermissible selectivity. However, a concern with prosecutorial
intent in at least some selective prosecution claims is unavoidable. This
is because a general formulation of the selective prosecution doctrine
entirely divorced from a concern with prosecutorial intent would leave
some constitutionally reprehensible behavior beyond reach.
Such a formulation would make the infrequency of a statute's enforcement, if of sufficient magnitude, grounds for invalidating a prosecution under it regardless of the prosecutor's motive in initiating the
prosecution. 5 It could be predicated upon the due process requirement
of fair notice,3 57 the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment 58 and the doctrine of desuetude, 59 a somewhat elusive concept
that basically holds that the long and continued disuse of a statute results in its abrogation. It could also draw support from the vagueness
doctrine, 6 0 under which the Court has consistently invalidated legisla8 See Comment, Curbing the Prosecutor'sDiscretion: United States v. Falk,
supra note 10, at 396.
357 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). Lambert struck down, on due
process grounds, a conviction for violating a Los Angeles municipal ordinance that required convicted felons coming into the city more than five times within a 30-day period to register with the Chief of Police. The Court's rationale rested in part on the fact
that there was no reason for the defendant to know that her failure to register was a
crime. A defendant prosecuted for an activity for which no one else is being punished
would be able to make this "no notice" argument in even stronger terms, since the
massive nonenforcement of the law would serve as affirmative proof that the activity
was condoned.
358 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman held that the death
penalty, as administered in 1972, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment. Although the holding of the Court was contained in a brief
per curiam opinion, four of the five Justices who joined that opinion, each of whom
also wrote separately, were significantly influenced by the highly sporadic and arbitrary imposition of capital punishment. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
293-95 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-11
(White, J., concurring).
'" See Rodgers & Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IowA L. REV. 1 (1966);
cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (dismissing suit due to lack of immediate threat
of criminal prosecution, relying in part on the fact that only one prosecution was initiated since the law was enacted in 1879). But see District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1953) ("The failure of the executive branch to
enforce a law does not result in its modification or repeal.").
"I0That doctrine "requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.'" Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (citation omitted). The
Court has highlighted the close relationship between the doctrines of selective prosecution and vagueness. Traditionally, the vagueness doctrine was justified on three
grounds: the need for fair notice and warning, the need to limit the discretion vested in
law enforcement personnel, and where the law "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms," Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964), the need to
prevent the inhibition of the exercise of those freedoms, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). In Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), how-
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tion that is too susceptible to selective prosecution without any inquiry
into the motive behind the particular prosecution that serves as the vehicle for challenging the law. 6 1 Since legislative judgments should be
afforded no less, and probably more, deference than executive actions,3 62 the invalidation of legislative acts solely because of their potential for arbitrary enforcement supports the condemnation of a prosecutor's actual arbitrary enforcement of a statute, a fact inferable from the
extreme infrequency of its use, 3 without a showing that the prosecutor acted with an impermissible motive.
While doctrinally sound, a principle of selective prosecution concerned solely with the infrequency with which others in the defendant's
situation are prosecuted would require a greater showing of nonprosecution than is currently required to make out a prima facie case of
selective prosecution. 3 " Thus, there would be some impermissibly motivated prosecutions that present selective prosecution analysis would
3 65
reach but a doctrine divorced from intent would not.
Because of the Constitution's special sensitivity to race-based discrimination and the doctrinal preoccupation of the equal protection
clause with governmental intent in such matters, this shortfall is most
unacceptable when race is the asserted impermissible basis of selectivity. A concern with prosecutorial intent in race-based selective prosecution claims is thus unavoidable. The use of evidentiary presumptions
that objectify the proof of discriminatory intent is, however, both a feasible and desirable means of vindicating that concern. First, the use of
objectifying presumptions to prove racial discrimination is well established in other areas of the law, including jury selection 6 6 and Title
ever, the Court emphasized that "the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine 'is
not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.'" Id. at 358

(quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 574).
"I See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 352; Goguen, 415 U.S. 566; Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971);

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
82 See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,

1077-87 (1969).
"' There are two situations in which a state's interest in prosecuting under a
dormant criminal statute may be justified as not being arbitrary and capricious. The
first is when the prosecutor uses the statute as a vehicle for bringing a test case, with
the anticipation that success will lead to its use in future prosecutions. The second is
when changes in legal doctrine render the statute applicable to a range of behavior
previously difficult to prosecute under it. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 181-87

(1961).

See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
This number would undoubtedly be very small, if only because selective prosecution claims under current law so rarely succeed.
"88 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
38

38
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VII litigation.367 Second, because under present law the proof required
to establish the first prong of a selective prosecution claim-that others
similarly situated have not been prosecuted 3 6 -will often contain statistics showing a disproportionate number of prosecutions against minorities, selective prosecution claims are especially amenable to the use
of objectifying presumptions.'6 9 Third, the benefits that flow from requiring the prosecutor to justify her actions, such as the inducement
towards regularity and the articulation of factors that affect the decision, are desperately needed in the charging area. This is especially
true when, as will often be the case in selective prosecution claims, the
statutes involved are enforced somewhat sporadically. Finally, the use
of objectifying presumptions to demonstrate impermissible intent should
be useful in smoking out an actual discriminatory intent. Because the
conscious use of race or ethnicity will rarely further legitimate
prosecutorial objectives, a"" the criteria available to defend a prosecution
that was, in fact, discriminatorily motivated will not explain the defendant's selection as well, making the true motive behind the prosecu.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell
Douglas, the Court set forth the initial showing required of a plaintiff to make out a
prima facie case of employment discrimination based upon the employer's discriminatory intent in highly objective terms:

The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under
the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This
may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
See supra notes 14 & 17 and accompanying text.
8 For example, once a defendant presents evidence that (1) the law is infrequently enforced against whites so that (2) a disproportionate number of defendants
against whom the law is enforced are black, a presumption may arise that requires the
state to demonstrate either that, under a neutral enforcement program, blacks are apprehended with disproportionate frequency or that, under acceptable charging considerations, blacks more frequently merit prosecution. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 608-10 (1985); United States v. Wilson, 806 F.2d 171, 176 (8th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. United States, 798 F.2d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dukehart, 687
F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1982).
370 One possible exception is the use of ethnicity in selecting defendants to prosecute for violations of the immigration laws. It is conceivable that the government could
decide that illegal aliens from a specific country are posing particular law enforcement
problems, and that resources should be concentrated on prosecuting illegal entrants
from that country. But because immigration offenses are unique in making ethnic origin (non-U.S. citizenship) the crux of the offense, it is unclear whether this possible
"4exception" is an exception at all. For claims based on selective prosecution based on
ethnicity, see Adame-Hernandez v. INS, 769 F.2d 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985); United
States v. McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d
187, 195 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tion more discernible."'
When selective prosecution claims are premised on bases of selectivity other than race-the exercise of first amendment rights or the
prosecutor's personal animosity towards the defendant-the doctrinal
imperatives mandating an inquiry into the prosecutor's motives are
weaker, although their strength varies according to the nature of the
claim. There are three distinct situations in which selective prosecution
claims premised on the defendant's exercise of her first amendment
rights may arise.
First, a defendant may be prosecuted under a statute that directly
reaches the defendant's asserted first amendment activity as well as
other activity that is not regularly prosecuted. This situation is typified
by United States v. O'Brien,7 2 in which a defendant who publicly
burned his draft card was prosecuted under a provision that declared
that a crime was committed by any person "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes" his
draft card. 3 ' The constitutionality of such prosecutions is dependent
upon the constitutionality of the provision the defendant is charged
with violating, which is a question that can readily be determined
under principles ordinarily used to evaluate first amendment challenges
to governmental proscriptions.37 4 These principles include doctrines
such as vagueness and overbreadth, which take into account the potential for enforcement patterns that would infringe on first amendment
rights, but do not focus on the prosecutor's actual intent in enforcing
the provision.
75
Second, as in cases involving the prosecution of tax protesters1
and draft registration resisters 3 76 a defendant may be prosecuted because of her activities in openly defying or protesting the law she is
charged with violating. Almost invariably, the prosecutor will defend
the targeting of such offenders on the grounds of deterrence and culpability. These bases for selection, even if not embodied in a written specific3 77 or general 78 statement of prosecutorial policy, are likely to be
371 See Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGo L.
REv. 1155, 1156-57 (1978).
372 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
373 Id. at 370.
"' See Note, supra note 18, at 149-.
171 See, e.g., United States v. Catlett, !.34 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir.
1974).
378 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); United States v.
Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); United
States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
3" See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 602-03.
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part of the charging policy in every prosecutor's office large enough to
have to exercise some discretion in enforcement. The constitutionality of
using such a policy to enforce the statute the defendant is charged with
violating may be evaluated under present doctrine without examining
the prosecutor's intent. As illustrated by the Court's recent decision in
Wayte v. United States,3 79 the issue may be decided purely on the basis
of first amendment principles. These principles reflect the importance
of the governmental interest furthered by the policy, whether that interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression-a question dependent on the nature of the interest and not on the prosecutor's motive-and the extent to which any encroachment on first amendment
protections is necessary to further the government's interest.38 0 The issue is also amenable to determination under the "fundamental rights"
branch of equal protection analysis. 8 ' There too, the focus is not on
the prosecutor's motive, 382 but on the degree to which the enforcement
policy abridges the asserted first amendment right and the strength of
the governmental interests that justify any extant infringement. 8 3
It is true that these nonintent-based analyses might not reach some
cases in which a vocal opponent of a law is prosecuted solely because of
the prosecutor's dislike of her message, a scenario that raises serious
first amendment concerns. 84 An inquiry into the prosecutor's actual
intent in instituting the prosecution, however, is unlikely to rectify this
shortfall. In contrast to the situation in which race is consciously used
as a selective factor, when a defendant is prosecuted for violating the
very law she openly disdains, 8 5 it will usually be virtually impossible
378

37
38

See DEP'T OF JUSTICE PRINCIPLES, supra note 318, at Part B, Principle 3.
470 U.S. 598 (1985).
See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 611; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376

(1968).

See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The infringement of first
amendment rights would constitute the infringement of "fundamental rights" because a
fundamental right is one that is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
82 See Note, supra note 18, at 156.
383 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson,
38

394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
384 See Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (denial of forum based
on content of speech violates first amendment and equal protection clause); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (1978).
38I See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (violating draft registration); United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (violating
draft registration), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d
940 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to file income tax returns); United States v. Falk, 479
F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (failing to have draft cards); United States v. Steele,
461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusing to answer census questions).
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to determine whether the prosecutor's choice of the defendant was made
solely or even principally on the impermissible basis, or was generated
by nondiscriminatory law enforcement objectives.
The difficulty in determining whether the prosecutor's intent was
impermissible arises because, unlike the conscious use of race or ethnicity, the purposeful selection of a highly vocal and visible violator may
further legitimate prosecutorial needs and objectives. These include the
relative ease with which the case against the defendant can be
proved, 8 the flagrance or egregiousness of the defendant's violation,:""
the defendant's prominence or visibility in the community, 8 8 and the
need for a test case to clarify the reach or application of an uncertain
law. 38 9 Put simply, a prosecutor may select a vocal protester for prosecution because the very activities which give rise to her first amendment
claim also render her a highly visible, flagrant violator whose culpable
mens rea *, easily proved. Because of this mesh between first amendment activity opposing a law and the legitimate objective of the law's
enforcement, it is difficult to condemn a prosecutor's conscious use of a
defendant's demonstrative opposition to a law as a factor in the defendant's selection for prosecution. To disallow such selection on first
amendment grounds would effectively immunize the most conspicuous
offenders from prosecution.
The third situation in which a claim of selective prosecution may
8I See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 612-13 (noting the cost effectiveness of prosecuting prominent offenders); United States v. Taylor, 693 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1982)
(government can consider whether potential defendants have made their participation
in illegal activity public); United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981)
(defendant selected based on ease of apprehension).
387 See, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding
that prosecutor can consider relative gravity of smuggling letters into prison); United
States v. Malizia, 437 F. Supp. 952, 954 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding defendant's flagrant contempt for the law a permissible consideration in prosecutorial selection), affd, 573
F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978).
388 See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (5th Cir.) (selective
prosecution of leaders of illegal strike permissible), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983);
United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1136 n.14 (1st Cir. 1981) (deterrence rationale
legitimate absent evidence controverting government's interest in deterring prosecuted
activity); United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 867-68 (8th Cir. 1978) (defendant's
public assertion of personal privilege not to pay taxes is permissible basis for selection);
United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 944-45 (8th Cir. 1976) (same); United States v.
Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 86 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant's prominent position as attorney
giving tax advice is permissible basis in case of falsifying tax returns), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 1975) (same
for accountant for failure to file tax returns).
389 See, e.g., Cook v. City of Price, 566 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1977) (selective
enforcement is justified where no malicious intent shown and test cse needed to determine reach of statute) (quoting Mackay Tel. Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94, 100
(1919)).
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be premised on the exercise of first amendment rights arises when a
defendant is prosecuted under a statute unrelated to the expressive activity she claims triggered the prosecution."' 0 In this situation, first
amendment doctrine requires examination of the prosecutor's motives
in instituting the prosecution. 91 This is needed because unlike the two
previous situations in which the connection between the defendant's
first amendment activity and the charge against her is patent, inquiry
into the prosecutor's motive in bringing the charge is necessary to establish that this nexus exists. The establishment of this link, however,
can hardly be dispositive grounds for invalidating a prosecution. A defendant should not be immune from prosecution for any offense simply
because she engaged in noncriminal behavior that called the prosecutor's attention to her.

The problem is similar to that posed by the last category of selective prosecution claims, which are based on the prosecutor's personal
animosity towards the defendant. In these prosecutions, the issue is
whether a prosecutor "ought

. .

.to be obligated to forego prosecuting

a violator whom he believes to be guilty, merely because of some personal feeling or antagonism he has toward that violator." '9 2 Indeed, the
third category of first amendment cases and the personal animosity
prosecutions have much in common. Both are apt to involve prosecutions under statutes that are enforced not rarely, but with some regularity, and both involve personal antipathy towards the defendant. Consequently, it is not inappropriate to view this latter type of first
amendment case as a variety of personal animosity selective prosecution
claims.
Such selective prosecution claims raise general equal protection
390 See, e.g., United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (prosecution for making false statements on loan application brought because of defendant's
"whistleblowing" activities); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (prosecution for traffic violations brought because defendant protested police misconduct); Lenske v. United States, 383 F.2d 20, 27-30 (9th Cir. 1967) (separate opinion of Madden, J.) (prosecution for tax evasion and making false statements on a tax
return brought because the defendant was a communist and a leader of the Lawyer's
Guild); State v. Holloway, 460 A.2d 976 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (prosecution for state
tax evasion and filing false statements brought because defendant was a "controversial
political figure"); People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96
(1964) (prosecution for violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law brought because the
defendant exposed corrupt practices in the Department of Buildings).
"I See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 28487 (1977) (board declined to renew teacher's contract because of disruptive behavior
which included criticism of board); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-73
(1968) (same).

3M2 Note, Equal Protection Clause: Enforcement of a Constitutionally Valid Ordinance: Administrator'sMotive in Enforcing a Statute, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 309, 315

(1965).
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and due process concerns, the resolution of which does not require an
inquiry into prosecutorial intent. The disposition of general equal protection claims usually turns on the existence of a rational basis for the
government's action. This question is divorced from the government's
intent, and is capable of determination in the selective prosecution context by an objective examination of the evidence that triggered the prosecution. Similarly, due process analysis is generally concerned with the
adequacy of and adherence to available procedures rather than the intent of the government actor with respect to them. 9 Due process analysis would, therefore, resolve a challenge to the filing of charges by
examining whether constitutionally sufficient procedures were followed
by the prosecutor.
Because there is usually sufficient evidence to support institution
of the challenged charge, these analyses might seem to eliminate meaningful scrutiny of selective prosecution claims premised on the prosecutor's personal antipathy towards the defendant. This elimination, however, may not occur. A critical mechanism for preventing personally
vengeful prosecutions is the adoption and enforcement of effective disqualification requirements applicable to prosecutors. 94 In the absence
of compensating procedural devices such as meaningful administrative
review of charging decisions, a court, in an appropriate case, may find
that the absence of adequate disqualification procedures constitutes a
due process violation, thereby spurring prosecution offices to adopt
them. Alternatively, taking a cue from decisions that have held judicial
disqualification to be constitutionally required in certain instances, 9 5 a
court might itself formulate and apply disqualification requirements to
s See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
8" See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 528 (1982) (requiring Attorney General to "promulgate
rules and regulations which require the disqualification of any officer or employee of
the Department of Justice, including a United States Attorney or a member of such
attorney's staff, from participation in a particular investigation or prosecution if such
participation may result in a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest, or the
appearance thereof."); Standards of Conduct, 28 C.F.R. § 45.735 (1986) (setting forth
the disqualification rules promulgated by the Attorney General).
311
See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1586 (1986) (state
supreme court justice disqualified from case on unsettled issues when he had pending
lawsuit on same issues); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (finding that defendant's contemptuous conduct may color the court's judgment); In re Murchinson, 349
U.S. 133 (1955) (disqualifying judge who served as both grand jury and trial judge in
contempt case); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (disqualifying judges who
have "direct, personal and substantial interest" in convictions of defendants); cf. Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (optometry board disqualified from hearing complaint because it had filed a similar claim in state court and members had pecuniary
interest in case); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor disqualified in traffic case where revenues from the infractions were a substantial portion of
village funds).
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prosecutors under the due process clause.3 a6
The courts have been chary about selective prosecution claims premised on a prosecutor's personal animosity towards the defendant because the expansive array of prosecutorial motives that may be called
into question and the complex nature of their relationship to legitimate
law enforcement aims guarantee that attempts to determine whether
and when such motives may play a part in the decision to prosecute
will prove fruitless.3 97 Consequently, objective disqualification approaches are unlikely to diminish and may well increase the modicum
of protection afforded under current selective prosecution law.
B.

Vindictiveness in Charging

Despite the considerable confusion sown by casting the vindictiveness doctrine in terms of impermissible prosecutorial intent, the decisions have nevertheless resulted in several concrete guidelines concern398 See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967) (due process violated
where prosecutor was representing defendant's wife in divorce proceedings based on
same alleged assault).
'" To the extent that any guiding principles are discernible in this area, there are
three factors that appear important: the level of enforcement of the law the defendant is
charged with violating, the strength of the case against the defendant, and the particular vindictive reason for which the prosecutor wants to "get" the defendant. For example, the prosecution of a controversial cult leader for regularly enforced fire code violations would be less troubling than her prosecution for rarely enforced Sunday closing
provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973) (emphasizing rate of prosecution); Dear Wing v. United States, 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962) (no
vindictive purpose); State v. Holloway, 460 A.2d 976 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (emphasizing nonuniqueness of prosecution). Similarly, the institution of a prosecution likely
to yield political benefits to the prosecutor is far less objectionable where the evidence
clearly demonstrates the commission of a regularly prosecuted, serious offense than
where the supporting evidence is, at best, marginal. See Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d
113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972). Finally, while it might be acceptable for the government to pursue a known organized crime boss for minor, sporadically enforced tax infractions because the government's evidence against her on more
serious charges is weak or largely inadmissible, it would be far more troubling if such a
prosecution were initiated against an individual only because she insulted the prosecutor's husband. Cf United States v. Mangieri, 769 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (no
prejudice where "whistle blower" prosecuted for filing false loan application); United
States v. Bourque, 541 F.2d 290 (1st Cir. 1976) (commonly charged offense, no showing of vindictive purpose).
Of course, even if the three factors identified are controlling, the results they
should yield in any particular case may be unpredictable because of difficulties in determining not only the degree to which a particular motive is unacceptable, but whether
it is unacceptable at all. Compare Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the
ProsecutingAttorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1034-35 (1967) (prosecutions of Al Capone
and James Hoffa were examples of unacceptable charging motivated by defendant's
other misdeeds (Capone) or prosecutor's personal antipathy (Hoffa)) with Braun, Ethics in Criminal Cases: A Response, 55 GEo. L.J. 1048, 1056-57 (1967) (charges
against Capone (tax evasion) and Hoffa (mail fraud, among others) were nontrivial
and generally prosecuted, so defendants not immune because of prosecutor's motives).
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ing the doctrine's application. Bordenkircher permits the increase of
charges during plea bargaining; 98 Goodwin disfavors their increase
post-trial; 39 9 and Blackledge and Thigpen flatly ban their increase
when a defendant exercises her unconditional right to a de novo trial
after being convicted of minor offenses in a court of limited jurisdiction. 00 As a doctrinal matter, these guidelines fit far more comfortably
into the mainstream of due process analysis than does the vindictiveness
doctrine itself.
Other than in the vindictiveness area, due process is generally far
more concerned with whether acceptable procedures have been followed
in depriving an individual of "life, liberty, or property," than with
monitoring the intent of those following the procedures.40 1 Thus, in the
absence of the vindictiveness doctrine, a prosecutor's charging actions
would be immune from a due process attack so long as the prosecutor
followed proper and constitutionally adequate procedures in instituting
and prosecuting the increased charges. A prosecutor would not be immune from attack if her actions implicated interests that normal procedures, including submission of the charges to a grand jury40 2 and, at the
defendant's instance, proving them beyond a reasonable doubt before a
petit jury, were inadequate to protect. In effect, the vindictiveness doctrine is a mechanism for identifying and protecting such inadequately
protected interests. It is not, however, necessary that this mechanism
turn on the prosecutor's intent in bringing the increased charges.
The thrust of the vindictiveness doctrine is to identify those situations in which a prosecutor, despite the existence of adequate evidence,
may not increase the charges against a defendant in the wake of the
defendant's assertion of some right. The vindictiveness doctrine thus
functions much like the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.403 That
See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
40 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
401 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
402 See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 26, at § 15.4(a) ("Where the
prosecutor is acting vindictively, the grand jury should be able to recognize that motivation from the unjust nature of the charges presented.").
403 Indeed, the Court seemingly acknowledged the relevance of unconstitutional
conditions analysis to the vindictiveness area in North Carolinav. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 724 n.19 (1969), the first of the Court's vindictiveness decisions, and a number of
commentators have assumed that Pearce and its progeny represent a branch of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See McCoy & Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due
Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REv. 887, 906 (1980); Rubin, The Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction? A Critical Look at Maher v. Roe and
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 174 (1979); Note, Divergent
388
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doctrine holds that a state cannot condition the receipt of benefits upon
the forfeiture or nonassertion of fundamental constitutional rights, or
withhold -or'cancef benefits so that a recipient is penalized for exercising such rights, unless the state presents a sufficiently compelling justification "for doing so.4 *' Formulated along these lines,4 0 5 the vindictiveLower Court Standards, supra note 50, at 438-42.
' For discussidti of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see French, Unconstitu-

tiohal Conditions:'An'Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234 (1961); Merrill, Unconstitutional
Conditions,"77 U. PA. L. REV. 879 (1929); O'Neil, UnconstitutionalConditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
404 See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (rejecting state's contention that
patronage dismissals contribute to the proper functioning of the democratic process);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (rejecting durational requirements on voting
rights); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (rejecting durational requirements
for the receipt of welfare benefits); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (finding
requirement that state employees take an oath to support federal and state laws compelling); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (rejecting state's denial of workman's
compensation benefits to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday);
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (rejecting the
imposition of common carrier requirements on private carriers to protect the business of
common carriers).
The Court applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to criminal sanctions in
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), where the Court invalidated a provision
of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), which provided for the imposition of the death penalty only "if the verdict of the jury [should] so recommend." Because the statute provided no procedure for imposing the death penalty when a defendant pleaded guilty or was tried before a judge, the Court found that the statute effectively conditioned an avoidance of the death penalty on a defendant's waiver of his fifth
amendment right to plead not guilty and his sixth amendment right to a jury trial, and
held that the statute thereby created unconstitutional conditions which unnecessarily
penalized a defendant's exercise of these rights. The Court observed that if the statute
had "no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by
penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional." Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581.
405 It is the structure rather than the scope of unconstitutional conditions analysis
that could be utilized. A pure unconstitutional conditions analysis would be inapplicable to situations in which the increased charges followed the assertion of rights that are
not "fundamental." The-lower courts have applied the vindictiveness doctrine in a
number of situations in-which the right exercised could hardly be so characterized. See,
e.g., United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1978) (rights under the
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1976)); United States v. De Marco, 550 F.2d
1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir.) (venue rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(b) (1976)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977); United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1174-75 (4th Cir.
1976) (rights under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 concerning the acceptance of guilty pleas);
United States V".Velsicol Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255, 1261-66 (D.D.C. 1980)
(statutory 'right to plead nolo contendere).
However, one commentator has argued that although the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not technically apply where the prosecutor brings increased charges
after the assertion of such nonfundamental rights, the courts should nevertheless use
their supervisory powers to require an "intermediate" level of justification-less than a
compelling interest but more than a rational basis-from the prosecutor in such cases.

See Note, Divergent Lower Court Standards, supra note 50, at 457-58.
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ness doctrine need not focus on the prosecutor's motive in bringing the
increased charges. Instead, it would entail (1) identifying the procedural rights that are sufficiently important that their exercise should
bar the institution of increased charges absent adequate justification,
which is a process similar to that courts currently engage in to determine whether a "presumption" of vindictiveness is warranted, and (2)
specifying the justifications that will suffice to allow the filing of increased charges after such rights have been exercised. Although mired
in the unfortunate rubric of "presumptions" of vindictiveness, some
courts have effectively analyzed claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness in
this manner.40 8
This formulation does much to reconcile the two prosecutorial vindictiveness decisions at greatest tension: Blackledge and Bordenkircher.
406 For example, in In re Bower, 38 Cal. 3d 865, 700 P.2d 1269, 215 Cal. Rptr.

267 (1985), the defendant successfully requested a mistrial after one of the prosecutor's
witnesses revealed that the defendant was on parole at the time of the murder with
which defendant was charged. Prior to the mistrial declaration, the prosecutor and the
defense had entered into a stipulation that limited the defendant's liability to second
degree murder. Id. at 870, 700 P.2d at 1271, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 269. This stipulation
was spurred by the prosecutor's belief that the fatal shot was fired by a codefendant,
and not the defendant. On retrial, however, the prosecutor announced that this stipulation would not be renewed because a more thorough examination of the evidence between the mistrial and the retrial convinced him that the defendant had fired the fatal
shot. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and he challenged his conviction on vindictiveness grounds. The state defended the conviction on the basis of the
prosecutor's affidavit, in which he swore that it was his re-evaluation of the evidence
that caused his refusal to enter into the limiting stipulation on retrial. Id. at 878, 700
P.2d at 1278, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
The California Supreme Court found the state's justification for exposing the defendant to the more serious charge insufficient. After first confirming that a "presumption of vindictiveness" is warranted where a defendant is subjected to increased charges
on retrial after a mistrial declared at his behest, id. at 876-77, 700 P.2d at 1276-77,
215 Cal. Rptr. 273-74, the court noted that "[t]he People's argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the presumption of vindictiveness." Id. The
Court held that the existence of the presumption "is not based on the subjective state of
mind of the individual prosecutor" and, therefore, "cannot be rebutted by the prosecutor's declaration that he or she was motivated by a reassessment of the evidence against
the defendant rather than by any desire to punish the exercise of a protected right." Id.
at 879, 700 P.2d at 1277, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 275. Instead,
[i]n order to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness, the prosecution must
demonstrate that (1) the increase in charge was justified by some objective
change in circumstances or in the state of the evidence which legitimately
influenced the charging process and (2) that the new information could
not reasonably have been discovered at the time the prosecution exercised
its discretion to bring the original charge.

Id.
As In re Bower demonstrates, it is possible for courts to set objective standards
governing the circumstances under which increased charges may be brought against a
defendant in the wake of her exercise of various procedural rights. Such standards
could, as Bordenkircher and Goodwin suggest, take into account the timing of the
right's exercise.
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Both could be viewed as cases in which the prosecutor penalized the
defendant for insisting on his fundamental right to a jury trial, 407 and
the issue was whether such a penalty was adequately justified. 40 8 The
different results-a due process violation in Blackledge, but no constitutional infirmity in Bordenkircher-could then be explained as a determination by the Court that the state's need to engage in effective
plea bargaining, a justification proffered in Bordenkircher but not in
Blackledge,4 °9 was a sufficiently compelling interest 1 ° to justify upholding the filing of increased charges in the case in which that interest
was advanced.411
In addition, a formulation that turns on the objective justifications
for the increased charge is better suited than an intent-based analysis to
protecting all of the interests behind the vindictiveness doctrine.
Preventing actual retaliation against a defendant, which is the sole concern of an intent-based doctrine, may be one of those interests, but
there are at least two others. The first is ensuring that defendants are
not deterred from exercising their procedural rights. Although the tendency to discuss this interest in terms of the availability of an undefined
"presumption" of vindictiveness has left the strength of this interest in
various situations in a state of confusion, 1 2 the existence of the interest
has been explicitly recognized in a number of cases, including
Pearce,4 3 Blackledge,4 14 and Wasman.415 This interest must go beyond
a concern with actual vindictiveness; for prior to the assertion of a given
right a defendant ordinarily will not know whether her prosecutor is of
a mind to retaliate. What is important to a defendant planning her
defense is knowledge of the circumstances under which a prosecutor is
allowed to increase charges. Conditioning the permissibility of increased charges on the prosecutor's attitude towards what the defendant
has done to defend herself is too uncertain a restraint to ensure that
defendants will exercise their procedural rights intelligently. Instead,
4' The Court has held that the right to a jury trial in all cases in which the
potential prison sentence exceeds six months is fundamental. See Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
411 See Note, Divergent Lower Court Standards, supra note 50, at 439-42.
40" There was no indication in Blackledge that the prosecutor attempted to engage
the defendant in plea bargaining prior to obtaining the felony indictment after the defendant exercised his right to a trial de novo on the misdemeanor originally charged.
See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1974).
410 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-65, 372 (1978) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
411

See Note, Divergent Lower Court Standards,supra note 50, at 439-42.

41'

See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.

413

414
415

395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974).
468 U.S. 559, 574 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
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ascertainable guidelines are necessary.
Unfortunately, under the present intent-oriented analysis, the only
thing that is clear from "[t]he judicial history of decisions involving
. . .prosecutorial vindictiveness is . . .that it is a mistake to measure
cases in this area of the law against fixed gauges."416 In contrast, there
is reason to expect that an objectified analysis would ultimately result
in a system of guidelines clearly delineating the circumstances under
which a prosecutor could increase charges after the institution of a
prosecution. Such a development has largely occurred in the judicial
vindictiveness area, where the Court has objectified the rules of proof
governing a defendant's claim and, consequently, the situations in
which a harsher sentence after retrial is permissible. 1 '
The second interest served by the vindictiveness doctrine flows
from the fact that vindictiveness cases generally do not involve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the increased
charges. Thus, where a new charge is filed purely to retaliate and not,
for example, because of evidentiary developments subsequent to the initial filing of charges, it will necessarily be true that the "retaliatory"
charge could have been brought initially. If the new charge cannot be
brought after the initial charging instrument has been filed it must, at
least in part, be because the defendant has some cognizable interest in
proceeding on the charges as initially formulated. Although the source
of this interest has not been articulated, it may lie in a defendant's due
process need to have the charges against her settled so that she can
adequately prepare her defense. Whatever the strength of this interest,
the validity of its abrogation is best analyzed in terms of the objective
bases for the new charges, not the prosecutor's good or bad faith in
bringing them.
Finally, casting the vindictiveness doctrine in objective terms
416 United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1364 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984).
417 Under that scheme, the defendant must first show (a) that she received a more
severe sentence after retrial, and (b) that this sentence was imposed by the same judge
who presided over the defendant's first trial. See Texas v. McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 976,
979-80 & n.3 (1986); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33-35 (1973); Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972). If the defendant makes this showing, then the
prosecution must present evidence that the increased sentence was based on information
relevant to the defendant's culpability that was not presented at the first trial in either
the merits or sentencing phases. See McCullough, 106 S. Ct. at 980-81; Wasman v.
United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569-71 (1984). It is unclear whether this additional information must have been unavailable at the first trial. Compare Wasman, 468 U.S. at
569 (increased sentence justified on the basis of another conviction occurring after sentencing at the first trial but prior to sentencing on retrial) with McCullough, 106 S.Ct.
at 982 (increased sentence justified on the basis of testimony from two additional witnesses at the retrial, whose availability at the first trial was not discussed).
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would not disserve a concern with actual retaliation. Actual retaliation
is not a Pavlovian notion, dependent simply upon whether the increased
charge followed the assertion of some procedural right. Rather, actual
retaliation must be examined in light of the context in which it occurs.
For example, a prosecutor's institution of homicide charges against a
defendant immediately after the defendant's successful appeal of a conviction for assault would hardly be retaliatory if the assault victim died
only after the appeal. A conclusion that a charge increase is retaliatory
entails a judgment that there are no adequate reasons for it. Thus, in
determining the sufficiency of various considerations that might prompt
prosecutors to file increased charges, courts not only define the charging
context, but the concept of retaliation as well.
C. ProsecutorialMisconduct with the GrandJury
1. Abuse of Grand Jury Process
The grand jury, and derivatively the prosecutor, is granted subpoena power only to gather evidence to determine whether a crime has
been committed for which an indictment should be issued."1 8 Even
though the prohibition on abuse of grand jury process condemns the use
of grand jury subpoenas for an improper "purpose," there are three
doctrinal mechanisms available to ensure that the power is not misused,
only one of which turns on intent.419 First, as current doctrine dictates,
there may be an inquiry into the intention with which the power is
utilized in a particular case. Second, objective rules may be formulated
that prohibit the issuance or enforcement of grand jury subpoenas in
circumstances where they are likely to result in forbidden discovery.
Finally, mechanisms may be employed that render the use of the power
for improper purposes futile. For example, rules could limit the prosecutor's ability to use evidence gathered by the grand jury in contexts
other than the particular criminal proceeding to which the grand jury's
investigation pertains. 20
See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
Cf Amsterdam, supra note 263, at 434-38 (discussing mechanisms for
preventing misuses of evidence found in stop-and-frisk searches).
410 See, e.g., United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1958)
(Whittaker, J., concurring) (suggesting that the government's use of the grand jury to
gather evidence for civil matters may be discouraged through the use of a rule requiring
the sealing of grand jury proceedings that result in a finding of "no true bill" and court
permission for the disclosure of such proceedings to any party, including the government); see also United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 432 (1983) ("If prosecutors in a given case knew that their colleagues would be free to use the materials
generated by the grand jury for a civil case, they might be tempted to manipulate the
grand jury's powerful investigative tools to root out additional evidence useful in the
418
41

1987]

PROSECUTORIAL INTENT

Rules of the latter type are not only feasible, but are already in
existence. Although designed to promote the requirement of grand jury
secrecy rather than to prevent abuse of the grand jury's process, Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure carefully controls the
disclosure of evidence gathered by the grand jury, and goes far towards
eliminating the prospect that the grand jury will be used to gather evidence for civil purposes.4 21 Limitations on disclosure are not a complete
answer, however, for they do not address two important types of potential abuse of grand jury process: the use of grand jury subpoenas to
gather evidence for a pending criminal case and for harassment. In the
first, there is no opportunity to prevent disclosure once the evidence is
gathered so long as the prosecutors responsible for the issuance of the
subpoena are also responsible for the pending case. In the second, limiting the disclosure of the information gathered is of little consequence
because the vice lies in using the grand jury's process against those who
have no information to give.
Objective restraints on the circumstances in which grand jury subpoenas may be issued also appear inadequate to reach these types of
abuses. For example, a ban on the issuance of subpoenas to those already under indictment,422 or to individuals slated to appear as witnesses in pending trials,42 3 would no doubt inhibit the use of grand jury
process to obtain evidence in a pending criminal case; but it would also
civil suit, or even to start or continue a grand jury inquiry where no criminal prosecution seemed likely.").
421 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (no participant can disclose "matters occurring
before a grand jury" except to a government attorney for use in performing her duty or
other government personnel to aid in such performance); see, e.gSells Eng'g, 463 U.S.
418, 427 (1983) (limiting disclosure to those attorneys who conduct the criminal matters to which the materials pertain); United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983)
(party seeking disclosure must show particularized need for access to grand jury material that is directly related to some identifiable litigation); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 774 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring examination of a number of factors
including, inter alia, the threat to the integrity of the grand jury, before granting disclosure to government attorneys for civil use), rev'd sub nom. United States v. John Doe,
Inc. I, 107 S. Ct. 1656 (1987).
422 See, e.g., United States v. Doss, 563 F.2d 265, 278-79 (6th Cir. 1977) (en
banc) (finding substantial grand jury questioning of a secretly indicted defendant on the
subject of the indictment to be prosecutorial abuse). But see United States v. Zarattini,
552 F.2d 753, 757 (7th Cir.) (declining to find an abuse of grand jury process to call
defendant's brother, an unindicted coconspirator, before grand jury after it had returned indictment against defendant), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 942 (1977).
423 See, e.g., United States v. Star, 470 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding prosecutor's subpoena of witness before grand jury for purposes of pretrial discovery to be an
abuse of process, but finding admission of the testimony to be harmless error); cf
United States v. Sellaro, 514 F.2d 114, 121 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding no abuse of grand
jury process in subpoenaing witnesses to testify regarding activities of persons other
than the defendant, but "any collateral fruits from bona fide inquiries may be utilized
by the government"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975).
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cause major difficulties in conducting grand jury investigations, especially where ongoing or complex criminal activities are involved.42 4
Similarly, it is difficult to formulate objective rules to prevent a prosecutor from using the grand jury's process for harassment. Even the
most apparent case, where the prosecutor has subpoenas issued by one
grand jury after another to the same individual, seems impervious to
such regulation. As Professors LaFave and Israel have noted, a rule
barring the issuance of more than a fixed number of subpoenas to an
individual within a given period would be problematic:
The fact that the witness was called before a third grand
jury, after having twice previously refused to testify, may
suggest no more than a continuing need for the information
and a hope that he may have changed his mind. Similarly,
successive appearances required of a testifying witness may
evidence no more than an investigation that has moved from
one subject to another, all of which relate to the witness.4 25
The reluctance of the federal courts to impose objective limitations on
the circumstances under which subpoenas may issue thus appears justified. 421 Consequently, an intent-based proscription remains the only
practical means available to prevent use of the grand jury's process for
harassment or to gather evidence in a pending criminal case. Moreover,
the case for employing objectifying presumptions to demonstrate an impermissible motive seems unpersuasive. First, it is difficult to identify
generic situations that are sufficiently indicative of a prohibited motive
that a presumption of improper intent is warranted. Second, any justification that an objectifying presumption would compel would, because
of grand jury secrecy requirements, almost certainly be proffered by the
prosecutor in camera. Thus, the public explanation of the factors guiding the decision, one of the principal benefits of the use of such presumptions, would largely be lost.
2.

Misconduct in the Presentation of Evidence

Neither doctrine nor the nature of the right to indictment by grand
424 Such cases often require information from those unlikely to cooperate unless
indicted themselves, and the use of informants who may testify in a series of investigations and trials.
425 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 26, at § 8.8(f) (footnotes omitted).
428 This reticence stems from the wide latitude traditionally afforded the prosecutor and the grand jury in conducting investigations. See, e.g., Zarattini, 552 F.2d at
757; United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 250 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 147 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. George, 444 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1971).
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jury compels a concern with the prosecutor's motives. 2 7 Although a
review of all the ways in which a prosecutor may misbehave in presenting evidence to the grand jury is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to note that this is one area in which the courts appear less
inclined to adopt intent-based approaches to the problem of
prosecutorial impropriety. 28 In federal courts, however, Costello's ban
on examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support an indictment
has greatly inhibited courts from monitoring the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation to the grand jury, so that a coherent body of doctrine
regulating the prosecutor's grand jury advocacy has been slow to
evolve.' 2 9 Nevertheless, to the extent that the courts have been willing
to use their supervisory authority over the grand jury to circumvent
Costello, their sporadic forays into regulating the prosecutor's grand
jury presentation indicate that, despite its breadth, the area is susceptible to nonintent-based restraints. For example, some courts have placed
limits on the extent to which prosecutors may rely on hearsay in their
grand jury presentation, and have authorized the dismissal of indictments where those limits are exceeded.' 30 Others have prohibited
prosecutorial advocacy that amounts to testifying. 3 "
D.

The Prosecutor's Obligation to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence

The Court has insisted that the prosecutor's constitutional disclosure obligations do not turn on the "character" of the prosecutor. 3 2
4" This point receives support, if somewhat obliquely, from the grand jury discrimination cases. If prosecutorial intent were to matter in the context of challenges to
the integrity of the grand jury's screening process, arguably it should matter where the
challenges concern the composition of the grand jury; the most expedient way to negate
wholesale the grand jury's independent screening function is purposefully to manipulate the grand jury's membership to assure its receptivity to any prosecution biases. Yet,
although the existence vel non of a discriminatory purpose is generally the core concern
of challenges to governmental actions that disproportionately affect constitutionally cognizable groups, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-44 (1976), the government's motive in limiting the representation of such groups in the grand jury is not
central to challenges to the grand jury's composition, see e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 565-66 (1979); Washington, 426 U.S. at 241.
428 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
429 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Pastor, 419 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp.
310 (D. Conn. 1975).
431 See, e.g., United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Tex.
1978).
42 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).
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The use of intent-based analysis to enforce those obligations, which, the
Court's denials notwithstanding, present doctrine does, is thus not compelled by doctrinal considerations. There are three nonintent-based alternatives to enforcing these obligations.
First, courts could attempt to formulate rules that prescribe the
categories of evidence that the prosecutor must provide the defense,
such as witness statements or the results of tests performed on physical
evidence. Such attempts are bound to falter on congruence grounds.
Putting aside serious objections that the promulgation of such rules is a
legislative rather than judicial matter, rules cast in categorical terms
would require the disclosure of material that is not favorable to the
defense and, therefore, not constitutionally compelled.4 33 Indeed, such
rules would run directly counter to the Court's admonition that, unless
favorable evidence is involved, "the Due Process Clause has little to say
regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be
afforded."'"
A second nonintent-based framework for enforcing the prosecutor's
disclosure obligations could take at its word the Court's asserted concern with "the misconduct's effect on the trial" 3 5 and divorce the prosecutor's blameworthiness from the showing required concerning the
probable impact of the undisclosed evidence at trial. The same showing
would be necessary to make out a constitutional violation regardless of
whether the prosecutor's failure to reveal the evidence was knowing,
negligent, or even excusable. The prosecutor's obligation to disclose
favorable evidence would be triggered simply by the prosecutor's possession of the evidence."3 6
This approach has some surface appeal. In addition to its simplic"' See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (defendant has no
constitutional right to disclosure of unfavorable evidence); United States ex rel. Knights
v. Wolff, 713 F.2d 240, 246 (7th Cir.) (prosecutor's withholding of inculpatory statements of witnesses did not amount to a denial of due process), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1000 (1983); cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (suppression by the prosecutor of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment).
"" Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); see also United States v.
Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969) (refusing to find a violation of constitutional magnitude in a denial of discovery of unfavorable evidence).
', Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 n.10 (1982).
', This would not be true if the disclosure was pegged to the showing required
by a defendant when she seeks a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. In that
event, a defendant would have to make the same showing regardless of whether the
evidence was in the prosecutor's possession prior to trial, so that the prosecutor's possession of the evidence would have no special significance. Obviously, however, removing any significance from the fact that the evidence was in the prosecutor's possession
effectively nullifies a prosecutor's constitutional disclosure obligations. See Agurs, 427
U.S. at 111.
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ity, a framework that makes the focus of the prosecutor's disclosure
obligations the prosecutor's possession of favorable evidence rather than
her awareness of favorable evidence is likely to discourage some of the
prosecutorial gamesmanship that currently takes place' 8 7 and encourage
prosecutors to be more forthcoming; the prosecutor's ignorance of the
favorable quality of certain evidence would not suffice to justify its
nondisclosure.
The approach, however, raises substantial congruence concerns.
First, the lower the single standard of materiality which would apply to
all nondisclosures, the greater the likelihood that a disclosure model
driven solely by the prosecutor's possession of favorable evidence would
evolve from a duty designed to ensure the defendant a fair trial into a
general, constitutionally-based discovery obligation. A prosecutor's information about the defendant's theory of the case or the evidence the
defendant possesses will inevitably be incomplete. The prospect that
overlooking even marginally helpful evidence could result in the reversal of a defendant's conviction might well impel prosecutors to open
their files to the defense 8 or to seek pretrial judicial determinations 39
concerning their disclosure obligations, with respect to either particular
pieces of evidence or even an entire case file. 4" If, on the other hand,
the standard of materiality were set too high, a prosecutor would be
encouraged not to disclose evidence even if she was aware of its
favorable nature, on the ground that such evidence is not favorable
enough.
Second, regardless of the standard of materiality applied, a frame"" See, e.g., United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224, 1230-31 (3d Cir. 1985)
(noting prosecutorial gamesmanship, but finding that in light of United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985), prosecutor's failure to disclose information received from a
witness who had been granted use immunity did not warrant new trial), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986).
"I' See, e.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109 ("If everything that might influence a jury
must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty
would be to allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice."),
quoted in United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866 (1982).
"' In order to avoid revealing information that the prosecutor has no duty to
disclose, such review is necessarily in camera. It may or may not be ex parte, largely
depending upon whether it is the prosecutor or the defendant that requests the hearing.

See Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 391, 423
(1984).
440

Prosecutors only rarely request pretrial judicial examinations. See Capra,
supra note 439, at 423-24; 2 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 26, at § 19.5.
Presumably, the prosecutor's incentive to seek pretrial review stems from the greater
deference that an appellate court would give to a trial court's determination that the
disclosure of certain evidence was not required, rather than a prosecutor's determination of the same matter. See Capra, supra note 439, at 431-37.
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work that makes possession the linchpin of the prosecutor's disclosure
obligations is more susceptible to defense complaints concerning the
prosecutor's failure to gather evidence4 4' than is a framework keyed to
the prosecutor's appreciation of the favorable nature of evidence in its
possession. If a prosecutor must reveal favorable evidence because she
has it, she should not be able to skirt this obligation simply by declining
to get it. This logic seems persuasive, at least where the prosecutor departs from normal evidence gathering procedures 442 or refuses to pursue leads that appear helpful to the defense. To the extent that this
logic is convincing, adoption of a nonintent-based scheme governing required prosecutorial disclosures also raises the specter of imposing
added constitutional obligations to the prosecutor's evidence-gathering
activities.
The third nonintent-based approach to regulating disclosure obligations is to remove responsibility for making disclosure decisions from
the prosecutor. Professor Capra has argued that the only way to guarantee that defendants receive all evidence to which they are constitutionally entitled is to place disclosure determinations entirely in the
hands of the judiciary by requiring in camera, pretrial judicial review
of the prosecutor's file in every case. 43 Practical problems such as the
composition of the "file" and timing of the review aside, the extraordinary judicial time and resources required by this scheme pose enormous
obstacles to its implementation, especially in urban jurisdictions with
congested criminal dockets. Moreover, as Professor Capra recognizes,
because a judge reviewing a "file" can hardly be expected to be as familiar with the case as the lawyers litigating it, input by the prosecutor
and defense counsel would be necessary to ensure that judicial disclosure determinations are meaningfully informed. That input, however,
would create a new layer of adversarial proceedings in criminal
cases. 44 4 Placing disclosure determinations in the hands of the judiciary
441 See, e.g., Morgan v. Salamack, 735 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1984) (claiming prosecutor failed to recognize false statements made by the state's principal witness at trial);
United States v. Hutcher, 622 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir.) (attacking the thoroughness of the
prosecutor's pretrial investigation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875 (1980).
442 In cases challenging the government's loss or destruction of evidence, the Court
has placed considerable importance on the regularity of the procedures that led to the
loss or destruction. The greater the extent to which the challenged procedure is normal
and regularly followed, the less likely its utilization in a particular case will violate due
process. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984) (police procedure
of destroying breath samples of suspected drunk drivers); United States v. Augenblick,
393 U.S. 348, 355-56 (1969) (routine destruction of interrogation tapes by the military); Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961) (FBI procedure of destroying
notes made during witness interviews).
44' Capra, supra note 439, at 421-48.

444

See id. at 428-30, 438-40.
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may well promote greater compliance with constitutional dictates and
avoid a concern with prosecutorial intent but it does so only by working
a major structural change in the process of criminal adjudication.
Thus, the present intent-driven scheme may well be justified because nonintent-based schemes are either impractical or substantially
alter the shape of the adversary or adjudicatory process.
E. The Prosecutor'sDiscriminatory Use
of Peremptory Challenges
Given Batson's concern with racial discrimination and the equal
protection basis of the decision, strong doctrinal imperatives dictate a
focus on prosecutorial intent.445 Nevertheless, several considerations undermine the inevitability of a concern with intent in this area. First, in
making the discriminatory intent of a prosecutor exercising peremptories in a particular case a matter of constitutional concern, Batson
marked "'an explicit and substantial break with prior precedent' because it 'overruled [a] portion of Swain.' ",446 Swain cabined the prosecutor's use of peremptories only if they were systematically used as a
vehicle to keep blacks off all juries.447 Second, although it is true that
race-based equal protection claims almost always turn on invidious intent, jury selection is the one area in which an intent showing is not
clearly required.44 Indeed, Washington v. Davis itself indicated that
the jury selection cases were different.4 49 Finally, there was no need to
"' Equal protection jurisprudence, especially in the racial discrimination area,
evinces a well recognized concern for intent. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (requiring proof of racially discriminatory intent of housing authorities in order to show an equal protection violation);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (calling for proof of racially discriminatory purpose in hiring to support an equal protection claim); see also Baker, Out-

come Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection,
131 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 972-84 (1983) (equal protection analysis should focus on the
objective, contextual purposes of laws).
446 Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708, 715 (1987) (holding Batson applicable to
cases pending on direct review) (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878, 2880 (1986)
(per curiam) (holding Batson does not apply retroactively to cases on federal habeas
review)).
4"1 See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977) (requiring only a
statistical showing of underrepresentation of a distinct class in order to make out a
prima facie equal protection violation); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-32
(1972) (stating that a statistical showing of underrepresentation combined with selection procedures that are not racially neutral demonstrates a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination); Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a DiscriminatoryPurpose:
Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 334, 351-54 (1986).
1 ,"See Washington, 426 U.S. at 241 (1976) (distinguishing jury selection cases on
the basis of the presumption of discriminatory intent that may be made with proof of
systematic exclusion of a particular group from juries).
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decide Batson under the equal protection clause at all. Batson did not
raise an equal protection challenge to his conviction; rather, he challenged it only under the sixth amendment's fair cross section guarantee. 450 That guarantee, which was the basis for a number of post-Swain
decisions allowing defendants to challenge the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in a particular case,45 1 does not require a showing of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor.45 2
Thus, the approach the Court took in Batson to combat prosecutors' indiscriminate use of peremptories to strike black jurors in cases
involving black defendants was not doctrinally inescapable. The question remains whether there are any doctrinally sound, nonintent-based
alternatives that the Court could have employed. The most obvious is a
rule requiring some level of racial balance on all petit juries hearing
cases against black defendants. Such a rule, however, would conflict
with the longstanding principle that "[diefendants are not entitled to a
jury of any particular composition.'

4 53

The Court, however, could have

utilized two other nonintent-based approaches. First, the Court might
have followed Justice Marshall's suggestion in Batson and banned the
use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases, at least by the prosecutor. 454 As a doctrinal matter, this result could have been achieved under

the sixth amendment's fair cross section guarantee without the need to
rely upon the existence of purposeful discrimination on the part of the
See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1716 n.4 (1986); id. at 1729-30
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1731-34 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This may well have
been because Batson assumed that any equal protection challenge would be unavailing
in light of Swain.
451 See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984),
vacated and
remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3289 (1986) (in light of Batson); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3339 (1986); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979).
"" See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979) (In contrast to equal
protection challenges to jury selection and composition in which discriminatory purpose
is an essential element of the violation, "in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases,
systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's interest
in a jury chosen from a fair community cross section. The only question is whether
there is adequate justification for this infringement."); id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The difference [between jury challenges based on the equal protection clause
and those based on the sixth amendment] apparently lies in the fact, among others, that
under equal protection analysis prima facie challenges are rebuttable by proof of absence of intent to discriminate, while under Sixth Amendment analysis intent is irrelevant, but the State may show 'adequate justification' for the disproportionate representation of the classes being compared.").
"I' Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); see Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261, 288-89 (1947) ("The defendant's right is a neutral jury. He has no constitutional right to friends on the jury.").
'I See Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1728-29 (Marshall, J., concurring).
40
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prosecutor.4 55 It is true that the sixth amendment's cross- section guarantee had previously been held applicable only to the selection of the
venire, the larger pool of jurors from which the petit jury is chosen, and
not to the composition of the petit jury itself. 5 " Nevertheless, it would
have been a modest extension of the cross section guarantee, and arguably less of a break with precedent than Batson's repudiation of Swain,
to hold, as had a number of state and federal courts, 457 that while "the
Sixth Amendment does not require any action to ensure that the representative character of the venire be carried over to the petit jury...
the Amendment simply prohibits the state's systematic elimination of
the possibility of such a carry-over."45 Because the peremptory challenge was readily and frequently used against blacks to prevent this
desired carry-over, 5 9 its elimination would be justified unless its retention served a "significant state interest."'O
The most obvious such interest would be the peremptory's role in
ensuring an impartial jury for the prosecution as well as for the defense."6" The fact that the peremptory has never been found constitu46 2
tionally necessary to preserve a defendant's right to an impartial jury
deflates this interest considerably, although it would. not be without
some substance if the defendant's right to exercise peremptories were
preserved intact. It could be argued, however, that even the state's interest in preserving some parity in its ability to strike hostile jurors is
insufficient to justify the continued availability of peremptories to the
prosecutor. As a practical matter, the availability of peremptories is almost certainly more important to a criminal defendant than to the prosSee supra notes 450-52 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (1986); Duren, 439 U.S.
at 363-64 & n.20; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
417 See supra note 451.
4"1 McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1129 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (extending the cross section guarantee to even a valid
venire because the group called for the petit jury was so small as to limit the possibility
that a fair cross section might be called)), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3289
(1986) (in light of Batson).
"" See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1726-27 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (cataloging cases that compiled figures showing the pervasiveness of the
practice); Note, McCray v. Abrams: An End to the Abuse of the Peremptory Challenge?, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 603, 616 n.66 (1985) (providing statistical studies evidencing the systematic exclusion of minorities from juries).
460 Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68; see Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1360, 1374-76 (1985) (advocating preservation of the peremptory challenge cleansed of its discriminatory predilections because it
serves the important purpose of removing partial jurors).
461 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (noting that one.of the functions of the peremptory challenge is "to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides").
462 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
455
456
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ecutor. This fact is implicitly recognized in the common practice of
granting defendants a greater number of peremptories than prosecutors.463 Studies show that 25% to 30% of the members of the federal
and state jury pools believe a defendant is probably guilty once indicted, 4 " while only 5% have animosity toward the government.46 5
Moreover, given the prosecutor's position as representative of the state,
it may well be appropriate to deny the prosecutor the ability to strike
jurors not sufficiently biased to be struck for cause, while preserving
that opportunity for defendants whose stake in the criminal trial is far
more personal and substantial. 6 6
It is thus possible to construct a reasonable argument for the elimination of the prosecutor's peremptories under the sixth amendment's
cross section guarantee. 6 7 The result, however, smacks too much of
"throwing the baby out with the bath water," and raises obvious congruence concerns. Although the Court did not define the constitutional
interest at stake in Batson with precision, it is indisputably tied to
eliminating race as a factor in jury selection. A defendant does not have
a cognizable interest in preventing prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges for other reasons. Thus, unless there are no workable
mechanisms, intent-based or otherwise, for preventing prosecutors from
exercising their peremptories on the basis of race, the complete elimination of the prosecutor's peremptories is unwarranted.
The second nonintent-based alternative that the Court could have
utilized is less drastic. Under equal protection and sixth amendment
principles, the Court might have rationalized the process by which
prosecutors exercise their peremptory challenges. More specifically, the
Court could have barred the prosecutor's use of peremptories against
minority jurors who, during voir dire, satisfactorily answer a group of
questions, agreed upon prior to jury selection by counsel and the trial
judge, designed to test (a) any inclination a prospective minority juror
"'
For example, Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure grants
the defendant 10 peremptories in a felony trial but allows the government only six.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
4" See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 254 (1977) (containing supplemental data submitted by Jay
Schulman, Coordinator, National Jury Project, entitled Studies of Federal and State
ProspectiveJurors' Tendency to Equate an Indictment With Probable Guilt).
465 Id. at 4 (testimony of Jay Schulman, Coordinator, National Jury Project).
"6 See Note, supra note 239, at 1787.
467 A ban on the prosecutor's use of peremptories has been suggested by several

commentators. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECrION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT To REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 167 (1977); Brown, McGuire &

Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials:
Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192, 234 (1978).
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may have to favor the defendant because of their shared race, (b) any
feelings the prospective juror may have against the prosecution of members of her race for the crime charged, and (c) any other case-related
basis articulated by the prosecutor on which the prosecutor planned to
exercise peremptory challenges.46 8 Although the procedure does inject
the issue of race into the voir dire, the Court has recognized that questioning prospective jurors concerning their racial biases is constitutionally required in certain circumstances,4 6 and indeed, so held in a case
decided the same day as Batson.47 ° Moreover, a prosecutor who wanted
to avoid the insinuation of racial issues into the voir dire and the trial
could simply agree to omit questions in categories (a) and (b) from the
voir dire of prospective minority jurors, and still retain the right to
peremptorily strike minority jurors based on their unsatisfactory answers to questions in category (c). Under Batson, it may well be that
the only sure way for a prosecutor to avoid raising the specter of racial
bias during voir dire is to forego peremptorily challenging any minority
juror.
The suggested procedure has substantial benefits. It ensures the
existence of both an adequate basis for the exercise of peremptory
strikes against minority jurors and an adequate record of the reasons
for the strikes. It obviates the prospect of post hoc rationalization by the
prosecutor as well as the need for the judiciary to make awkward deter448 See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 136, 142 (7th Cir. 1985) (prosecutor was justified in striking all four black members of the venire because the crimes
with which the defendants were charged, wire fraud and submitting false statements to
a federally insured bank, revolved around a "complicated commercial transaction, and
the four blacks happened to have very little education or commercial experience"), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3338 (1986).
469 See Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1686-87 (1986) (when defendant is
charged with a capital crime and there is a "constitutionally significant likelihood that,
absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors would not be indifferent as they
stand unsworn"); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 192 (1981) (when
"requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and the
victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups"); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S.
589, 595 (1976) (when "an impermissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed by due
process is posed by a trial court's refusal to question prospective jurors specifically
about racial prejudice during voir dire"); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527
(1973) (when well-known, black civil rights activist being tried for possession of marihuana claimed racially motivated frame-up by police, "the essential fairness required
by the Due Process Clause" justified such questioning).
470 In Turner, the Court held that "a capital defendant accused of an interracial
crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias." 106 S. Ct. at 1688. Although handed down on the
same day, there is obviously some tension between Turner's recognition that, because of
their race, white jurors may be biased against a black defendant charged with killing a
white victim, see id. at 1687, and Batson's refusal to recognize that, because of their
race, black jurors may be biased in favor of such a defendant, see Batson v. Kentucky,

106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986).
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minations concerning the prosecutor's sincerity in justifying challenged
strikes. It is also likely to limit the range of reasons for which prosecutors might strike minority jurors, for in the relative calm before jury
selection begins, prosecutors are less likely to articulate, and judges are
less likely to accept, flimsy or idiosyncratic concerns as valid areas for
voir dire.
There are two possible objections to this scheme, one that raises
practical concerns and another that creates congruence problems. The
first is that the proposal will expand the scope of voir dire because, in
order to retain maximum latitude in their exercise of peremptories,
prosecutors will request voir dire into any and all conceivable bases
upon which they might strike a juror. There are several responses to
this objection. First, most prosecutors would use the procedure in good
faith and have little interest in needlessly extending the voir dire. Indeed, because defendants generally have more strikes,4 ' the defense is
likely to benefit more than the prosecution from an expanded voir dire,
a fact not likely to be lost on prosecutors. Second, judges obviously have
discretion to rule out areas of inquiry that are too remotely related to
the case. Finally, it is unclear that any increased amount of voir dire
under the suggested scheme would be much greater than that Batson is
apt to generate; for Batson gives prosecutors who desire to strike black
jurors an incentive to subject them to extensive voir dire in order to
unearth some reason that could justify the strike.
The second objection is that, although less egregiously than eliminating the prosecutor's peremptories entirely, the limits imposed on the
prosecutor's use of peremptories will bar their exercise in some instances where the defendant's interest does not require it. More specifically, the proposed scheme may prevent prosecutors from exercising
peremptories on intuitive bases that do not lend themselves to articulation prior to jury selection or substantiation during voir dire, such as a
juror's "anti-authoritarian personality." This type of challenge is so
likely to prompt objection, elude persuasive justification, and result in a
finding of discriminatory intent that prosecutors are apt to steer clear of
it under Batson. Thus, conceding that some range of constitutionally
permissible challenges will be denied the prosecutor under the proposed
nonintent-based scheme, it may not be markedly different from that
which results under Batson.
71

See supra note 463.
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F. The DoubleJeopardy Bar to Retrial
After a Mistrial Due to ProsecutorialMisconduct
There is little in the nature of the double jeopardy guarantee or in
double jeopardy doctrine that dictates a focus on prosecutorial intent.
The double jeopardy guarantee is principally designed to prevent a defendant from being tried or punished twice for the same crime. Double
jeopardy doctrine is, accordingly, concerned with delineating the situations in which a second trial or prosecution is permissible. The focus of
a double jeopardy inquiry thus tends to be objective: Did jeopardy attach during the first proceeding?" Is the second charge brought
against the defendant the "same offense" as the first crime for which
she was tried?47 3 Was the second prosecution instituted by a "separate
sovereign? ' 47 4 Was the trial judge's "dismissal" in the first trial "related to factual guilt or innocence? ' 47 5 Indeed, the fact that there is no
doctrinal imperative to make the resolution of double jeopardy claims
turn on the prosecutor's intent is demonstrated by the analysis applicable in situations where a mistrial is declared without the defendant's
request or consent. Such a situation differs from that of Oregon v. Kennedy47 6 only by the absence of the defendant's explicit acquiescence in
the mistrial declaration. There, the constitutionality of a retrial turns
on whether the mistrial was a "manifest necessity," 4 77 a question that
depends on an objective evaluation of the circumstances under which
.the mistrial was declared.
While the prosecutorial misbehavior that Kennedy
reaches-actions motivated by a desire to provoke a mistrial-presents
472 See, e.g., Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (whether retrial is barred
when conviction is based on weight of evidence); United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14,
15-16 (1976) (per curiam) (whether prosecution is barred when hung jury caused mistrial); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-94 (1975) (whether double jeopardy
clause bars an appeal by the state following a pretrial order dismissing an indictment).
47s See, e.g., Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1980) (inquiring whether
statute at issue required proof of fact that the statute under which defendant had been
convicted did not establish the "same offense"); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-69
(1977) (same); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1932) (same).
"" See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 106 S. Ct. 433, 437-39 (1985) (two states that
seek to prosecute a defendant are actually separate sovereigns); Waller v. Florida, 397
U.S. 387, 390-95 (1970) (ruling that a municipality and the state in which it is found
are separate sovereigns); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1959) (finding
that state and federal governments are separate sovereigns); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 128-29 (1959) (same).
471 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92, 94-95 (1978) (discussing
whether a dismissal followed by a government appeal would require further proceedings relating to factual guilt or innocence); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 36970 (1975) (same).
176 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
'7' See supra notes 285-90 and accompanying text.
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the type of prosecutorial trial activity most pristinely at odds with
double jeopardy values, it by no means represents the only instance in
which those values are implicated by a prosecutor's improper trial behavior. Indeed, there is much to be said for the notion that the double
jeopardy ramifications of a prosecutor's improprieties should be determined without any reference to the prosecutor's state of mind in engaging in them. To the extent that a defendant has a cognizable interest in
"a single, fair adjudication of his guilt or innocence,"4 ' that interest is
compromised no less by negligent or stupid prosecutorial behavior that
improperly and substantially threatens the jury's impartiality than by
behavior specifically intended by the prosecutor to undermine a fair
trial.4 9 From the defendant's standpoint, the detrimental effect on the
value of a verdict from the first tribunal sworn to decide her case is the
same.
The adoption of an intent-based standard that very few defendants
will be able to meet when seeking to bar retrial in the wake of a mistrial is likely driven by a reluctance to immunize defendants from prosecution as a result of prosecutorial errors at trial.48 0 "[T]he defendant's
double jeopardy interests, however defined, do not go so far as to compel society to so mobilize its decisionmaking resources that it will be
prepared to assure the defendant a single proceeding free from harmful
governmental or judicial error."4 " That is why retrial is generally permitted after a reversal on appeal. It is possible, however, to formulate a
nonintent-based model for determining the permissibility of a retrial
following a defendant's successful mistrial motion that would both protect a defendant's interest in having her case decided by the first tribunal chosen to hear it, and avoid conferring a windfall immunity on the
defendant.
Such a model would take into account (1) the magnitude of the
misconduct and (2) the availability of alternative remedies. With respect to the first attribute, misconduct objected to by the defendant and
amounting to plain error would constitute a necessary threshold for any
47' Green v. United States, 451 U.S. 929, 931 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari).
479 Prior to Kennedy, several lower courts had recognized that grossly negligent
prosecutorial misconduct at trial could bar retrial after a defense request for a mistrial.
See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 140 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246, 1256 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Comment, The DoubleJeopardy
Clause and Mistrials Granted on Defendant's Motion: What Kind of Prosecutorial
Misconduct Precludes Reprosecution? 18 DuQ. L. REV. 103, 131-33 (1979).
480 See Note, Double Jeopardy: An Illusory Remedy for Governmental Overreaching at Trial, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 759, 772-73 (1980).
481 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971)
(Harlan, J., plurality
opinion).
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double jeopardy bar to retrial.48 2 Prosecutorial improprieties that
clearly tread on established constitutional rights such as the right to
remain silent are most apt to rise to this threshold.4 " However, highly
prejudicial errors of nonconstitutional proportions, such as the unauthorized introduction of clearly improper evidence of "other crimes"
committed by the defendant, might also reach this level. 4 '
The plain error requirement achieves several double jeopardy-related aims. Because plain errors must be sufficiently egregious to require reversal despite the defendant's failure to object to them at
trial, 4 5 conditioning the availability of double jeopardy relief on the
existence of error of such proportions ensures that a defendant will not
be immunized from further prosecution unless the prosecutor's behavior
renders reversal on appeal and a resulting second trial highly probable.
It also obviates the prospect that retrial will be barred because of
prosecutorial mistakes of a strategic or tactical nature.4 6 Finally, because plain errors are those that any competent prosecutor would know
are errors, the plain error requirement guarantees that retrial will be
barred only where there is a significant level of prosecutorial culpability in making the error.
With respect to the remedy requirement of the model, even if a
482 See Ponsoldt, supra note 293, at 98-99. The model is not framed to require
that the error actually constitute plain error, because such a determination technically
encompasses a finding that, viewed in the context of all of the evidence presented at
irial, the error to which the defendant did not object was, in fact, harmful. See United
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 n.14 (1985). In some mistrial situations, especially
those occurring before the close of the prosecutor's case, this determination would be
premature.
483 Although constitutional error is "not necessarily reversible error," United
States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1132 (7th Cir. 1985), constitutional error is reversible
error "unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)); see also 3A
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 856 (2d ed. 1982) (constitutional
errors are more easily noticed than less serious, nonconstitutional errors).
484 Because of the prejudicial capacity of "other crimes" evidence, jurisdictions
may have special procedures designed to give the defendant an opportunity to object to,
and obviate the need for, its introduction. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d
934, 938-42 (2d Cir. 1980). So long as she follows accepted procedures for introducing
the evidence, a prosecutor does not commit error of the magnitude of plain error simply
by offering "other crimes" evidence that the judge finds inadmissible. Where, however,
the prosecutor introduces "other crimes" evidence without following established procedures and without giving the defendant an adequate opportunity to object outside of the
jury's hearing, or introduces the evidence in the face of the judge's ruling to exclude it,
the introduction of the "other crimes" evidence may rise to the level of plain error.
485 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); 3A C. WRIGHT, supra note 483, at § 851.
488 To the extent that there are questions as to whether a prosecutor's misconduct
constitutes ordinary rather than plain error, factors such as prior warnings to the prosecutor by the trial judge and the prosecutor's request for clarifying rulings could be
taken into account. See United States v. Roberts, 640 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Norris, J., dissenting).
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prosecutor's misconduct rises to the level of plain error, retrial would
be barred only if the defendant could carry the burden of persuading
the court that the misconduct cannot be remedied by devices short of a
mistrial, such as curative instructions, the striking of testimony, or the
exclusion of evidence.48 7 Placing the burden on the defendant to persuade the court488 that curative alternatives to a mistrial would be unavailing helps ensure the propriety of the mistrial declaration and ensures against windfall immunization. It also furthers double jeopardy
values. The less certain that remedies short of a mistrial would be inefficacious, the more likely that the defendant's election to abort the trial
by requesting or consenting to a mistrial is a meaningful decision that
vindicates her double jeopardy interests.
The fact that a prosecutorial error is sufficiently serious to amount
to plain error if not objected to does not mean that the error is incapable of rectification if a timely challenge is made at trial. 4 9 For example, an instruction emphasizing the importance of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination coupled with an admonition to the
prosecutor in front of the jury generally should suffice to remedy any
harm caused by a prosecutor's allusion to a defendant's failure to testify. Some such errors, however, may not be rectifiable. For example, in
a situation where the defendant's guilt turns on the particulars of a
transaction witnessed only by the defendant and the prosecutor's key
witness and the prosecutor indicates that the defendant's failure to testify and refute the witness's account confirms the credibility of the witness and the validity of the prosecutor's case, it may be impossible to
remedy the effects of the prosecutor's allusion to the defendant's failure
to take the stand.
487 See, e.g., United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246, 1258 n.22 (5th Cir. 1976)
(finding that the harm caused by the prosecutor's misconduct to be so pervasive that it
could not be cured by any jury instructions). Indeed, the fact that the prosecutorial
error may be remedied by other curative mechanisms is itself a sufficient reason to deny

the request for a mistrial. See II A. AMSTERDAM,

TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE

§ 420 (1984).
48 The use of the word "persuade" is deliberate. The efficacy of curative devices
rests on their predicted effect on the jury. Yet the jury cannot be asked directly how it
would react to various remedial options. Thus, although courts are occasionally willing
to make blanket judgments as to the potency of certain curative devices, see Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968) (holding that instructions to jury to disregard incriminating extrajudicial statements were insufficient to prevent the jury from
considering such evidence), presentations concerning the effectiveness of remedial alternatives to a mistrial usually take the form of arguments from facts already presented at
trial, rather than the presentation of additional facts bearing directly on the effectiveness of other remedies.
489 This is why a plain error by the prosecutor that is unchallenged at trial should
not bar retrial, even though under plain error principles, the error requires reversal of
the defendant's conviction.
OF CRIMINAL CASES

1987]

PROSECUTORIAL INTENT

1475

After hearing the prosecution and defense presentations concerning
alternative means of correcting the prosecutorial error, a court may
make one of three possible determinations. First, the court may make
an affirmative finding that other remedial alternatives would rectify the
error, in which case the mistrial should be denied. Second, the court
may find that, although the defense has not carried its burden of persuasion, it has made a showing that there is some prospect of taint. In
this instance, the court may grant the defendant the option of proceeding with the trial or opting for a mistrial, with the express condition
that a retrial is permissible. Because the defendant has not convincingly
demonstrated that the trial is infected beyond repair, allowing her the
choice of continuing with it or starting another gives full play to the
defendant's interest in "retain[ing] primary control over the course to
be followed in the event of such error.1 490 Finally, the court may find
that the defense has carried its burden of persuasion on the question of
alternative remedies, so that the mistrial should be granted and retrial
barred.4 91
A nonintent-based approach like the one proposed would spur the
creation of more concrete rules governing impermissible prosecutorial
practices at trial. It would generate a corpus juris delineating which
errors are sufficiently severe to amount to plain error. The proposed
scheme, moreover, would produce more visible decisions concerning the
effectiveness of curative alternatives to a mistrial. This increased visibility would hopefully prompt more systematic study of the efficacy of
remedies such as curative instructions. Even if such study were not initiated, such decisions would nevertheless promote greater rationality
and consistency in the application of procedures to remedy
490 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982) (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976)).
491 Appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny a mistrial or to allow a
retrial after a mistrial should be deferential because of the factual nature of the trial
court's decision. Such review would take one of two forms. First, if a mistrial is granted
but retrial is allowed, the appellate court would review the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds. See Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479-80
(1971); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-89 (1957). If the appellate court
determines that it was error to permit retrial, it may correct the error simply by reversing the trial court and barring retrial. Second, if a mistrial is denied, appellate review
will focus on the defendant's conviction. Where the appellate court finds that the trial
court erred in not granting a mistrial and barring reprosecution, it is not sufficient
simply to reverse the defendant's conviction. Reprosecution should be barred in this
instance as well, even though the defendant has received a verdict from the first tribunal empaneled to hear her case. Not only would it be anomalous to put the defendant
in a worse position because of the trial court's error, but compelling a defendant to
undergo a second, unnecessary trial is one of the harms that the double jeopardy clause
seeks to prevent. See supra note 303.
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prosecutorial error.
CONCLUSION

The current corpus juris challenging the constitutionality of
prosecutorial behavior is characterized by an unexplained, unsystematic
focus on the prosecutor's intent. This preference for an intent-based
analysis inheres in examinations of prosecutorial behavior throughout
the criminal process, from the filing of charges to the completion of the
trial and afterward. It is evident through a cross section of prosecutorial
actions, including selective prosecution, prosecutorial vindictiveness in
charging, abuse of the grand jury process, the prosecutor's duty to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor's use of
discriminatory peremptory challenges, and the double jeopardy bar to
retrial. Only challenges to the prosecutor's grand jury presentation have
resisted this mode of constitutional analysis.
This preference has created a number of difficulties for defendants
who intend to exercise various constitutional guarantees. The intent focus has also created systemic costs not offset by the systemic benefits it
generates. Consequently, the case for using intent-based analysis to define a prosecutor's constitutional obligations is largely a residual one,
dependent upon the unavailability of realistic, nonintent-based alternatives that protect the constitutional interest at stake in a reasonably precise way. Simply put, objective restraints should be utilized unless they
are not feasible, either for doctrinal or practical reasons, and these reasons should be examined critically. In effect, the current preference for
intent-based constitutional regulation of prosecutorial behavior should
be reversed.
A preliminary inquiry indicates that in a number of areas in
which courts have reflexively couched constitutional restraints in terms
of prosecutorial intent, there are doctrinally sound alternatives that do
not turn on the prosecutor's thoughts. This is true of selective prosecution claims other than those based on race, claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness in charging, challenges to a prosecutor's discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges, and double jeopardy claims based on
prosecutorial misconduct at trial. Nevertheless, certain challenges to
prosecutorial behavior, including some claims of abuse of grand jury
process and race-based selective prosecution claims, apparently require
an inquiry into the prosecutor's motivation. In the latter instance, however, the drawbacks of intent-based analysis can be substantially ameliorated through the use of objectifying presumptions.
There is an irony in the constitutional regulation of prosecutorial
behavior. It is the enormous power prosecutors wield that likely drives
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judicial concern over their intentions and motives; for their purity of
heart is fervently to be wished. It is, however, precisely because prosecutors wield so much power that the restraints which limit exercise of
that power must be more discernable and objective.

